原则性禁止维持转售价格的立法错误及其解决

发布时间：2018-03-16 05:00

本文选题：维持转售价格　切入点：纵向垄断协议　出处：《政治与法律》2017年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：针对消费需求的市场供给所发生的竞争环节首先产生于品牌供货商之间,维持转售价格可以促使经销商帮助品牌供货商快速进入市场。这表明维持转售价格能够从根本上促进品牌边际间的市场竞争。以限制或者排除品牌内部市场竞争作为立法禁止维持转售价格理由的"垄断说"显得一叶障目。虽然维持转售价格客观上可能成为品牌供货商或者经销商实施横向垄断协议的手段,但是在维持转售价格本身能够有效促进品牌边际间的市场竞争和法律已对横向垄断协议与滥用市场支配地位作出规制情况下,以此作为立法禁止维持转售价格理由的"手段说"显得因噎废食。除滥用市场支配地位情形外,经销协议的合意生成排除了维持转售价格的单方行为,仅以履约或者追责所呈现的片面性限制损害经销商的自主定价权作为立法禁止维持转售价格的理由,属于断章取义。
[Abstract]:The competition for the market supply of consumer demand first comes from the brand suppliers. Maintaining resale price can prompt dealers to help brand suppliers to enter the market quickly. This shows that maintaining resale price can fundamentally promote market competition between brands. "Monopoly", which is the reason why legislation forbids the maintenance of resale prices, appears to be out of sight. Although maintaining resale prices may objectively become a means for brand suppliers or dealers to implement horizontal monopoly agreements, However, when maintaining resale price itself can effectively promote market competition among brands and the law has regulated horizontal monopoly agreements and abuse of market dominance, In addition to abusing its dominant position in the market, the consensual formation of the distribution agreement precludes the unilateral act of maintaining the resale price. It is out of context that only the unilateral restriction of performance or liability damages the dealer's independent pricing right as the reason of legislation prohibiting the maintenance of resale price.
【作者单位】：上海政法学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金青年项目“中国(上海)自由贸易试验区竞争中立政策研究”(项目编号:14CFX043)的阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：D922.294

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