反垄断法罚款制度之法经济学研究

发布时间：2018-04-24 10:54

本文选题：反垄断法 + 反垄断罚款　；参考：《浙江理工大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：反垄断罚款以威慑为主要目的，本文以法经济学中威慑理论的发展为出发点，研究了最适威慑应发生于当社会因处罚犯罪所需额外支付的边际成本等于社会因犯罪减少所可获得的额外的边际收益时，并基于最适威慑理论探讨了基于获利的反垄断罚款以及基于损害的反垄断罚款的设定。以获利为基础的反垄断罚款是以违法者的成本收益范式为研究对象，通过提高违法者的预期成本使其在违法行为中无利可图，从而放弃进一步行动，达到有力的威慑效果。以损害为基础的反垄断罚款是从社会总成本的角度进行分析，因为违法者在违法行为中所承担的成本小于社会总成本，从而给社会带来了净损害，这种损害包括执法成本的增加。因此，，反垄断罚款制度惩罚标准的核心应该是使违法者承担违法行为给社会带来的全部成本。由于执法机关发现并惩罚违法行为存在一定的或然性，故实际罚款应设定在名义罚款/惩罚机率的水平上，才能达到有效的威慑目的。厂商之所以从事垄断行为，是因为在垄断市场中可以获得比竞争市场更多的利润，即超额利润。如果用违法企业的销售额作为衡量利润的标准，那么超额利润与销售额的百分比主要受价格上升百分比、价格需求弹性以及成本加成率这三个因素的影响。而该百分比的最大值是在假设价格需求弹性和成本加成率为零时的值，此时超额利润与销售额的比率只受价格上升百分比的影响。而价格上升百分比又是厂商对市场价格控制力的重要指标。同时，对违法企业处以罚款并不是因为企业获得了超额利润，而是因为企业的垄断行为给社会带来了净损害，导致了社会福利的下降，资源配置处于低效率的状态。反垄断罚款制度的发展经历了从不确定性到明确性规定、从定额到百分比的计算方式等历程，为实现法律制裁的有效威慑而不断革新。因卡特尔案件的隐秘性、取证困难等特点，宽恕政策被引入到反垄断法中，以给申请者提供减轻或免除罚款为诱因促使卡特尔成员主动报告达成垄断协议的有关情况并提供重要的内部证据。宽恕政策的实施有效地提高了执法机关发现并惩罚违法行为的机率，进一步提高了法律实施的威慑效果。因罚款制度设定的理论性与实际执法的实践性之间存在偏差，使得反垄断罚款在实际执法中的威慑效果不佳，必须对其进行进一步的革新，方可达到有效威慑的地步。我国反垄断法仅对罚款制度做了原则性的规定，执法机关在实际执法中还需对其进行行政解释方可适用。但由于我国现行法律解释体制的束缚和反垄断执法经验的不足，实际操作中反垄断执法机关通常以原文照搬、词语替换等方式简单处理，进而诱发执法标准不统一、反垄断罚款不具有明确性和可操作性等问题，反垄断罚款的威慑力大打折扣。为此，本文在上述研究的基础之上，以最适威慑理论为指导，尝试构建相关的配套法规及实施细则，以提高罚款制度的明确性和可预测性，从而使执法机关在处罚违法行为时能够灵活运用，还可避免因标准不一而造成执法不公的现象。最后，鉴于上述分析，本文提出我国反垄断法的实施应基于我国的市场经济环境，而不应当盲目的追求执法绩效。在适度的威慑之外，反垄断法的实施还兼有宣传和提高经营者竞争意识的目的。在此基础上，我们应制定统一、具体的罚款指南，并完善宽恕政策。以此促使我国反垄断罚款制度实现有效威慑效果，创造一个有序的竞争环境。
[Abstract]:The main purpose of antitrust fines is deterrence. This paper, taking the development of the theory of deterrence in law and economics as the starting point, studies that the optimal deterrence should occur when the marginal cost of the extra payment required by the society for punishment is equal to the additional marginal income obtained by the reduction of the crime, and based on the optimal deterrence theory, it is based on the theory of the most suitable deterrence theory. The profit based antitrust fines and the setting of the damage based antimonopoly fines. The profit based antitrust fines are based on the paradigm of the cost and return of the violators. By raising the expected cost of the violators, it makes it unprofitable in the violation of the law, thus giving up a step of action to achieve a powerful deterrent effect. The basic antitrust fines are analyzed from the point of view of the total social cost, because the cost of the violators is less than the total cost of the society, which brings net damage to the society, which includes the increase in the cost of law enforcement. Therefore, the core of the penalty standard for the antitrust penalty system should be to make the violators undertake illegal actions. In order to bring all the costs to the society, the actual fines should be set at the level of nominal fines / penalties in order to achieve effective deterrence because the law enforcement agencies found and punished illegal acts.
The reason why the manufacturers engage in monopolistic behavior is that they can gain more profits than the competitive market in the monopoly market, that is, excess profits. If the sales of illegal enterprises are used as the standard of profit, the percentage of excess profits and sales is mainly by the percentage of the price increase, the elasticity of price demand and the rate of cost addition of three. The maximum value of the percentage is in the assumption that the price demand elasticity and the cost addition rate are zero, at this time the ratio of excess profit to sales is only influenced by the percentage of rising prices, and the percentage of price rise is a key indicator of the firm's control of the market price. Not because the enterprise has obtained excess profit, but because the monopoly of the enterprise has brought net damage to the society, resulting in the decline of social welfare, and the allocation of resources in a state of low efficiency.
The development of the system of antimonopoly fines has gone through the process of uncertainty to definiteness, from the amount of the quota to the percentage, in order to realize the effective deterrence of the legal sanctions. The policy of forgiveness is introduced into the antitrust law for the purpose of alleviating or exemption from the application of the cartel case. The exception of fines prompted cartel members to report on the situation of a monopoly agreement and provide important internal evidence. The implementation of the policy of forgiveness improved the probability of the law enforcement agencies to discover and punish the illegal acts and further improved the deterrent effect of the enforcement of the law. There is a deviation between the practicality and the deter effect of the antitrust fines in the actual law enforcement. It is necessary to carry out further innovation in order to reach the level of effective deterrence.
In our country, the anti monopoly law only stipulates the principle of the fine system, and the law enforcement organs need to apply the administrative interpretation to it in the actual law enforcement. However, due to the constraints of the current legal interpretation system and the lack of experience in the anti monopoly law enforcement, the antitrust law enforcement machine is usually copied and replaced by the original text in the actual operation. Single processing, and then induce the law enforcement standard is not uniform, the antimonopoly fine does not have the clarity and the maneuverability, and so on. The deterrence of the antimonopoly fines is discounted. On the basis of the above research, this paper tries to build the relevant regulations and implementation rules with the guidance of the most suitable deterrence theory, so as to improve the clarity of the fine system. And predictability, so that law enforcement agencies can use flexibly in punishing illegal activities, and avoid unfair enforcement caused by different standards.
Finally, in view of the above analysis, this paper proposes that the implementation of China's antitrust law should be based on the market economic environment of our country, and should not blindly pursue the performance of law enforcement. In addition to the moderate deterrence, the implementation of the antitrust law also has the purpose of publicizing and improving the awareness of the operators' competition. On this basis, we should formulate a unified, specific fine. In the south, we should improve the leniency policy so as to promote the effective deterrent effect of our anti trust fines system and create an orderly competitive environment.

【学位授予单位】：浙江理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.294

【参考文献】