股东申请解散公司案件法律问题研究

发布时间：2018-01-15 07:00

  本文关键词：股东申请解散公司案件法律问题研究　出处：《安徽大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

  更多相关文章： 司法解散 公司僵局 解散公司 股东利益

【摘要】：公司司法解散是与行政解散相对的另外一种强制解散制度,是指通过有权人提出解散之诉,由法院做出解散公司的判决,从而导致公司解散的后果①。对此,我国《公司法》第182条对该制度作出了规定,赋予了股东向法院申请解散公司的请求权。在此背景下,股东申请解散公司案件不断发生,而法院在处理此类案件也存在缺憾之处,这些缺憾包括:同类案件得不到相同处理、和解与调解结案率低、过于依赖解散手段等。通过对股东申请解散公司的案例进行对比分析,可以归纳出此类案件的共同争议焦点。争议焦点主要有三点:1、关于"公司经营管理是否遇到严重困难"的认定。该争议焦点的主要争议在于"严重困难"中的"严重"缺乏合理标准,笔者主张以是否发生公司僵局作为判断标准,主张只有发生公司僵局股东方可申请解散公司,单纯的股东压迫案件法院不应认定为公司经营管理出现严重困难;对于股东压迫与公司僵局的界限问题应根据股东单方实力和公司治理机制的关系进行综合考量。2、关于"公司继续存续是否会使股东利益受到重大损失"的判断。对于公司经营状况而言,最重要的就是公司未来预期。公司的未来预期虽大致确定,但也有改变可能。如果法院能运用调解手段尽可能的修复此类股东关系人合性裂缝,那么就可能降低公司成本,改善公司未来的预期,从而更好的保护股东利益。因此,调解是维护股东利益的有效途径,调解的方式上可以考虑做一些技术性的处理,以提高调解的成功率。3、关于应否解散公司问题。有学者认为解散公司是保护股东利益的重要措施,或是破解公司僵局的最彻底措施。这些看法既忽略了解散公司本身对股东利益的巨大破坏作用,也忽略了部分股东有可能从强制解散公司结果中不当获利的事实。因此仅仅解散公司而不作出针对原告与被告过错行为的惩罚是不够的。惩罚是保护弱势股东利益的需要,也是从根本上破解公司僵局的需要,具有惩罚性是司法解散制度的显著优势,司法主动查清股东的某些过错行为与节约司法资源两目标是可以兼容的。
[Abstract]:The judicial dissolution of the company and relative administrative dissolution in a compulsory dissolution system, refers to the right of the dissolution of the lawsuit, the court made the decision to dissolve the company, leading to the consequences of the dissolution of the company. In this regard, China's company law > 182nd < on the system of regulations, gives shareholders to apply to the court for the right to request the dissolution of the company. Under this background, the shareholders for company dissolution cases continue to occur, but the court in dealing with such cases has shortcomings, these deficiencies include: similar cases are not the same, reconciliation and mediation. The case rate is low, is too dependent on the dissolution method. Through the comparative analysis of the shareholders the application of company dissolution case, summarizes the common focus of controversy in such cases. The focus of controversy has three main points: 1. The identification of the company management is serious trouble ". The main focus of controversy To the dispute is "serious difficulties" in the "serious" lack of reasonable standards, the author advocates that whether the company deadlock as the judgment standard, argues that only the deadlocks shareholders may apply for dissolution of the company, the shareholder oppression court should not be recognized as the company management serious difficulties; boundary problem for company deadlock and oppression the.2 should be comprehensive consideration according to the relationship between shareholder unilateral strength and the mechanism of corporate governance, "the company continues to exist on whether it will be significant losses to the interests of shareholders" judgment. For the operation of the company, the most important is that the company's future expectations. The company's future expectations is roughly determined, but there may change if the court. Can the use of mediation means to repair relations with such shareholders may crack, so it is possible to reduce the cost of the company, improve the company's future expectations, from To better protect the interests of shareholders. Therefore, mediation is an effective way to protect the interests of the shareholders, mediation can be considered to do some processing technology, in order to improve the success rate of mediation in.3, on the question of the dissolution of the company. Some scholars believe that the dissolution of the company is an important measure to protect the interests of the shareholders, or is the most radical measures the company deadlock. Both these views ignore the dissolution of the company itself to the interests of shareholders of the huge damage, it also ignores the part of shareholders may result from improper compulsory disbandment of company profit facts. Therefore only the dissolution of the company and not made for the plaintiff and the defendant fault behavior is not enough punishment. The punishment is to protect the interests of vulnerable the shareholders, but also the need to fundamentally solve the company deadlock, which is a significant advantage of punitive system of judicial dissolution, the judicial initiative to identify some fault behavior of shareholders It is compatible with the two goal of saving judicial resources.

【学位授予单位】：安徽大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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本文编号：1427253