价格决策听证中的零和博弈及其均衡化

发布时间：2018-06-18 03:17

本文选题：听证主体构造 + 零和博弈　；参考：《湖北社会科学》2017年03期

【摘要】：现代法治国家的宪法和行政程序法中所规定的正当行政程序要求政府在做出公共决策时,应充分听取各方意见。价格决策无疑是一种重要的公共决策,我国《价格法》早在2002年已从制度层面将听证制度引入政府价格决策程序中。但运行多年的价格听证并没有发挥预想的制度效能,这说明价格决策听证程序中存在除法规范层面以外的其他干扰因素。从博弈论角度分析,价格听证制度功能不彰的原因是博弈各方进行的是零和博弈或负和博弈,一方的利益增长以相对方的利益减损为代价。打破政企之间的角色合谋、实现博弈双方的信息均衡化以及解除立法中的制度锁定是我国公共价格决策听证博弈均衡化的关键。
[Abstract]:The proper administrative procedure stipulated in the constitution and administrative procedure law of a modern country ruled by law requires that the government should fully listen to the opinions of all parties when making public decisions. Price decision is undoubtedly an important public decision. As early as 2002, China's "Price Law" has introduced the hearing system into the government price decision-making process from the system level. However, the price hearing which has been running for many years has not brought into full play the expected institutional efficiency, which indicates that there are other interference factors in the price decision hearing procedure except the normative level. From the point of view of game theory, the reason why the price hearing system does not function well is that the parties in the game play a zero-sum game or a negative-sum game, and the benefit increase of one party comes at the expense of the opposite party's interest loss. Breaking the role collusion between the government and enterprise, realizing the information equalization of both sides of the game and lifting the system lock in the legislation are the key to the game equalization of the public price decision hearing in our country.
【作者单位】：武汉大学;
【基金】：中国博士后科学基金第9批特别资助(2016T90711)阶段性成果国家“2011计划”司法文明协同创新中心相关成果
【分类号】：D922.294

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