内幕交易民事赔偿诉讼的适格原告研究

发布时间：2018-01-31 03:43

本文关键词： 内幕交易民事赔偿诉讼适格原告　出处：《中国社会科学院研究生院》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：本文主要围绕内幕交易民事赔偿诉讼中当事人的资格问题进行研究。在世界范围内,现有的反内幕交易法律制度通常兼采刑事、行政和民事三种手段,而且传统上更偏重于前两者。形成这一局面的原因在于,传统理论与学说很难完成内幕交易民事责任之因果关系的论证。这一难题一至今尚未得到妥善解决,结果便导致了无法为内幕交易民事赔偿诉讼正当当事人提供比较有说服力的理论支撑,传统理论与学说因此要么通过法律的直接规定规避了这一难题,要么走向了否定民事救济的极端。传统的理论与学说多认为,内幕交易类似于虚假陈述,是对交易所市场公开原则的违背,内幕交易行为人通过内幕交易行为侵犯的是投资者的平等知情权。然而,内幕信息持有人对于内幕信息的掌控一般并不为法律所禁止,也就无从谈起有碍投资者正常享有对于内幕信息的平等知情权。所以,传统的理论与学说从保护知情权出发来论证内幕交易行为与投资者经济损失之间的因果关系的努力,从一开始就决定了最后不会得到确定的结果。基于这种认识,本文通过比较研究域外国家和地区的法律实践经验,分析国内现有的相关法律规定,总结审判实务中出现的一些案例,吸收与借鉴其中合理的成分,最终提出本文认为可行的确定内交易民事赔偿诉讼适格原告的办法。本文在明确内幕交易侵害客体为投资者的公平交易权益基础之上,阐明了内幕交易民事责任之因果关系。本文的分析表明,要界定内幕交易民事赔偿诉讼适格原告,应同时在私益诉讼模式和公益诉讼模式两种模式上下功夫。在私益诉讼模式下,内幕交易者的对手交易方宜作为适格原告。只是限于目前的技术条件,暂时以“同期交易者”代替,具体可由法官就个案实际判断并提供充足的理由。在公益诉讼模式下,可由法律直接赋予“投服中心”等合适的社会团体提起内幕交易公益诉讼的原告资格,并授予中国证监会法定监管权之上次位的公益诉讼原告资格,同时保障检察机关法律监督权之上兜底的公益诉讼原告资格。
[Abstract]:This paper mainly researches on the qualifications of the parties in the civil compensation lawsuit of insider trading. In the world, the existing anti insider trading legal system usually adopt criminal, administrative and civil three means, and traditionally more emphasis on them. Because of the formation of this situation, the traditional theory and the theory is very difficult to complete the causality of civil liability of insider trading and the relationship between the argument. This problem so far has not been solved properly, the result is not for insider trading civil litigation for legitimate parties to provide more convincing theoretical support, the traditional theory and doctrine so either to circumvent this problem by law directly, or to deny the civil relief extreme. Theory and the traditional theory that insider trading is similar to the false statement, is a violation of the principle of open market exchange, insider trading A violation of the insider trading behavior of investors is equal rights. However, the insider information holder for insider information control is generally not prohibited by law, it is impossible to enjoy normal investors for the insider information of the equal right to know. So, the theory and the traditional theory of the right to know from the protection to prove a causal relationship between insider trading and economic losses to investors, from the beginning of the final decision will not be determined results. Based on this understanding, through the comparative study of foreign countries and regions in the legal practice, analysis of the existing relevant laws and regulations, some cases summed up in the practice of trial, the absorption and reference reasonable composition, finally puts forward the determination of transaction in the civil compensation lawsuit of the plaintiff's method is feasible. Based on the clear inside The object of infringement for insider trading on equity basis even bargain investors, to clarify the causal relationship between the civil liability for insider trading. The analysis shows that to define insider trading civil compensation lawsuit plaintiff, should also work hard in the private interest litigation mode and litigation mode two modes. In the private interest litigation, insider trading Fang Yi as the counterparty plaintiff. Only the current technical conditions, to temporarily "earlier traders" instead, specifically by the judge on the case of the actual judgment and provide adequate reasons. In the mode of public interest litigation, by law to "investment service center" and other appropriate social groups filed the plaintiff qualification of insider trading the public interest litigation, legal supervision of the China Commission last bit of plaintiff qualification and grant, and the protection of the right of legal supervision of procuratorial organs on the pocket bottom The plaintiff qualification of public interest litigation.

【学位授予单位】：中国社会科学院研究生院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D925.1

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