分权制衡视角下的公司治理研究

发布时间：2018-02-24 17:02

本文关键词： 公司治理分权制衡权力划分人员独立机构分离　出处：《华中科技大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：科学合理的治理规范是公司正常运行和发展的有力保证,尽管我国当前实施的《公司法》在形式和内容上对公司内部不同的机构制定了具体的规范化运行机制,向分权制衡的治理模式迈出了坚实的一步,却仅有分权之名而无制衡之实。根据分权制衡的基本理论,分权应该以实现权力的划分、人员的独立和机构的分离为最终目标。其中,权力划分是实现权力制衡的首要前提和基础,人员独立是保障公司各利益主体间实现权力分离的必然要求,而机构分离则是公司内部各利益主体之间利益平衡的结果。所以,要在公司内部实现真正意义上的分权,必须要保证权力、人员和机构的有效分离。我国上市公司在公司治理中普遍呈现出分权而未制衡的现状,具有一股独大及存在控制链的显著特征。在立法上,我国《公司法》对股东大会与董事会之间的权力边界划分不清晰,将导致在公司实际运行中出现股东大会直接干预董事会的事务执行和董事会越权行使股东大会决策权的现象;董事会与经理之间的权力边界划分不清晰,势必会导致经理权限的扩大和董事会职权的相对限缩,影响公司日常事务的决策与执行;监事会与独立董事之间的权力边界划分不清晰,则会使公司已有的监督机制被进一步弱化,造成对部分权力主体的监视盲区。制衡应该在保证权力、人员和机构有效分离的基础上来实现,而我国公司各机关之间的制衡机制缺乏相关独立性,仅从表象上进行了权力的划分,虽然也设立了独立的监督机构和引入了独立董事,却并未实现真正的人员和机构的分立,制衡根本无法谈起。在人员的独立上,大股东利用自己拥有的强大权力在董事长或总经理等重要职务上选择“意中人”或者自己亲自上阵,通过人事任免权直接或间接的把持和操控了整个公司,而董事长与经理职位的兼任现象则会使公司经营者避开中小股东和其他利益主体的有力监督,导致大股东和经营者通过暗箱操作从上市公司攫取私利。在机构的分离上,股东大会的权力过大而又被大股东控制,可能沦为大股东控制公司的工具,董事会则成为了大股东谋取私利的业务执行部门。在这种权力现状下,公司的内部监控机制若完全依附于经营者,终将会因大股东的直接或间接干预而导致其失灵,监督权对经营权的制衡效果将微乎其微。本文从现代公司与现代国家的角度分析了分权制衡理论对公司治理的影响,并对西方国家公司治理中的权力制约机制进行了对比和利弊分析,最后,针对我国公司各机关分权制衡的现状和存在的问题提出了相应的完善措施,以期为我国公司治理中分权制衡机制的合理设定提供法律建议。
[Abstract]:A scientific and reasonable governance standard is a powerful guarantee for the normal operation and development of a company, although the Company Law currently in force in our country formulates a specific standardized operating mechanism for different organizations within the company in both form and content. A solid step has been taken towards the governance model of separation of powers and checks and balances, but only in the name of separation of powers without the reality of checks and balances. According to the basic theory of separation of powers and checks and balances, separation of powers should be realized. The ultimate goal is the independence of personnel and the separation of institutions, in which the division of power is the first prerequisite and foundation for the realization of power balance, and the independence of personnel is the necessary requirement to ensure the separation of power among the interests of the company. The separation of institutions is the result of the balance of interests among the various stakeholders within the company. Therefore, in order to achieve real decentralization within the company, power must be guaranteed. The effective separation of personnel and institutions. In corporate governance, listed companies in our country generally present the status quo of separation of powers without checks and balances, which has the characteristics of a dominant force and a chain of control. The division of the power boundary between the shareholders' meeting and the board of directors is not clear in the Company Law of our country, which will lead to the phenomenon that the shareholders' general meeting directly interferes with the affairs of the board of directors and the board of directors exercises the decision-making power of the shareholders' general meeting in the actual operation of the company. The division of the power boundary between the board of directors and the manager is not clear, which will inevitably lead to the expansion of the authority of the manager and the relative limitation of the authority of the board of directors, which will affect the decision-making and execution of the daily affairs of the company; If the demarcation of the power boundary between the board of supervisors and the independent director is not clear, the existing supervision mechanism of the company will be further weakened, resulting in a blind spot for the monitoring of some power subjects, and checks and balances should ensure the power. On the basis of the effective separation of personnel and institutions, the checks and balances between the various organs of the companies in our country are lack of relevant independence, and the powers are divided only from the appearance, although independent supervisory bodies and independent directors are also established. But there is no real separation of personnel and institutions, and checks and balances are simply impossible to talk about. In terms of the independence of personnel, Major shareholders use their powerful power to choose the "right person" for important positions, such as chairman or general manager, or take part in the battle themselves, directly or indirectly controlling and manipulating the entire company through the power of personnel appointment and removal. The co-appointment of the chairman of the board of directors and the manager will enable the company operators to avoid the strong supervision of the minority shareholders and other stakeholders, leading to the large shareholders and operators taking private profits from the listed companies through dark box operations. The power of the shareholders' general meeting is too large to be controlled by the large shareholders, and it may become a tool for the majority shareholders to control the company, while the board of directors becomes the business executive department of the major shareholders for their own gain. In this situation of power, If the company's internal monitoring mechanism is completely dependent on the operator, it will eventually fail because of the direct or indirect intervention of the major shareholders. This paper analyzes the influence of the theory of separation of powers of checks and balances on corporate governance from the perspective of modern companies and modern countries. In addition, the author compares the power restriction mechanism in the corporate governance of western countries and analyzes its advantages and disadvantages. Finally, the author puts forward the corresponding measures to improve the power restriction mechanism in China. In order to provide legal advice for the reasonable establishment of the mechanism of separation of powers and checks and balances in the corporate governance of our country.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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