混合并购中的救济制度研究

发布时间：2018-04-23 08:48

本文选题：混合并购 + 反垄断规制　；参考：《华东政法大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：自《反垄断法》颁布以来截止至2014年12月31日,商务部共审经营者集中案件990件,其中只有2件被直接禁止,24件以附条件的方式予以批准。混合并购案件中有1件被直接禁止,2件附条件批准。相对于横向并购或纵向并购,混合并购的反竞争效果通常以特有的方式实现且较为隐蔽,因此对具有竞争隐患的混合并购采用救济措施显得尤为重要。然而,我国目前针对混合并购的损害竞争理论研究以及混合并购对竞争影响的相关规定几乎处于空白状态,救济制度在混合并购中如何运用和实施的规范性文件、可操作的规则以及相关的监管措施也并不完善。鉴于此,本文拟从混合并购中救济制度运用的角度出发,参考国内外对混合并购损害竞争的理论研究及相关执法案例,通过理论结合实践的分析方法,详细论述混合并购的损害竞争理论、救济制度在混合并购中的适用以及我国混合并购案件适用救济制度的情况,并对我国救济制度的发展提供一些完善建议,希望能起到一定的借鉴意义。本文主要分为以下四个部分:第一部分,介绍混合并购的概念及其三种类型,分析不同并购类型中存在的竞争隐患,进而结合实际执法案例对混合并购的损害竞争理论进行阐述。损害竞争理论主要有美国的潜在竞争者理论和欧盟的组合效应理论。其中潜在竞争者理论主要关注并购前后对目标市场上潜在竞争者数量的影响及市场势力的变化,组合效应理论更加关注并购后企业的反竞争行为及市场势力的变化。无论哪种理论都是对混合并购的反竞争效应进行分析,而这正是对具有竞争隐患的混合并购采取救济措施的基础。第二部分,对救济制度的概念和作用进行介绍,归纳了救济措施的分类。救济措施分为结构性救济措施和行为性救济措施,并对常用的救济措施进行了列举并用案例加以说明,如剥离、防火墙条款、公平交易条款、最高限价条款等。阐述了混合并购中行为性救济措施运用时存在的问题,如预期效果的不确定性、执行与监管的难度大及总成本可能过高等问题。第三部分,对我国目前救济制度的立法及执法状况进行总结梳理,发现在立法方面,存在部分内容仍然缺失、部分规则过于原则、规则位阶有待提高等问题;在执法方面,存在受到竞争关注的混合并购极少、行为性救济措施的运用过于广泛且灵活开放等现象。对附加限制性条件予以批准的两起混合并购案件进行分析,总结商务部在损害竞争理论的运用及救济措施的选择等方面的进步与不足。第四部分,对混合并购中救济制度的完善提出建议,主要包括建立损害理论的分析框架、慎重选择救济措施的类型、完善监督受托人制度、建立案件跟访制度及建立复审制度等。
[Abstract]:Since the promulgation of the Anti-monopoly Law, as of December 31, 2014, the Ministry of Commerce has tried 990 cases involving a concentration of operators, of which only 2 cases have been directly prohibited and 24 cases have been approved in a conditional manner. One of the mixed M & A cases was directly prohibited, with two conditional approvals. Compared with horizontal or vertical mergers and acquisitions, the anti-competitive effect of hybrid mergers and acquisitions is usually achieved in a unique way and more subtle, so it is particularly important to adopt relief measures for mixed mergers and acquisitions with hidden risks of competition. However, at present, the research on the damage competition theory of mixed M & A and the related regulations on the influence of mixed M & A on competition are almost blank, and the normative documents on how to use and implement the relief system in mixed M & A. Operational rules and related regulatory measures are also imperfect. In view of this, this paper intends to use the relief system in hybrid mergers and acquisitions, referring to the domestic and foreign theoretical research on the damage competition of hybrid mergers and acquisitions and related law enforcement cases, through the combination of theory and practice of the analysis method, This paper discusses in detail the damage competition theory of mixed merger, the application of relief system in mixed merger and acquisition, and the application of relief system in mixed merger cases in China, and provides some perfect suggestions for the development of relief system in China. Hope to play a certain reference significance. This paper is divided into four parts as follows: the first part introduces the concept and three types of hybrid mergers and acquisitions, analyzes the hidden dangers of competition in different types of mergers and acquisitions. Then combined with the actual law enforcement cases, the damage competition theory of mixed mergers and acquisitions is expounded. The damage competition theory mainly includes the potential competitor theory of the United States and the combination effect theory of the European Union. The theory of potential competitors mainly focuses on the influence on the number of potential competitors and the changes of market forces before and after M & A, while the theory of combination effect pays more attention to the anti-competitive behavior and the changes of market forces after M & A. Either theory is to analyze the anti-competitive effect of mixed M & A, which is the basis for the remedy of mixed M & A with hidden risks of competition. The second part introduces the concept and function of relief system and summarizes the classification of relief measures. The relief measures are divided into structural relief measures and behavioral relief measures, and the commonly used relief measures are listed and illustrated with cases, such as stripping, firewall clause, fair trade clause, maximum price clause and so on. This paper expounds the problems existing in the application of the remedial measures such as the uncertainty of expected effect, the difficulty of execution and supervision, and the possibility of excessive total cost in mixed mergers and acquisitions. The third part summarizes the legislation and law enforcement situation of our country's current relief system, and finds that there are still some problems in legislation, some rules are too principle, the rank of rules need to be improved, and so on. There are few mixed mergers and acquisitions which are concerned by competition, and the use of behavioral remedies is too wide and flexible and open. This paper analyzes two cases of mixed mergers and acquisitions approved with restrictive conditions and summarizes the progress and shortcomings of the Ministry of Commerce in the application of the theory of damaging competition and the choice of relief measures. In the fourth part, the author puts forward some suggestions on how to perfect the relief system in mixed mergers and acquisitions, including establishing the analytical framework of damage theory, choosing the type of relief measures carefully, and perfecting the supervision trustee system. Set up the system of case following visit and the system of reexamination.
【学位授予单位】：华东政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.294

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