优先股股东与普通股股东的利益平衡研究

发布时间：2018-01-26 05:43

本文关键词： 优先股普通股利益失衡公司治理利益平衡　出处：《西南政法大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：优先股的引入对于资本市场和公司治理具有重要的意义。然而,从公司治理角度而言,其发行意味着公司将产生新的利益主体,如何平衡优先股股东与其它利益主体之间的利益将成为公司治理面临的新问题。有鉴于此,本文选取其中最为显著的问题,即优先股股东与普通股股东之间的利益平衡,作为文章研究的方向。全文将结合国内外现有优先股实践经验,在理论和实践两个层面探讨中国公司法语境下的优先股股东与普通股股东平衡机制,以期对我国关于优先股制度的构建和完善提出一些有益的建议。本文除导论和结束语外,分为五部分:第一部分——优先股的基本理论。优先股主要是指一种“优先于普通股股东分配公司利润和剩余财产,但参与公司决策管理等权利受到限制”的类别股份;性质上是一种融合了债之优点的公司股权资本;本质上是商事自治理念下股份权利自治性配置的结果。基于前述分析,优先股将具备在资本市场和公司治理两方面的独特商事价值。第二部分——优先股股东与普通股股东利益失衡的风险。我国长期围绕单一股份形式进行公司治理机制构建,优先股这种类别股权将对我国公司法传统理念和制度内容造成冲击。如果缺少利益平衡的制度设计,优先股的债权性约定和普通股的表决权优势将可能造成两类股东的利益失衡。从国内外现有实践分析,利益失衡可能出现在股利分配、股份回购、公司合并等情形下。第三部分——优先股股东与普通股股东利益失衡的成因。通过股权对比分析,以下两个理论视角有助于理解两类股东利益失衡的基本逻辑:其一,“异质化”理论。股权的差异化设计使得优先股股东与普通股股东之间呈现“异质化”特征,具体体现在利益取向、风险偏好以及股权权能三方面。其二,股东维度代理理论。优先股的参与性权利与经济性权利是非比例性配置的,这使得优先股股东与普通股股东间产生了实质代理问题。缺少制衡的控制权将使得两类股东间代理成本的提升,最终表现为股东间失衡。第四部分——优先股股东与普通股股东的利益平衡之道。利益失衡的形成源于股份权利义务的非合理配置。故在平衡优先股股东与普通股股东的利益过程中,须遵循以下基本路径:其一,优先股与普通股的法权制衡,包括合理配置优先股股权和制衡普通股权力两方面;其二,公司法信义义务的分层演进,包括董事信义义务和股东信义义务。第五部分——我国优先股股东与普通股股东的利益平衡。本部分将回归现实,首先将梳理中国优先股的发展历程和制度规范,进而从比较和制度功能的视角对相关平衡制度进行分析,同时相应地提出我国相关制度的完善之策。具体包括发行制度、表决权复活制度、分类表决制度、退出制度、信息披露制度、救济制度。
[Abstract]:The introduction of preferred stock is of great significance to the capital market and corporate governance. However, from the point of view of corporate governance, the issuance of preferred stock means that the company will produce new stakeholders. How to balance the interests between preferred shareholders and other stakeholders will become a new problem in corporate governance. That is, the balance of interests between preferred stock shareholders and common shareholders, as the direction of the article. The full text will be combined with the existing domestic and foreign preferred stock practice experience. This paper probes into the balance mechanism between preferred shareholders and common shareholders in the context of Chinese company law from the theoretical and practical aspects. In order to put forward some useful suggestions on the construction and perfection of preferred stock system in China. It is divided into five parts: the first part is the basic theory of preferred stock. Preferred stock mainly refers to a kind of "preferential distribution of company profits and surplus property over common shareholders." But participation in the company's decision-making management and other rights are restricted "the category of shares;" The nature of the company is a combination of the advantages of debt equity capital; In essence, it is the result of the allocation of stock right autonomy under the concept of commercial autonomy. Preferred stock will have unique commercial value in capital market and corporate governance. The second part is the risk of imbalance of interests between preferred stock shareholders and common shareholders. Our country has carried out corporate governance in the form of single shares for a long time. Mechanism construction. This kind of preferred shares will impact the traditional concept and system content of our company law, if there is a lack of institutional design of interest balance. The creditor's rights agreement of preferred stock and the voting advantage of common stock may cause the interest imbalance of two kinds of shareholders. From the analysis of the existing practice at home and abroad, the imbalance of interest may appear in dividend distribution and share repurchase. The third part is the cause of interest imbalance between preferred shareholders and common shareholders. The following two theoretical perspectives are helpful to understand the basic logic of the two types of shareholder interest imbalance: first. The theory of "heterogeneity". The difference design of stock right makes preferred shareholders and common shareholders present "heterogeneity", which is embodied in three aspects: interest orientation, risk preference and equity power. Shareholders' dimensional agency theory. The participation right and economic right of preferred stock are allocated non-proportionally. This makes the real agency problem between preferred shareholders and common shareholders. The lack of checks and balances of control will increase the cost of agency between the two types of shareholders. The ultimate manifestation is the imbalance between shareholders. 4th-the way to balance the interests of preferred shareholders and common shareholders. The formation of interest imbalance stems from the unreasonable allocation of rights and obligations of shares. Therefore, the balance between preferred shareholders and ordinary shareholders. The interests of shareholders in the process. We must follow the following basic paths: first, the balance of legal rights between preferred stock and common stock, including the rational allocation of preferred shares and checks and balances of common stock power; Second, the hierarchical evolution of company law fiduciary obligations, including directors' fiduciary obligations and shareholders' fiduciary obligations. Part 5th-the balance of interests between preferred shareholders and common shareholders in China. This part will return to reality. First of all, it will comb the development of Chinese preferred stock and institutional norms, and then from the perspective of comparative and institutional functions to analyze the relevant balance system. At the same time, the author puts forward the corresponding measures to improve the relevant systems of our country, including the issuing system, the resurrection of voting rights system, the classified voting system, the withdrawal system, the information disclosure system and the relief system.
【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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