财政责任视角下的地方债发行制度比较与借鉴
发布时间:2018-04-16 02:13
本文选题:地方政府 + 债券发行 ; 参考:《北京外国语大学》2017年硕士论文
【摘要】:我国目前处于存量债务和新增债务并行且需要进行交接的特定历史阶段。国务院和财政部在认识到目前地方政府债务困局后,系统性、有针对性地构建起我国当前"开前门、堵后门、修围墙"的地方政府债务处置机制。"开前门"是指允许地方政府在国务院确定的限额内发行债券,但有发债权的地方政府仅限于省级,且发行量由国务院决定。"堵后门"是指剥离地方政府融资平台公司的融资职能。"修围墙"是指针对现有的政府融资方式进行完善,鼓励通过PPP模式将社会资本引入公共部门。地方政府存量债务中通过银行贷款举借的部分,通过3年左右窗口期,由省级财政部门在限额内安排发行地方债券进行置换。对于地方政府债务的风险处置,也提出了应急预案和地方政府财政重整计划,对当前尚未发生但将来发生可能行极大的债务风险化解提出了纾困方案。我国地方政府债券发行起步比较晚,制度细节也仍待完善。因此需要借鉴国外的制度设计和经验教训,为我国地方政府债券发行制度的发展提供参考。日本与我国同为单一制国家,在中央与地方政府事权划分和财政责任承担上,可以为我国央地事权、财权改革提供一定借鉴。北海道夕张市的财政困局产生原因和财政重整处置也值得我们参考。美国的财政联邦制度决定了其政府间的财政事权划分和财政责任承担都相对独立,美国繁荣、高度发达的金融市场使其地方政府债券呈现出鲜明的市场化特点。由于政治体制和立法精神的差异,美国的联邦财政制度不符合我国国情,但其高度市场化的政府债券发行制度和政府财政信息披露制度对我国建立和完善政府债券市场仍有借鉴意义。印度储备银行的独立性比较低,在政府债务融资事务中参与度很高,虽然印度地方政府债券的发行历史很长,但是定价机制和信用评级制度始终很难建立。我国的地方政府债券发行刚刚起步,参考印度央行做法,对我国央行在地方政府债券发行中扮演的角色有一定启示。通过对日本、美国和印度地方政府债券发行制度的比较研究,目前我国地方政府债务管理制度的主要缺陷有以下几点:一是地方政府发债权限与支出责任分配不合理;二是地方债市场化定价失灵,具体表现为债券发行量受上级政府控制、债券发行方与承销商关联交易和地方债券信用无差别评级;三是窗口期债务置换操作模式有损央行独立性。这三点缺陷之间是有逻辑联系的,也有共同的法律制度基础原因:财政责任划分不清。其中,既有中央政府与地方政府之间的财政责任,又有省级政府对其下级政府的财政责任,还有货币当局央行对地方政府的财政责任问题。适当对引发债务危机的原因进行区分或许更有利于划定央地财政责任的边界,如财政治理引发的债务危机和债券违约引发的债务危机。对于前者,中央政府无需承担责任,但如果是经过中央政府审批的债券发行,中央政府应当承担审批失误造成的后果,但又不是地方政府债务危机的全部后果。如果能够做到权责分离,中央政府无需全权财政兜底。在厘清事权财权的前提下,还应实施配套改革,构建地方政府债券信用评级制度,发挥市场的约束作用,增强地方政府预算监督管理。
[Abstract]:The specific historical stage of China is currently in the stock of debt and new debt and the need for parallel handover. The State Council and the Ministry of Finance in recognition of the current local government debt predicament, systematic, targeted to build China's current open the front door, blocking the back door, repair the fence "of the local government debt disposal mechanism." the front door is to allow local governments to issue bonds within the limits set by the State Council, but have the right to issuing bonds of local government is limited to the provincial level, and the issue is decided by the State Council. "Blocking the back door" refers to the release of local government financing platform companies financing functions. "Repair the fence" refers to government financing to improve the existing that will encourage social capital into the public sector through the PPP model. Through bank loans raised by some local government debt stock, through 3 years of the window period, by the provincial finance department in limits arrangements issued Party bond replacement. For risk management of local government debt, also put forward the emergency plan and local government fiscal restructuring plan, the future has not yet occurred but the bail-out may resolve for huge debt risk. Local government bonds issued in our country started relatively late, yet the details of the system is also perfect. Therefore it is necessary to learn from abroad the system design and experience, provide a reference for the development of our country's local government bonds issuing system. Japan and China as a unitary state, the central and local government fiscal responsibility and division of powers, for our country the central powers, provides some reference for financial reform. A city in Hokkaido the financial predicament the causes and disposal of financial restructuring is also worthy of our reference. The United States federal fiscal system determines its fiscal responsibility and financial responsibilities are relatively The United States Independence, prosperity, highly developed financial markets so that the local government bond market showed distinctive characteristics. Due to differences in the political system and the spirit of the legislation, the federal financial system does not meet the conditions of our country, but its highly market-oriented government bond issuance system and government financial information disclosure system of our country and establish the perfection of the government bond market is still of great significance. The independence of the Reserve Bank of India is relatively low, the government debt financing transaction in a high degree of participation, although the India local government bond issuance has a very long history, but the pricing mechanism and credit rating system is still difficult to establish in China. The local government bond issuance has just started, reference India's central bank, has implications for China's central bank plays in the local government bond issuance in the role. In Japan, the United States and India local government bond issuance system ratio. More research, the main defects of our local government debt management system has the following several points: one is the local government authority to issue bonds and expenditure responsibility allocation is unreasonable; the two is the failure of the local debt market pricing, the specific performance of the amount of bonds issued by the superior government control, bond issuers and underwriters and local bond credit transactions no difference in rating; three is the window period of debt replacement operation mode loss of central bank independence. There is a logical connection between the three point defects, also have a common law system is the fundamental reason: the division of fiscal responsibility is not clear. Among them, both between the central government and local government fiscal responsibility, and the provincial government the lower levels of government fiscal responsibility, the central bank and monetary authorities to fiscal responsibility of the local government. Due to the causes of the debt crisis of the distinction may be more conducive to delimit central fiscal responsibility boundary Circles, such as financial management caused by the debt crisis and debt default triggered debt crisis. For the former, the central government should bear the responsibility, but if it is approved by the central government bond issue, the central government approval shall bear the consequences of mistakes, but not all the consequences of local government debt crisis. If you can do separate responsibilities the central government, without full financial fallback. In clarifying the powers of, should also be supporting the implementation of the reform, the construction of local government bond credit rating system, play the role of constraints of the market, strengthen the supervision and management of the local government budget.
【学位授予单位】:北京外国语大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:D922.2
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