金融可得性、融资成本与法律实施

发布时间：2018-09-07 22:06

【摘要】：转型中国常被作为缺乏法律有效支持的情况下取得巨大经济成功的例子,也被作为"法律的有效实施有助于企业更好地获得融资"这个命题的例外。原因有二:一是中国的经济成功主要是那些非正规部门推动的,这些部门的企业却主要依赖于长期关系、声誉维持的非正规融资;二是许多更有效率的民营企业的融资来自国企的金融资源漏损,这种漏损是非法的。如果长期关系和声誉、甚至非法漏损在融资中扮演重要角色,法律的作用要么不显著,要么为负。本文利用微观的企业融资数据重新审视这个问题后发现,全部的企业样本证明法律有利于企业融资,局部的融资困难的民营企业样本,甚至参与腐败的企业样本同样支持法律的有效性命题;我们以信任作为长期关系的代理变量,考察了正式的法律制度、非正式的长期关系及其交互作用,发现法律与长期关系中的信任是互补而不是替代关系,都有利于企业融资;民营企业、金融可得性差的企业更容易参与金融腐败,外资企业更不容易参与金融腐败。
[Abstract]:China in transition is often cited as an example of enormous economic success in the absence of effective legal support, and as an exception to the proposition that effective enforcement of the law will help enterprises to obtain better financing. Informal financing, which relies on long-term relationships to maintain reputation, is illegal. If long-term relationships and reputation, or even illegal leakage, play an important role in financing, the role of law is either insignificant or negative. After re-examining this issue, we find that all the corporate samples prove that the law is conducive to corporate financing, some of the private enterprises with financing difficulties, and even the corporate samples involved in corruption support the validity of the law. The informal long-term relationship and its interaction show that the trust between law and long-term relationship is complementary rather than substitutive, which is conducive to corporate financing; private enterprises, enterprises with poor financial availability are more likely to participate in financial corruption, and foreign-funded enterprises are less likely to participate in financial corruption.
【作者单位】：西南财经大学法学院;
【基金】：四川省哲学社会科学重点研究基地中国金融法研究中心基地项目的阶段性成果
【分类号】：D922.28

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