论敌意收购中目标公司董事会权利
本文选题:目标公司 + 股东优先 ; 参考:《辽宁大学》2017年硕士论文
【摘要】:明确敌意收购中目标公司董事会权利范围,是我国上市公司在面对敌意收购时的重要问题,同样也是我国证券市场上的各上市公司在面对现今的公司收购浪潮中的迫切需要。但是,在如今我国的公司法与证券法中,这一问题却并未得到应得的重视,在立法上处于相对落后的状态。同时,由于缺乏相关法律的规制,实践中的现状也呈现出混乱的局面,一方面一些目标公司的董事会过于强势,在恶意收购时大权独揽,大肆侵蚀、占有本应属于股东的权利;另一方面则有一部分公司在面对敌意收购时股董双方为了争夺权利而争吵不休,矛盾不断激化。这些现象都不是一个健康的资本市场所应拥有的。本文提出:首先,在恶意收购过程中被收购公司董事会所拥有的权利应被部分限制。这表现在平衡股东与董事会之间的关系上。公司所有者与管理者之间的利益平衡是公司内部最为基本的问题,因此也是确定董事会权利范围时的首要问题。其次,是在处理其他利益相关者时的权利扩张。现代企业的发展离不开除了股东之外的其他利益群体,这不仅是现代公司生存的要求,也是现代公司社会责任的体现。在划分目标公司董事会权利范围时,将其他利益相关者纳入公司内部权利制衡的考量范围符合现代公司发展的内涵。最后,应赋予目标公司董事会保护公司内部中小股东的责任,这是法律公平与正义的体现,为此公司董事会应作为中小股东的代理,获得对抗公司内大股东的权利。建议在未来的立法过程中,以司法解释的方式在《公司法》中明确目标公司董事会的权利范围,同时可以通过单行条例的方式在法律之余为制度的具体实施提供必要的补充。具体而言,制度的设计应当在同董事会与股东会、其他利益相关者和中小股东的关系中明确其在面对敌意收购时的自身定位,并在同这三大利益群体的互动交流之际把握住三项原则:和公司所有人的股东优先原则、和其他利益相关者的多重代理原则以及和中小股东之间的平等对待原则。
[Abstract]:Making clear the scope of the board of directors of the target company in hostile takeover is an important problem for the listed companies in facing the hostile takeover, and it is also the urgent need of the listed companies in the face of the current wave of corporate takeover in the securities market of our country.However, in our country's company law and securities law, this problem has not been given due attention and is relatively backward in legislation.At the same time, due to the lack of relevant legal regulation, the current situation in practice also presents a chaotic situation, on the one hand, some target companies' board of directors is too strong, in the hostile takeover of the monopoly of power, wantonly erosion, possession of the rights that should belong to shareholders;On the other hand, some companies in the face of hostile takeover when the two sides to fight for rights, the conflict has intensified.None of this is what a healthy capital market should have.Firstly, the rights of the board of directors of the acquired company should be partially restricted.This is manifested in balancing the relationship between shareholders and the board of directors.The balance of interests between the owner and the manager is the most basic problem within the company, and therefore the most important issue in determining the scope of the board of directors' rights.Second, the expansion of rights in dealing with other stakeholders.The development of modern enterprises can not be separated from other interest groups except shareholders, which is not only the requirement of modern company survival, but also the embodiment of modern corporate social responsibility.When dividing the scope of the board of directors of the target company, it is in line with the connotation of modern company development that other stakeholders should be included in the scope of the balance of rights within the company.Finally, the board of directors of the target company should be given the responsibility to protect the minority shareholders in the company, which is the embodiment of legal fairness and justice. Therefore, the board of directors of the company should act as the agent of the minority shareholders and obtain the right to resist the large shareholders in the company.It is suggested that in the future legislative process, the scope of the rights of the board of directors of the target company should be defined in the form of judicial interpretation in the Company Law, and at the same time, the necessary supplement for the concrete implementation of the system should be provided by means of separate regulations.Specifically, the system should be designed in the relationship with the board of directors and shareholders, other stakeholders and minority shareholders in the face of hostile takeover in their own position,At the time of the interaction and communication with these three interest groups, we should grasp three principles: the shareholder priority principle of the owner of the company, the multi-agent principle of other stakeholders and the principle of equal treatment between the minority shareholders and the other stakeholders.
【学位授予单位】:辽宁大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:D922.291.91
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