当前位置:主页 > 法律论文 > 经济法论文 >

当下我国债权人保护机制的探析

发布时间:2018-06-12 12:32

  本文选题:法定资本制度 + 债权人保护 ; 参考:《四川省社会科学院》2017年硕士论文


【摘要】:随着2013年公司法的修改,我国债权人保护的立法逻辑有了重大的调整,立法制度也随着立法思路的调整有了重大变化,最直接的表现就是资本制度从实缴制度变更为认缴制度。然而,资本制度的变革仅仅是一个开始,我国整个债权人保护的机制都随着资本制度的变革发生了颠覆性的转变,然而接续性的债权人保护机制目前又尚未构建。因此,有必要理清本次改革的基本理论基础、意图和方向,以及当下债权人保护机制的现状与不足,从而正确的重构债权人保护机制。以下就改革的原因和问题进行简单的梳理。改革的原因,从宏观的层面来看,立法者致力于借助市场的力量构建债权人自主博弈争取权利的基础,而非长期家长式借助行政力量保护债权人。这其中的本质是立法者意识到契约自治才能根本性的降低成本提升效率促进繁荣,这也是各国对公司法价值的认识共识。从微观的层面看,立法者长期以来认为资本充足才能保证公司的偿债能力,进而保护债权人的利益。然而,着研究的深入和实践的弊病不断出现,立法者逐步意识到公司真正的清偿能力不是静态不变的资本,而是公司不断变化的资产。因此,强制实缴、验资以及最低注册资本并不能有效的实现债权人保护,反而会增加社会运行监管成本、增加公司设立门槛、阻碍市场发展,带来诸多负面效应。问题是,我国长期以来奉行国家中心主义,政府干预深入社会各个层面。资本制度的改革后债权人并没有足够的博弈工具和博弈意识。从短期看,原债权人保护机制业已崩塌,新债权人保护机制尚未构建,债权人反而处于更加不利的地位。此时,应当准确把握立法改革方向,正确梳理各种学派的制度建议。本文主要就以构筑债权人自主博弈基础为标准进行衡量,梳理重构债权人保护方式。
[Abstract]:With the revision of company law in 2013, the legislative logic of creditor protection in China has been greatly adjusted, and the legislative system has changed greatly with the adjustment of legislative thinking. The most direct expression is that the capital system has changed from the actual payment system to the subscription system. However, the reform of capital system is only a beginning, the whole creditor protection mechanism of our country has undergone a subversive change with the change of capital system, but the successive creditor protection mechanism has not yet been constructed. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the basic theoretical basis, intention and direction of this reform, as well as the current situation and shortcomings of creditor protection mechanism, so as to correctly reconstruct the creditor protection mechanism. The following is a simple combing of the causes and problems of the reform. The reason of the reform is from the macroscopic aspect, the legislator devotes to build the creditor independent game to fight for the right foundation by the market force, but not the long-term paternalistic way to protect the creditor with the administrative force. The essence of this is that legislators realize that contractual autonomy can fundamentally reduce costs and enhance efficiency to promote prosperity, which is also the common understanding of the value of corporate law in various countries. At the micro level, legislators have long believed that capital is sufficient to ensure the company's solvency and thus protect the interests of creditors. However, with the development of research and practice, legislators gradually realize that the real solvency of a company is not a static capital, but a constantly changing asset. Therefore, compulsory payment, capital verification and minimum registered capital can not effectively protect creditors, but will increase the cost of social operation supervision, increase the threshold of the establishment of the company, hinder the development of the market, and bring a lot of negative effects. The problem is that our country has long pursued state-centrism and government intervention has penetrated into all levels of society. After the reform of capital system, creditors do not have enough game tools and game consciousness. In the short term, the original creditor protection mechanism has collapsed, the new creditor protection mechanism has not been constructed, and the creditor is in a more disadvantageous position. At this time, we should accurately grasp the direction of legislative reform and correctly sort out the institutional suggestions of various schools. This paper is mainly to construct the basis of independent game of creditors as a standard to sort out the reconstruction of creditor protection.
【学位授予单位】:四川省社会科学院
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:D922.291.91

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前1条

1 冯春晓;;关于德国社会信用体系建设模式的若干思考[J];北方经济;2014年08期

相关博士学位论文 前2条

1 耿得科;征信体制建设及其对金融的影响[D];浙江大学;2012年

2 薄守省;债务欺诈研究[D];对外经济贸易大学;2003年

相关硕士学位论文 前2条

1 何弦;“深石原则”研究[D];吉林大学;2010年

2 曾小平;美、德、日信用体系比较分析[D];吉林大学;2004年



本文编号:2009685

资料下载
论文发表

本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/falvlunwen/jingjifalunwen/2009685.html


Copyright(c)文论论文网All Rights Reserved | 网站地图 |

版权申明:资料由用户0845c***提供,本站仅收录摘要或目录,作者需要删除请E-mail邮箱bigeng88@qq.com