股权激励对盈余管理影响的实证研究——基于激励有效期与行权指标的视角

发布时间：2018-06-13 20:35

  本文选题：激励有效期 + 行权条件　； 参考：《上海金融》2017年07期

【摘要】：根据上市公司公布的股权激励方案,本文将行权条件划分为"严格型"和"宽松型",以我国2006-2013年实施股权激励计划的上市公司为样本,研究激励有效期和行权条件对盈余管理程度的影响。研究发现:激励期限与盈余管理程度呈显著的负相关关系;"严格型"激励条件与盈余管理程度呈显著的负相关关系。上述实证结果说明,适度延长股权激励的有效期,以及设计较为"严格"的激励条件有利于发挥其积极作用,抑制经理人的盈余管理行为。
[Abstract]:According to the stock incentive scheme published by the listed companies, this paper divides the exercise conditions into strict type and loose type, taking the listed companies that implemented the equity incentive plan from 2006 to 2013 as samples. This paper studies the effect of incentive period and exercise conditions on earnings management. It is found that there is a significant negative correlation between incentive period and earnings management degree, and a significant negative correlation between "strict" incentive conditions and earnings management degree. The above empirical results show that the appropriate extension of the term of validity of equity incentives and the design of more "strict" incentive conditions are conducive to play a positive role and restrain managers' earnings management behavior.
【作者单位】： 上海海事大学经济管理学院;东北财经大学会计学院;中国人民银行沈阳分行;
【分类号】：D922.287
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本文编号：2015328