WTO框架下跨协议报复机制研究
发布时间：2019-05-24 04:17
【摘要】：作为世界贸易组织（the World Trade Organization，下文简称“WTO”）乌拉圭回合多边贸易谈判的成果之一，跨协议报复机制被首次明确地引入WTO争端解决机制。在谈判之初，以美国为首的发达国家为在WTO所有成员范围内对知识产权建立起最低保护限度的国际协定，主张引入跨协议报复机制以迫使发展中国家履行保护知识产权的义务。但WTO的实践证明跨协议报复机制已然成为发展中国家迫使发达国家履行争端解决机构(Dispute Settlement Body,下文简称“DSB”)裁决或建议的有力武器。 迄今为止，WTO关于跨协议报复授的判例仅有三例：厄瓜多尔诉欧共体香蕉案、安提瓜诉美国博彩案和巴西诉美国棉花案。这些案件的共性在于：均是授权发展中国家对发达国家实施跨协议报复；均是针对货物贸易或服务贸易的争端授权发展中国家在知识产权领域实施报复；获得报复授权的发展中国家无一例外地没有真正意义上实施报复措施，反而将其作为谈判筹码；在DSB做出跨协议报复授权后，作为败诉方的发达国家均一改借故拖延不履行DSB裁决的态度，积极协商促成争端解决的方案。显然，跨协议报复机制是发展中国家的可用武器，同时发展中国家惧怕实施跨协议报复措施的顾虑暴露出跨协议报复机制的缺陷，，如跨协议报复机制本身存在的制度缺陷，发展中国家经济实力等客观因素。故，本文在梳理跨协议报复机制的形成过程、发展现状、适用条件、原则和程序的基础上，结合判例，剖析跨协议报复机制的缺陷和困境，力求为发展中国家如何运用好跨协议报复这把双刃剑提供合理可行的法律建议。 本文分为五部分： 第一部分采用历史分析的方法，梳理跨协议报复机制的形成过程和发展状况。对WTO关于跨协议报复授权三个判例进行了研究和评论。 第二部分采用文本分析的方法，结合《关于争端解决规则和程序的谅解》（TheDispute Settlement Understanding下文简称“DSU”）第22.3条条文的规定，分析跨协议报复机制的内容和适用。指出跨协议报复机制的形式条件和实质条件，并结合案例重点分析了实质条件之“可行性”“有效性”和“情况足够严重”。指出DSU给发展中国家在知识产权领域适用报复措施留下了法律空间的同时并未就相关适用标准作出规定的缺陷，须在今后的判例中逐步完善，并尽早达成谈判合意。 第三部分主要采用实证分析的方法，结合DSB三个判例的裁决，具体论述了跨协议报复机制的缺陷和困境，即形式上的不公允性、实质条件审查标准的模糊性、知识产权领域内跨协议报复水平难以控制、发展中国家实施跨协议报复的高成本性等。 第四部分针对第三部分提出的困境，从制度层面提出对跨协议报复机制的完善建议。 第五部分从三个方面为发展中国家合理运用跨协议报复机制提出应对之策。明晰跨协议报复机制的利弊，跨协议报复机制在发展中国家具有可行性是首先应有的态度；合理选择相关知识产权种类进行报复是控制报复水平的可行之举；积极参与国际谈判，力求早日达成国际一致意见是最终归宿。
[Abstract]:As one of the outcomes of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism has been introduced into the WTO dispute settlement mechanism for the first time. At the beginning of the negotiations, the developed countries, led by the United States, established a minimum protection limit for intellectual property rights within the framework of all WTO members, and advocated the introduction of cross-protocol retaliation mechanisms to force developing countries to fulfil their obligations to protect intellectual property rights. But the practice of the WTO has proved that the cross-agreement retaliation mechanism has become a powerful weapon in the developing countries to force the developed countries to implement the decision or suggestion of the dispute settlement body (hereinafter referred to as" "DSB" "). To date, there are only three cases of the WTO's jurisprudence on cross-agreement retaliation: Ecuador v. European Community Bananas, Antigua and the United States, and Brazil v. American Cotton The commonalities of these cases are: the authorization of developing countries to implement cross-agreement reprisals against developed countries; and the implementation of the report of developing countries in the field of intellectual property in respect of disputes concerning trade in goods or services. Complex; the developing countries with the authorization of reprisals have no true sense of retaliatory measures in real sense; instead, they are used as bargaining chips; after the DSB makes cross-agreement retaliation, the developed countries, which are the losing party, have modified the state of non-compliance with the DSB decision A party that has contributed to the settlement of the dispute. It is clear that the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism is an available weapon for developing countries, while developing countries are afraid of the implementation of cross-protocol retaliation measures that expose the shortcomings of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, such as the institutional weaknesses inherent in the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, the economic strength of developing countries, and the like Therefore, on the basis of combing the formation process, development status, application conditions, principles and procedures of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, this paper analyzes the defects and difficulties of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism. To seek to provide reasonable and feasible legal construction for the double-edged sword for developing countries with good cross-protocol retaliation The article is divided into two parts: Part five: The first part uses the method of historical analysis to sort out the formation process of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism And the status of development. Three cases concerning the authorization of cross-agreement on cross-agreement in the WTO are given. The second part uses the method of text analysis to analyze the cross-protocol retaliation machine in conjunction with the provisions of the provisions of Article 22.3 of the Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures ("DSU") The content and application of the system. It is pointed out that the form of a cross-protocol retaliation mechanism The conditions and essential conditions, and in combination with the case, analyzed the feasibility of the substantial condition "validity and" the situation is serious enough ". It is pointed out that the DSU has left the legal space for the application of the retaliatory measures in the field of intellectual property, and has not applied the relevant applicable standards. To make the specified deficiency, it shall be gradually perfected in the case of the future, and shall be done as far as possible The third part mainly adopts the method of empirical analysis, in combination with the decision of the three cases of DSB, and discusses the defects and difficulties of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism. In other words, the unfairness in the form, the fuzziness of the substantive condition review standard, the difficulty in controlling the cross-protocol retaliation level in the intellectual property field, and the implementation of the cross-association in the developing countries On the nature of revenge. Part four. In the light of the dilemma of the third part, the cross-section is put forward from the system level. The fifth part puts forward the countermeasures for the rational use of cross-protocol retaliation mechanism in developing countries from three aspects To clear the advantages and disadvantages of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, the feasibility of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism in developing countries is the first to be given first; the rational choice of the types of relevant intellectual property is a feasible step towards the control of the level of retaliation; active participation in international negotiations and the pursuit of an early date
【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D996.1
本文编号：2484551
[Abstract]:As one of the outcomes of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism has been introduced into the WTO dispute settlement mechanism for the first time. At the beginning of the negotiations, the developed countries, led by the United States, established a minimum protection limit for intellectual property rights within the framework of all WTO members, and advocated the introduction of cross-protocol retaliation mechanisms to force developing countries to fulfil their obligations to protect intellectual property rights. But the practice of the WTO has proved that the cross-agreement retaliation mechanism has become a powerful weapon in the developing countries to force the developed countries to implement the decision or suggestion of the dispute settlement body (hereinafter referred to as" "DSB" "). To date, there are only three cases of the WTO's jurisprudence on cross-agreement retaliation: Ecuador v. European Community Bananas, Antigua and the United States, and Brazil v. American Cotton The commonalities of these cases are: the authorization of developing countries to implement cross-agreement reprisals against developed countries; and the implementation of the report of developing countries in the field of intellectual property in respect of disputes concerning trade in goods or services. Complex; the developing countries with the authorization of reprisals have no true sense of retaliatory measures in real sense; instead, they are used as bargaining chips; after the DSB makes cross-agreement retaliation, the developed countries, which are the losing party, have modified the state of non-compliance with the DSB decision A party that has contributed to the settlement of the dispute. It is clear that the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism is an available weapon for developing countries, while developing countries are afraid of the implementation of cross-protocol retaliation measures that expose the shortcomings of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, such as the institutional weaknesses inherent in the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, the economic strength of developing countries, and the like Therefore, on the basis of combing the formation process, development status, application conditions, principles and procedures of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, this paper analyzes the defects and difficulties of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism. To seek to provide reasonable and feasible legal construction for the double-edged sword for developing countries with good cross-protocol retaliation The article is divided into two parts: Part five: The first part uses the method of historical analysis to sort out the formation process of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism And the status of development. Three cases concerning the authorization of cross-agreement on cross-agreement in the WTO are given. The second part uses the method of text analysis to analyze the cross-protocol retaliation machine in conjunction with the provisions of the provisions of Article 22.3 of the Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures ("DSU") The content and application of the system. It is pointed out that the form of a cross-protocol retaliation mechanism The conditions and essential conditions, and in combination with the case, analyzed the feasibility of the substantial condition "validity and" the situation is serious enough ". It is pointed out that the DSU has left the legal space for the application of the retaliatory measures in the field of intellectual property, and has not applied the relevant applicable standards. To make the specified deficiency, it shall be gradually perfected in the case of the future, and shall be done as far as possible The third part mainly adopts the method of empirical analysis, in combination with the decision of the three cases of DSB, and discusses the defects and difficulties of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism. In other words, the unfairness in the form, the fuzziness of the substantive condition review standard, the difficulty in controlling the cross-protocol retaliation level in the intellectual property field, and the implementation of the cross-association in the developing countries On the nature of revenge. Part four. In the light of the dilemma of the third part, the cross-section is put forward from the system level. The fifth part puts forward the countermeasures for the rational use of cross-protocol retaliation mechanism in developing countries from three aspects To clear the advantages and disadvantages of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism, the feasibility of the cross-protocol retaliation mechanism in developing countries is the first to be given first; the rational choice of the types of relevant intellectual property is a feasible step towards the control of the level of retaliation; active participation in international negotiations and the pursuit of an early date
【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D996.1
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