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上市公司控股股东关联交易的法律规制研究

发布时间:2018-03-19 22:33

  本文选题:关联交易 切入点:控股股东 出处:《上海师范大学》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:关联交易是企业运行中常见的“利益冲突”交易,与经济发展过程中企业的快速运行相伴而生。虽然其利弊皆有,但因近年来上市公司利用关联交易损害中小股东和债权人利益的丑闻频频爆发,导致关联交易给投资者留下了利大于弊的直观印象。一方面,从经济效益的角度来看,关联人能够掌握非关联竞争者缺少的公司信息等优势资源,节约交易费用,加速企业运行效率。另一方面,由于信息不对称和权利不对等,交易的一方能够利用自己对另一方的影响力和控制力,使双方交易违背公平原则,进而损害公司及其他“用脚投票”的中小股东和投资者的利益。此外,在交易中拥有控制权和影响力的一方还可以通过关联交易为规避税负、利益输送、形成市场垄断等非法目的披上合法的外衣。关联交易在我国的上市公司、国有企业和有限责任公司的运行中都普遍存在。然而,因为上市公司在证券市场上公开募集资金,涉及到众多中小股东的利益,因此上市公司的关联交易对经济生活的影响更为深远,产生的法律问题也更为突出。相关数据表明,上市公司与其母公司进行关联交易的比率高达百分之四十,涉及资金往来巨大,相对复杂。我国大部分上市公司股权结构集中导致控股股东更容易获得公司的控制权进行关联交易。法律若不能对这类非公允关联交易进行有效规则,证券市场的发展无疑会受到巨大的阻碍。但是目前,我国相关法律对控股股东关联交易的规制过于粗糙,不够细化,仅见于《公司法》的原则性规定和中国证监会以及上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所的有关规则和准则。可见我国法律关于关联交易的规范层级较低,缺乏总体规制思路;同时,预防非公允关联交易产生的上市公司信息披露制度、股东表决权回避制度也存在不足之处;对上市公司控股股东进行非公允关联交易的责任追究制度尚未建立。本文主要从上市公司控股股东关联交易的法律规制入手,梳理我国现行法对此规制的不足之处,借鉴美国、英国、香港等域外国家和地区的制度设计,对完善我国关联交易的法律制度提出建议。对非公允关联交易的事前预防,从控股股东的诚信义务、信息披露制度、股东表决权回避制度等方面进行阐述;对非公允关联交易的事后救济,从法院对关联交易公允性的审查、股东派生诉讼、法人人格否认原则和“深石原则”等方面的完善提出建议。
[Abstract]:Related party transaction is a common "conflict of interest" transaction in the operation of the enterprise, which is accompanied by the rapid operation of the enterprise in the process of economic development. However, in recent years, the scandals of listed companies using related party transactions to harm the interests of minority shareholders and creditors have frequently broken out, leading to the intuitive impression that related party transactions leave investors with more advantages than disadvantages. On the one hand, from the point of view of economic benefits, The associated person can grasp the advantage resources such as the company information which the non-affiliated competitor lacks, saves the transaction cost, accelerates the enterprise operation efficiency, on the other hand, because of the information asymmetry and the power asymmetry, One party to the transaction can use its influence and control over the other party to make the transaction against the principle of fairness, thereby harming the interests of the company and other minority shareholders and investors who "vote with their feet." in addition, The party that has the control and influence in the transaction can also put on the legal cloak for the illegal purposes of avoiding tax burden, transferring benefits, forming market monopoly and so on through related party transaction. The related party transaction is listed company in our country. The operation of state-owned enterprises and limited liability companies is widespread. However, because the listed companies raise funds publicly in the stock market, it involves the interests of many minority shareholders. As a result, the related transactions of listed companies have a more profound impact on economic life and more serious legal problems. Relevant data show that the ratio of related transactions between listed companies and their parent companies is as high as 40%. The ownership structure of most listed companies in China makes it easier for the controlling shareholders to obtain the control of the company to conduct related transactions. If the law can not carry out effective rules for this kind of unfair related transactions, There is no doubt that the development of the securities market will be greatly hindered. However, at present, the relevant laws of our country are too rough to regulate the related transactions of controlling shareholders, and they are not detailed enough. It can only be seen in the principled provisions of Company Law and the relevant rules and standards of CSRC, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. At the same time, the system of information disclosure of listed companies and the system of avoiding voting rights of listed companies arising from unfair related party transactions also have some shortcomings. The system of accountability for unfair related party transactions of controlling shareholders of listed companies has not yet been established. This paper starts with the legal regulation of related transactions of controlling shareholders of listed companies, combs the deficiencies of the existing laws of our country, and draws lessons from the United States. The system design of foreign countries and regions, such as Britain and Hong Kong, makes suggestions for perfecting the legal system of related party transactions in our country. The prior prevention of unfair related party transactions, from the fiduciary obligations of controlling shareholders and the information disclosure system, The ex post relief of unfair related party transactions, from the court review of the fairness of related transactions, shareholder derivative litigation, The author puts forward some suggestions on the perfection of the principle of denial of legal personality and the principle of deep stone.
【学位授予单位】:上海师范大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:D922.291.91

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