“华为诉互交数字案”的反垄断法分析

发布时间：2018-03-09 14:24

本文选题：标准必要专利　切入点：互交数字相关市场　出处：《西南政法大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2013年10月28日,广东省高院就“华为公司诉互交数字公司垄断案”作出终审判决,认定互交数字公司的行为违法,判决其向华为公司赔偿2千万元。作为我国首例就标准必要专利许可引发的纠纷,该判决一作出即引起了学界的高度关注。本文主要从反垄断法的视角,采取“提出问题——分析问题——解决问题”的思路安排写作。首先,在充分把握“华为诉互交数字垄断纠纷”案情基础上,论证了在无线通信领域技术标准化条件下每个必要专利许可市场,皆组成一个完整、独立的相关市场。鉴于专利的独一与无法替换特征,必要专利持有人在每个必要专利许可市场都占据完全份额,拥有可以阻挡、控制其他参与主体进入相关市场的能力,具有市场支配地位;其次,围绕案件争议点进行分析,继而界定标准必要专利条件下的相关市场,分析互交数字公司是否拥有市场支配地位,有无违反FRAND规则授予其必要专利,滥用其市场支配地位的行为;最后,提出一些改进建议,提高中国《反垄断法》在无线通信市场中的适用。全文除引言和结论外,共分三部分进行论述:第一部分“华为诉互交数字案”主要案情及争议点。经过对华为和互交数字公司在无线通信市场格局的分析,阐述华为诉互交数字公司垄断纠纷案件的经过及判决结果,从而提取出案件的争议焦点:怎样界定相关市场的范围;互交数字公司在相关市场中是不是拥有市场支配地位;互交数字公司是不是滥用了市场支配地位。第二部分以反垄断法为视角,围绕争议点进行具体分析。首先,本案涉及专利技术标准化所引发的相关市场之界定问题,必须明晰标准必要专利条件下相关市场的基本理论,进而界定本案相关市场为互交数字在中美两国就无线通信技术标准下的每个必要专利许可市场。其次,通过阐释市场支配地位的含义及认定标准,从而认定互交数字在与华为公司进行标准必要专利许可商洽过程中,具有单方面决定华为公司价钱、数目以及其他交易条件的能力,拥有市场支配地位。最后,互交数字在与华为公司进行许可商洽时,违背FRAND规则的承诺,存在不合理定价与捆绑搭售等滥用市场支配地位的行为。第三部分“华为诉互交数字案”对我国反垄断法的启示。当前我国反垄断立法关于标准必要专利持有人滥用市场支配地位等违法行为的规定过于抽象,国际标准化机构也缺乏关于许可使用费计算的规定。基于此,可以从立法、执法与司法三个方面来完善我国反垄断法制,提高《反垄断法》的适用性。同时,修正FRAND规则,构建科学、完备的标准必要专利许可制度,更好地平衡标准必要专利持有人、标准实施者以及社会公众三方的权益,广泛推进标准实施。
[Abstract]:In October 28th 2013, the Guangdong Provincial High Court handed down a final judgment in the case of "Huawei Company v. Mutual Digital Company Monopoly," and found that the act of interleaving digital companies was illegal. As the first dispute over the necessary standard patent license in China, this decision has aroused great concern in the academic community. This article mainly focuses on the perspective of antitrust law. First of all, on the basis of fully grasping the case of "Huawei v. Mutual Digital Monopoly dispute", It is demonstrated that, under the condition of technical standardization in the field of wireless communication, every necessary patent license market constitutes a complete and independent relevant market. In view of the unique and irreplaceable characteristics of the patent, The necessary patent holder occupies a full share in every necessary patent license market, has the ability to block and control the other participants to enter the relevant market, and has the market dominant position. Secondly, the article analyzes the dispute point of the case. Then define the relevant market under the condition of standard necessary patent, analyze whether the digital company has the dominant position in the market, whether it has violated the FRAND rules to grant it the necessary patent, and abuse its market dominant position; finally, Some suggestions are put forward to improve the application of China's Anti-monopoly Law in the wireless communication market. It is divided into three parts: the first part, "Huawei v. reciprocal digital case", the main facts and points of dispute. After the analysis of Huawei and the mutual digital company in the wireless communication market structure, This paper expounds the process and the judgment result of the monopoly dispute case of Huawei v. Mutual Digital Company, so as to extract the dispute focus of the case: how to define the scope of the relevant market, whether the interleaving digital company has the market dominant position in the related market, and how to define the scope of the related market. In the second part, from the perspective of anti-monopoly law, the author makes a specific analysis of the dispute points. First, this case involves the definition of the relevant market caused by the standardization of patent technology. It is necessary to clarify the basic theory of the relevant market under the condition of standard essential patent, and then define the relevant market in this case as each necessary patent license market under the standards of wireless communication technology between China and the United States. By explaining the meaning of market dominance and the criteria for determining the market dominance, it is concluded that in the course of conducting negotiations with Huawei on the necessary standard patent licenses, it is possible to determine the price, number and other trading conditions of Huawei unilaterally, Has a dominant market position. Finally, when negotiating with Huawei in licensing, the interleaving figures violate the FRAND rules, There is abuse of market dominant position such as unreasonable pricing and bundling, etc. The third part "Huawei v. reciprocal figures case" has implications for china's anti-monopoly law. Current anti-monopoly legislation in china about standard necessary patent holders. The provisions on abuse of market dominance and other illegal acts are too abstract. Based on this, we can perfect the anti-monopoly law system in our country from three aspects: legislation, law enforcement and judicature, and improve the applicability of Anti-monopoly Law. At the same time, we should amend the FRAND rules. Constructing a scientific and complete system of standard necessary patent licensing, balancing the rights and interests of standard essential patent holders, standard implementers and the public, and promoting the implementation of standards widely.
【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.294

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