我国反垄断法中的个人宽大制度构建研究

发布时间：2018-03-03 06:21

本文选题：宽大制度　切入点：个人宽大制度　出处：《安徽大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：自1978年美国开始实施宽大制度以来,反垄断法中的宽大制度就陆续被一些国家效仿。国际经验表明,宽大制度是一个重要的卡特尔调查工具,通过激励卡特尔违法行为人主动承认其犯罪行为、配合有关机关的调查,增加了检测和处罚卡特尔的机会。同时宽大制度使得证据可以通过速度更快、成本更低的方式取得,使其成为阻止和惩罚卡特尔最具成本效益的工具。为了进一步发现与打击卡特尔,1994年8月10日,美国在公司宽大制度的基础上公布了《个人宽大制度》,并明确规定这里的宽大仅指个人基于自己的利益不受损害而在公司申请宽大之前向有关机关申请的宽大,这一方法通过对垄断行为的源头施加法律责任,进而提高了发现与侦查卡特尔的效率。个人宽大制度的实施将提高垄断行为的发现率、确保个人在垄断组织的自主选择。随着市场经济的发展,反垄断工作成为目前中国反垄断执法机构的一项常态而又艰巨的任务。第一,实践证明越是加强对卡特尔的打击,其活动就越具有隐秘性,证据也愈发难以收集。目前的公司宽大制度下仅对公司处以罚款,没有触及个人利益的情况下,个人不会主动向反垄断执法机关"告密",使得宽大制度存在激励性不足的问题。第二,现有宽大制度容易给一些大型的跨国公司造成错误的印像,使他们认为如果公司积极申请宽大,即使交了罚款也值得,从而不利于打击潜在卡特尔。第三,近年来反垄断案件数量快速增长,案件的查处难度在增加,查处的时间也越来越长,现有宽恕制度下寄希望于公司申请宽大从而获得查处垄断行为的证据将严重降低垄断行为的查处效率。故个人宽大适度在我国有构建的必要性。串通招投标是最为人民熟悉的垄断行为之一,故我国在构建个人宽大制度时可以串通招投标为例,分析其如何适用个人宽大制度,形成典型,从而为以后垄断案件的处理起到示范的作用。为此,还要处理好以下关系:首先,正如串通招投标行为规定了刑事责任与行政责任一样,在立法中也只有对垄断行为既规定刑事责任又规定行政责任,才能增加垄断责任的威慑力,从而刺激个人宽大的申请。其次,在申请的实体条件方面要通过制订《关于垄断协议个人宽大适用的一般性条件和程序的指南》将个人宽大申请的主体条件、证据条件与合作程度等具体要求加以明确。再次,在申请的程序方面应明确规定个人宽大申请的受理机关、申请方式与实施方式,从而使得宽大待遇的给予方式及步骤更加详细、透明。最后,应营造一个良好的申请宽大的外部环境,一方面要注意与反垄断私人实施的协调,可以通过对垄断责任中的民事赔偿责任给予一定的减免来确保个人申请宽大的积极性,另一方面要通过完善行政复议与行政诉讼来确保反垄断法中的个人宽大申请的权利救济。
[Abstract]:Since the United States began to implement leniency in 1978, leniency in anti-monopoly laws has been followed by some countries. International experience shows that leniency is an important tool for cartel investigation. By encouraging cartel offenders to take the initiative to admit their criminal acts and to cooperate with investigations by the relevant authorities, opportunities for detecting and punishing cartels are increased. At the same time, lenient regimes enable evidence to be obtained in a faster and cheaper way. Making it the most cost-effective tool to deter and punish cartels. In order to further detect and combat cartels, in August 10th 1994, The United States published the "personal leniency regime" on the basis of the corporate leniency regime, and explicitly stipulated that leniency here refers only to leniency that individuals apply to the relevant authorities before the company applies for leniency on the grounds that their own interests are not harmed. This method increases the efficiency of cartel detection and investigation by imposing legal responsibility on the source of monopoly behavior. The implementation of individual leniency system will increase the detection rate of monopoly behavior. With the development of the market economy, antitrust work has become a normal and arduous task for China's anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies. First, practice has proved that the more the crackdown on cartels is strengthened, The more secretive its activities are, the more difficult it is to collect evidence. Under the current lenient system, companies are fined only, without touching their personal interests. Individuals will not take the initiative to "report" to antitrust law enforcement agencies, resulting in inadequate incentives for leniency regimes. Second, the existing leniency regime can easily give some large multinational corporations the wrong impression. It makes them think that if companies actively apply for leniency, even if they pay a fine, it is worth it, which is not conducive to cracking down on potential cartels. Third, the number of antitrust cases has increased rapidly in recent years, and the investigation of cases has become more difficult. The time for investigation and punishment is also getting longer and longer. Under the existing leniency system, it is hoped that the company will apply for leniency so as to obtain evidence of the investigation of monopoly behavior, which will seriously reduce the efficiency of the investigation of monopoly behavior. Therefore, it is necessary for individual leniency to be moderate in our country. Collusive bidding is the most important. For one of the people's familiar monopolies, Therefore, when constructing individual leniency system in our country, we can collude bidding for example, analyze how to apply individual leniency system and form a typical model, thus play an exemplary role in dealing with monopoly cases in the future. We should also deal with the following relations: first, just as collusive bidding acts stipulate criminal liability and administrative liability, in legislation, only by stipulating both criminal and administrative responsibilities for monopolistic acts can the deterrent power of monopoly liability be increased. In order to stimulate individual applications for leniency. Secondly, with regard to the substantive conditions of an application, the main conditions of an individual application for leniency should be determined through the "Guide on General conditions and procedures for the Application of individual leniency under Monopoly agreements". The conditions of evidence and the degree of cooperation should be clarified. Thirdly, the procedure for applying for leniency should be clearly defined as the organ that accepts the application for leniency, the mode of application and the mode of implementation. In order to make the way and steps of granting leniency more detailed and transparent. Finally, a good external environment for applications for leniency should be created. On the one hand, attention should be paid to coordination with private antitrust implementation. We can guarantee the enthusiasm of individual to apply for leniency by granting certain relief to civil liability in monopoly liability, on the other hand, we should ensure the right relief of individual leniency application in antitrust law by perfecting administrative reconsideration and administrative litigation.
【学位授予单位】：安徽大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D922.294

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