反垄断罚款数额量化规则研究

发布时间：2018-06-11 15:52

本文选题：反垄断罚款 + 量化　；参考：《湘潭大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：反垄断罚款是最为重要的反垄断行政责任,与同是金钱制裁的其他反垄断责任形式相比,罚款能发挥最适度的惩罚、威慑功能。要充分发挥罚款的惩罚、威慑功能就不得不完善罚款数额的量化规则。无论在以罚金为主的美国还是以罚款为主的欧盟和日本,其对数额的量化都有较为详细的规定。美国反垄断罚金的计算一般分两步:首先是基础罚金的确定;然后对罚金数额进行调整,即先计算涉案企业的犯罪点数,进而以犯罪点数确定系数区间,罚金基础乘以系数区间可以得出一个罚金范围,法院将以该企业在违法行为中担任的角色以及刑罚的目的等因素为依据,确定最后罚金数额;对于较为隐蔽的卡特尔行为,可以适用宽恕制度对其罚金数额进行免除。欧盟委员会确定罚款数额也同样分为两步:首先确定基础金额,即销售价值的一定比例乘以涉案企业垄断违法行为的年数;然后在基础金额之上考虑加重或者减轻事由以调整基础金额最终确定罚款数额。对于卡特尔行为可运用宽恕制度对罚款数额进行减免。日本的课征金制度即为其反垄断罚款制度,课征金数额由违法行为实施期间内该行为所针对的商品或者服务的销售额或者购进额乘以一定比率得出。针对不正当交易限制行为,还规定了课征金减免制度。与美国、欧盟、日本相比,我国反垄断罚款数额量化规则存在罚款威慑性不足、罚款设定方式不科学、罚款的具体规定缺乏可操作性以及罚款减免规定不完善的缺陷。要完善反垄断罚款量化规则。首先,应该完善反垄断罚款量化规则的基本理念。其次,应该完善反垄断罚款量化规则的具体规定,使得反垄断罚款数额的确定标准明确、具体。要使反垄断罚款数额的量化规则完整、具体且可操作性强,就必须有科学的罚款设定方式,必须从产品或服务维度、时间维度和空间维度来综合考虑罚款基数的确定,必须明确不同垄断违法行为所适用的罚款裁量因素和裁量比率。最后,应该从减免比率和减免的适用条件两个方面来完善宽恕制度。除了完善立法规定外,在执法中还应该考虑被处罚经营者的实际负担能力以及竞争合规制度对罚款数额的影响。
[Abstract]:Anti-monopoly penalty is the most important administrative responsibility of anti-monopoly. Compared with other forms of anti-monopoly liability, the penalty can play the most appropriate punishment and deterrent function. In order to give full play to the penalty of fine, the deterrent function has to perfect the quantitative rules of fine amount. Both the United States and the European Union and Japan, which mainly pay fines, have more detailed rules on the quantification of the amount. The calculation of antitrust fines in the United States is generally divided into two steps: first, the determination of the basic fine; and secondly, the amount of the fine is adjusted, that is, the crime points of the enterprises involved are first calculated, and then the coefficient range is determined by the number of crime points. A penalty range can be obtained by multiplying the penalty basis by the coefficient interval, and the court will determine the final amount of the fine based on factors such as the enterprise's role in the offence and the purpose of the penalty; in the case of a more covert cartel, The amount of the fine may be waived by the application of the leniency system. The European Commission's determination of the amount of the fine is equally divided into two steps: first, the base amount, that is, a percentage of the value of the sale multiplied by the number of years in which the enterprise has committed a monopoly offence; Then consider aggravating or mitigating reasons above the base amount to adjust the base amount to determine the amount of the fine. For cartel behavior, leniency can be used to reduce the amount of the fine. Japan's levy system is its antitrust penalty system. The amount of levy is obtained by multiplying the sales or purchase amount of goods or services targeted by the illegal act within the period of the illegal act. In view of the improper trading restrictions, it also stipulated a system of deductions and deductions. Compared with the United States, European Union and Japan, the quantitative rules for the amount of antitrust fines in our country have the defects of inadequate deterrence of fines, unscientific way of setting fines, lack of maneuverability of specific provisions of fines and imperfections of provisions on the reduction and reduction of fines. It is necessary to improve the rules for quantifying antitrust fines. First of all, we should improve the basic concept of anti-monopoly penalty quantitative rules. Secondly, we should perfect the specific regulation of the quantitative rules of antitrust penalty, so as to make the determination standard of the amount of antitrust penalty clear and specific. In order to make the quantitative rules of the amount of antitrust penalty complete, specific and operable, there must be a scientific way to set the penalty, and the determination of the penalty base must be considered synthetically from the dimensions of product or service, time and space. It is necessary to define the penalty discretion factors and the discretion ratio for different monopolistic violations. Finally, the forgiveness system should be perfected from two aspects: the relief rate and the applicable conditions. In addition to improving legislative provisions, the actual affordability of the penalized operator and the impact of the competition compliance system on the amount of the fine should also be taken into account in the enforcement of the law.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.294

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