P2P网络贷款监管法律问题研究
发布时间:2018-09-12 13:53
【摘要】:最初在国外诞生之时,P2P平台仅仅充当着信息中介的角色,不直接参与借贷行为,但P2P网络贷款这一新型借贷方式一经传入我国,就有了异化发展的趋势,其更多的演化成为一种信用中介,直接参与借贷行为,不免有涉及金融机构之嫌。在我国,P2P网络借贷模式大致可以分为以下三种:线上传统模式、线下债权转让模式和复合担保模式。其中,线上传统模式发展到现在仅剩拍拍贷一家,在此模式下,借贷行为的风险更多的表现为信用风险、技术风险、逆向选择和道德风险等;宜信贷为典型的债权转让模式,其通过将债权拆分和转让,使得P2P平台成为一个资金中介枢纽平台,可以说是一种无牌照、无监管的“影子银行”。该模式面临的最大风险在于经营风险以及涉嫌非法集资、非法吸收公众存款和涉嫌个人放贷的法律风险。复合担保模式下,相比传统模式而言,担保机构也参与到了借贷行为当中,可以减少部分借贷行为中的信用风险,但却也增加了担保与关联交易风险等等。可见,无论哪一种运营模式,都不可避免的会面临各种风险,要想将风险的危害降到最低,就必须找到风险的成因加以防范。 P2P网络贷款活动中的种种风险,其成因可以概括为以下三点:第一,对该行业缺乏有效监管。在2014年以前,我国的P2P行业一直处于无政府监管的状态,这种监管缺失造成行业混乱和无序经营,导致P2P网络贷款一直游离于我国金融监管体系之外,风险频发。第二,个人信用体系不完善。P2P借贷平台无法像银行一样,获取到相对完善的征信信息,在审核借款人资信时,P2P借贷平台往往只能依靠有限的信息进行判断,,当然,行业的信用风险也便随之而来。第三,借贷行为中的信息不对称问题,这是逆向选择和道德风险形成的最主要原因。在市场上,由于交易双方信息不对称,加之利益的驱动,必然会发生优质借款人会逐步退出市场,借款人的总体质量下降,形成“劣币驱逐良币”现象。 近年来,随着P2P网络贷款模式的不断发展,借贷行为中形成的法律关系也日趋复杂,除了一般的借贷法律外,还存在着担保和债权转让等特殊的法律关系,这就影响到对于P2P网络贷款平台的定性,笔者认为应该将P2P平台分为类金融机构和信用中介来分类定性,并以此进行分类监管。 P2P平台等互联网金融的风险监管问题已引起业界高度关注。2015年1月20日,银监会宣布新设普惠金融部,规定P2P网络贷款由其监管,至此,P2P行业的监管主体最终确定,但具体的监管细则仍处于空白缺失状态。本文认为,监管主体虽已确定,却还存在一些问题,资产证券化的过程并不是银监会所能监管的范围,这种特殊的P2P模式由证监会监管更为适宜。 P2P网络贷款的监管应充分考虑到类金融机构型平台和信用中介型平台之间的不同,在市场准入监管、持续经营监管和市场退出监管中坚持分类监管的原则,只有这样才能使监管更加具有针对性。
[Abstract]:At the beginning of its birth in foreign countries, P2P platform only acted as an information intermediary, not directly involved in lending behavior. However, as soon as P2P network lending, a new lending method, was introduced into China, there was a trend of alienation. More of it evolved into a credit intermediary, directly involved in lending behavior, it is unavoidable to involve financial institutions. In our country, P2P network lending mode can be divided into three kinds: online traditional mode, offline creditor's rights transfer mode and compound guarantee mode. By splitting and transferring the creditor's rights, the P2P platform becomes a capital intermediary hub platform, which can be said to be a "shadow bank" without license and supervision. Under the compound guarantee mode, compared with the traditional mode, the guarantee institution also participates in the lending behavior, which can reduce the credit risk of some lending behavior, but also increase the risk of guarantee and related party transactions and so on. If we want to minimize the risk, we must find out the cause of the risk and guard against it.
The causes of the risks in P2P network lending activities can be summarized as follows: First, there is a lack of effective supervision over the industry. Before 2014, the P2P industry in China has been in a state of anarchic supervision. This lack of supervision has caused confusion and disorderly operation of the industry, leading to the P2P network lending has been dissociated from China's financial supervision system. Second, the personal credit system is imperfect. P2P lending platform can not get relatively perfect credit information like banks. When examining the credit of borrowers, P2P lending platform can only rely on limited information to judge, of course, the credit risk of the industry will follow. Third, information in lending behavior. Asymmetry is the main reason for adverse selection and moral hazard. In the market, due to the asymmetric information of both sides of the transaction, coupled with the drive of interests, high-quality borrowers will gradually withdraw from the market, the overall quality of borrowers will decline, resulting in the phenomenon of "bad money expelling good money".
In recent years, with the continuous development of P2P network lending model, the legal relationship formed in the lending behavior is becoming more and more complex. In addition to the general lending law, there are also special legal relationships such as guarantee and transfer of creditor's rights, which affects the qualitative analysis of P2P network lending platform. The author thinks that the P2P platform should be classified into financial institutions. And credit intermediaries to classify and identify, and to classify supervision.
On January 20, 2015, the Banking Regulatory Commission announced the establishment of a new GSP Finance Department, stipulating that P2P network loans should be supervised by it. So far, the regulatory body of the P2P industry has been finalized, but the specific regulatory rules are still in a blank state. However, there are still some problems. The process of asset securitization is not the scope that the CBRC can supervise. This special P2P model is more suitable for the supervision of the CSRC.
The supervision of P2P network loan should take full account of the differences between financial institution-like platform and credit intermediary platform, and insist on the principle of classified supervision in market access supervision, continuous operation supervision and market exit supervision. Only in this way can the supervision be more targeted.
【学位授予单位】:山西财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:D922.28
本文编号:2239204
[Abstract]:At the beginning of its birth in foreign countries, P2P platform only acted as an information intermediary, not directly involved in lending behavior. However, as soon as P2P network lending, a new lending method, was introduced into China, there was a trend of alienation. More of it evolved into a credit intermediary, directly involved in lending behavior, it is unavoidable to involve financial institutions. In our country, P2P network lending mode can be divided into three kinds: online traditional mode, offline creditor's rights transfer mode and compound guarantee mode. By splitting and transferring the creditor's rights, the P2P platform becomes a capital intermediary hub platform, which can be said to be a "shadow bank" without license and supervision. Under the compound guarantee mode, compared with the traditional mode, the guarantee institution also participates in the lending behavior, which can reduce the credit risk of some lending behavior, but also increase the risk of guarantee and related party transactions and so on. If we want to minimize the risk, we must find out the cause of the risk and guard against it.
The causes of the risks in P2P network lending activities can be summarized as follows: First, there is a lack of effective supervision over the industry. Before 2014, the P2P industry in China has been in a state of anarchic supervision. This lack of supervision has caused confusion and disorderly operation of the industry, leading to the P2P network lending has been dissociated from China's financial supervision system. Second, the personal credit system is imperfect. P2P lending platform can not get relatively perfect credit information like banks. When examining the credit of borrowers, P2P lending platform can only rely on limited information to judge, of course, the credit risk of the industry will follow. Third, information in lending behavior. Asymmetry is the main reason for adverse selection and moral hazard. In the market, due to the asymmetric information of both sides of the transaction, coupled with the drive of interests, high-quality borrowers will gradually withdraw from the market, the overall quality of borrowers will decline, resulting in the phenomenon of "bad money expelling good money".
In recent years, with the continuous development of P2P network lending model, the legal relationship formed in the lending behavior is becoming more and more complex. In addition to the general lending law, there are also special legal relationships such as guarantee and transfer of creditor's rights, which affects the qualitative analysis of P2P network lending platform. The author thinks that the P2P platform should be classified into financial institutions. And credit intermediaries to classify and identify, and to classify supervision.
On January 20, 2015, the Banking Regulatory Commission announced the establishment of a new GSP Finance Department, stipulating that P2P network loans should be supervised by it. So far, the regulatory body of the P2P industry has been finalized, but the specific regulatory rules are still in a blank state. However, there are still some problems. The process of asset securitization is not the scope that the CBRC can supervise. This special P2P model is more suitable for the supervision of the CSRC.
The supervision of P2P network loan should take full account of the differences between financial institution-like platform and credit intermediary platform, and insist on the principle of classified supervision in market access supervision, continuous operation supervision and market exit supervision. Only in this way can the supervision be more targeted.
【学位授予单位】:山西财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:D922.28
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