国有资产“委托——代理”经营法律关系研究
本文选题:国有资产 切入点:“委托——代理” 出处:《贵州大学》2009年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】: 国有企业是我国国民经济的支柱,是财政收入的主要来源。国有企业改革是整个经济体制改革的中心环节,是中国改革成败的关键。因此,对此必须引起我们的高度重视。本文就此作了一些新的探索。下面是本文的主要内容摘要。 论文首先简述了重构我国国有资产经营法律关系的紧迫性和必要性,介绍了国内关于国有资产经营现状及有关法律关系理论研究概况。我国国有资产经营的主要现实困境就是所有权“虚置”问题,出资人职能和政府公共管理职能相混淆,导致政府宏观监管职能效率低下,国有企业生产经营成本过高,国有资产流失严重。 接着分述了国外国有资产经营模式及有关理论成果:美国国会是立法机关,也是国有资产的所有者。它可以通过立法方式来决定国有企业的设立、撤销或内部体制的改革,根据实际需要设立常设委员会或临时特别委员会对有关国有资产管理的问题进行调查,审议有关国有资产管理的议案,同时掌握国家财权。 英国议会也是国有资产的所有者,它通过对国有资产进行调整改造,不但在很大程度上甩掉了政府对亏损企业的财政补贴包袱,而且将变现的国有资产投入到新的高科技行业和“外部性”明显的行业(他们的产品主要用于出口),这样强化了国有经济的引导力和控制力。 法国议会还设立公共部门观察所,设立公众经常参与清点的制度,以增加国有资产经营活动的透明度。同时,议员还拥有直接或间接的调查权。让国有资产经营治理主体象私人企业一样按照市场规则运行,“一视同仁,平等竞争”。 在西方市场经济国家中,国有资产所占比例都比较小,尤其是经营性国有资产比重更是少之又少。另外,他们的契约观念深入人心,国有企业改革中的一切重大关系均由契约条款来界定。这从由民法中拓展到商法中的“委托—代理”契约理论就可见一斑。 美国高尔森和罗易在1993年撰文断言:“对美国公司治理的分析是解决所有权与控制权的分离问题”。而把这一问题概括为“委托——代理(principal—agent)"问题的是罗斯、詹森和麦克林,他们最先使用这一概念来论证股东和经理之间存在的公司治理关系而享誉理论界。詹森和麦克林(Jensen和Meckling)公司理论的逻辑起点是Berle和Means提出的所有权与控制权的分离理论。在两权分离的公司,股东与管理者之间的关系是一种委托代理关系。 然后论文重点阐述了我国国有资产“委托——代理”经营法律关系的制度重构,创设人大及其常委会下的国有资产“委托——代理”经营法律关系模式,即人大及其常委会拥有国有资产所有权,直接行使国有资产出资人职能,设立国有资产管理公司及金融控股公司,设置双重“委托——代理”经营法律关系。 紧接着论文具体安排了一些监督与职责的相关制度设计,包括国有资产代理人资格认证制度、独立董事和独立监事制度、参与型民主管理制度、专职人大代表制度、检举制度、经济巡查制度、政府对国有企业的宏观监管制度、行业自律制度等,以及有关各方法律责任之规制。 论文最后综述这种制度设计的优越性和国有企业与国家之间平等市场主体地位的真正确立需要观念的更新和一定时间的技术准备。
[Abstract]:The state-owned enterprise is the pillar of our national economy, is the main source of revenue. The reform of state-owned enterprises is the central link of the reform of the economic system, is the key to the success of the reform of China. Therefore, this must cause our attention. In this paper, some new exploration on this. The following are the main contents of this paper abstract.
This dissertation firstly introduces the urgency and necessity of the reconstruction of China's state-owned assets management legal relationship, introduces the domestic present situation of the state-owned assets and the relevant management on legal relation theory research. The main difficulty of our state-owned asset management is the ownership of "dummy" problem, capital function and public management function leads to confusion, the government's macro regulatory functions of inefficient state-owned enterprises, production and operation cost is too high, serious loss of state assets.
Then, the state-owned asset management mode of foreign countries and the related theoretical achievements: the United States Congress is a legislative body, is also the owner of state-owned assets. It is decided to set up state-owned enterprises by way of legislation, reform the revocation or internal system, according to the establishment of a standing committee or temporary special Committee to investigate the problem of the actual needs of the state-owned assets management and consider the relevant State-owned Assets Management Bill, and master the national property rights.
The British Parliament is also the owner of state-owned assets, through the reform and adjustment of state-owned assets, not only to a great extent to get rid of government subsidies to loss making enterprises burden, and will the realization of state-owned assets into a new high-tech industry and the "external" obvious industry (their products are mainly for export), so strengthening the guiding force and the controlling force of state-owned economy.
The French parliament also set up the public sector to set up public observation, often participate in the inventory system, to increase the transparency of state-owned asset management activities. At the same time, members also have the right of investigation and directly or indirectly. Let the state-owned asset management governance as private business. In accordance with the rules of the market operation, "the same, equal competition."
In the western market economy countries, the proportion of state-owned assets are relatively small, especially the proportion of operating state-owned assets is less and less. In addition, the concept of contract of their people, all the major relations in the reform of state owned enterprises by the contract to define the terms of this. From civil law to expand the business law the "principal-agent" contract theory is remarkable.
The United States high and in 1993 the author Roy Wilson asserted: "the analysis of American corporate governance is the problem of the separation of ownership and control. To solve this problem and summarized as the" principal-agent "(principal - agent) is the problem of Ross, Jansen and Mclean, they were the first to use this concept to prove the existence of between the shareholders and the managers of the relationship between corporate governance and reputation theory. Jansen and Mclean (Jensen and Meckling), the logical starting point of theory is the theory of separation of ownership and control of the Berle and Means is proposed. In the separation of two rights of the company, the relationship between shareholders and managers is a kind of principal-agent relationship.
Then the paper focuses on the state-owned assets "principal agent system reconstruction" business law, the creation of the NPC and its Standing Committee of state owned assets under the "principal-agent" business legal relation mode, namely the NPC and its Standing Committee have the ownership of state-owned assets, directly exercise the functions of state-owned assets, the establishment of the State-owned Assets Management Corporation and financial holding company set double "principal-agent" business legal relationship.
Then the relevant system design some specific arrangements and supervision responsibilities, including state-owned assets agent qualification certification system, independent directors and independent supervisors, participatory democracy management system, professional people's Congress system, legal system, economic inspection system, the government of state-owned enterprise's macro regulation, industry self-regulation, and regulation of legal liability of the parties concerned.
At last, the paper summarizes the superiority of this system design and the real establishment of the equal market main body between state owned enterprises and the state. It needs updating concepts and preparing for a certain time.
【学位授予单位】:贵州大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2009
【分类号】:D922.291.91
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