当前位置:主页 > 法律论文 > 诉讼法论文 >

反垄断公益诉讼制度研究

发布时间:2018-07-26 21:06
【摘要】:以《反垄断法》的颁布实施作为一个分水岭,我国的反垄断局面发生一个翻天覆地的变化。随着公众对《反垄断法》认识的加深以及自身权利和社会公益维护意识慢慢觉醒,在实践中涌现出许多反垄断公益维权案件,越来越多的公民和企业,特别是直接利益受到垄断违法行为侵害的个体,希望能够直接参与到反垄断活动之中,通过某些途径对抗垄断违法行为,实现自身权利的救济,维护社会公共利益。但我国《反垄断法》所规定的反垄断实施机制是以行政手段为主,零星的规定了追究刑事责任的某些情形,并未对公众参与反垄断诉讼的具体措施进行规定,仅在第五十条中原则性地规定了垄断违法者的民事责任,这种反垄断实施机制已经无法适应形势的要求。反垄断公益诉讼作为新兴的反垄断实施手段,顺应时代发展的趋势并符合现实的需要,它开始受到学界和司法实践领域的关注和重视。 反垄断公益诉讼允许自然人、法人、非法人组织、公益团体等市场参与主体在法律规定的范围内,在垄断侵益行为发生或处于某种预期损害的威胁状态之时,为了维护国家和社会公益,保护自身的合法权益避免侵害,向具有管辖权的法院起诉,它以其自身的特性及特殊的制度设计在反垄断实施中有着得天独厚的优势。第一,反垄断公益诉讼迎合了反垄断法的“社会本位”的要求,反垄断法可以通过反垄断公益诉讼对社会公共利益提供更为有效的保护,对受损的社会公共利益进行救济,完成自身的立法目的和任务,两者之间有着完美的契合;第二,反垄断公益诉讼打破了传统民事诉讼法中对当事人的“直接利害关系”要求,允许与垄断违法行为并没有直接利害关系的自然人、法人、非法人组织甚至公益团体提起诉讼,可以最大程度地发动公众力量打击垄断违法行为;三,运用群体性诉讼模式解决反垄断诉讼纠纷,节省诉讼资源,提高诉讼效率;四、反垄断公益诉讼中的证据制度设计、刺激鼓励机制都体现着对弱势群体的倾向性保护,并且检察机关介入到反垄断公益诉讼中,更适合应对反垄断活动中诉讼双方力量不对等的实际情况,有利于调动私人原告的积极性,增强原告方的力量。 本文在宏观、整体把握反垄断公益诉讼制度基本理论的前提下,主要运用实证与比较分析的方法,对美、日、德等几个发达国家的反垄断公益诉讼制度进行比较研究,在比较他们在诉讼模式与诉讼规则方面的制度设计过程中引出对我国反垄断公益诉讼制度建设的启示,并进一步分析我国当前反垄断实施中存在的问题及我国引入反垄断公益诉讼的价值,最终构建适应本国国情的反垄断诉讼模式与规则。特别值得提出的是本文要在借鉴他国该领域先进经验的基础上建立一系列服务于反垄断公益诉讼的配套激励措施,在此之前,,国内学界在这个方面的研究并不多。全文通过五个部分进行阐述。 第一部分通过具体案例引入,进而分析选题的背景和意义; 第二部分在了解反垄断公益诉讼发展进程的前提下,对其概念及内涵进行全面阐述,并揭示反垄断公益诉讼的特点,从法理、政治经济学层面分析其理论基础; 第三部分介绍并比较英美法系与大陆法系几个国家有代表性的反垄断公益诉讼制度,把握其对我国反垄断公益诉讼制度构建的启示; 第四部分分析反垄断与公益诉讼的契合性,从法律与经济两个角度对在反垄断中引入公益诉讼进行价值分析,阐述反垄断引入公益诉讼的必要性; 第五部分借鉴国外在反垄断公益诉讼上的先进经验,结合我国具体情况,构建我国反垄断公益诉讼规则,其中包括我国反垄断公益诉讼模式的选择、原告资格的界定、举证责任的分配、刺激鼓励机制几个方面,通过对这几方面的探讨提出建立反垄断公益诉讼制度的初步意见。
[Abstract]:With the promulgation and implementation of the "antitrust law" as a watershed, China's anti-monopoly situation has undergone a dramatic change. With the deepening of the public awareness of the anti monopoly law, and the awakening of its own rights and social public welfare maintenance consciousness, many anti trust public welfare rights cases have emerged in practice, and more and more citizens and enterprises have come into being. In particular, the individuals who have been infringed by the monopoly law, especially the direct interests, are expected to be able to participate in the anti monopoly activities directly, to counteract the monopolistic acts in some ways, to realize the relief of their own rights and to safeguard the social and public interests. However, the Anti-monopoly Enforcement mechanism stipulated in China's antitrust law is mainly administrative and sporadic. It stipulates certain cases of criminal responsibility, and does not stipulate specific measures for public participation in antitrust litigation. It stipulates the civil liability of the monopolistic violators in principle only in the fiftieth article. This anti-monopoly implementation mechanism is unable to meet the requirements of the situation. Conform to the trend of development of the times and meet the needs of reality, it has begun to receive the attention and attention of academia and judicial practice.
The antitrust public interest litigation allows the market participants, such as natural persons, legal persons, non legal persons, and public welfare groups, to protect the national and social public welfare and protect their legitimate rights and interests from the legal rights of the court in the scope of the legal provisions. The prosecution, with its own characteristics and special system design, has a unique advantage in the implementation of antitrust. First, the anti trust public interest litigation caters to the "social standard" of the antitrust law, and the antitrust law can provide more effective protection to the social public interest through the antitrust public interest litigation and the damaged social public. The common interests carry out relief and complete their own legislative purposes and tasks, and there is a perfect agreement between them. Second, the antitrust public interest litigation breaks the "direct interest relationship" of the parties in the traditional civil procedure law and allows the natural persons, legal persons, non legal organizations and even non legal organizations that have no direct harm to the illegal acts of monopoly. Public interest groups take action to initiate public power to combat monopoly illegal behavior to the maximum extent. Three, use group litigation mode to solve antitrust litigation disputes, save litigation resources, improve litigation efficiency; four, the design of evidence system in antitrust public interest litigation, stimulating incentive mechanism to reflect the tendency of vulnerable groups. Protection, and the procuratorial organ intervenes in the antitrust public interest litigation, is more suitable to deal with the actual situation of the unequal strength of the two parties in the anti monopoly activities, which is beneficial to mobilize the enthusiasm of the private plaintiff and strengthen the power of the plaintiff.
On the premise of macro and overall grasp of the basic theory of antitrust public interest litigation system, this paper makes a comparative study of the antitrust public interest litigation system in several developed countries, such as the United States, Japan, Germany and other developed countries by using the method of empirical and comparative analysis. The Enlightenment of the construction of antitrust public interest litigation system, and further analysis of the existing problems in the implementation of anti-monopoly in China and the value of the introduction of anti trust public interest litigation in our country, and finally build the anti-monopoly litigation mode and rules adapting to the national conditions of our country. It is particularly worth putting forward that this article should be based on the advanced experience of this field in other countries. Set up a series of supporting incentive measures to serve the antitrust public interest litigation. Before this, there are few studies in this field in the domestic academic circles. The full text is expounded through five parts.
The first part is the introduction of specific cases, and then analyzes the background and significance of the topic selection.
The second part, under the premise of understanding the development process of antitrust public interest litigation, expatiate on its concept and connotation, and reveal the characteristics of antitrust public interest litigation, and analyze its theoretical basis from the legal and political economic level.
The third part introduces and compares the representative antitrust public interest litigation system in several countries of common law and continental law system, and grasps its enlightenment to the construction of China's antitrust public interest litigation system.
The fourth part analyzes the compatibility between antitrust and public interest litigation, and analyzes the value of the introduction of public interest litigation in antitrust from two angles of law and economy, and expounds the necessity of introducing antitrust into public interest litigation.
The fifth part, drawing on the advanced experience of foreign antitrust public interest litigation and combining with the specific circumstances of our country, constructs the rules of our country's antitrust public interest litigation, including the choice of our antitrust public interest litigation mode, the definition of the qualification of the plaintiff, the distribution of the burden of proof, the stimulation and encouragement mechanism, and the discussion of these aspects. A preliminary opinion on the establishment of a system of antitrust public interest litigation.
【学位授予单位】:重庆大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:D922.294

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前10条

1 宋怡林;法经济学的效益目标[J];鞍山科技大学学报;2003年01期

2 李长春;罗丽华;;制度溯源及其意义——公益诉讼原告制度的法系考察[J];北京航空航天大学学报(社会科学版);2007年03期

3 陈静媛;公法、私法的划分及其意义[J];当代法学;1999年02期

4 耿昭;;对政府网上公众参与的实践与思考[J];电子政务;2008年Z1期

5 王晓晔;;有效竞争——我国竞争政策和反垄断法的目标模式[J];法学家;1998年02期

6 王立国;;经济法视野下的竞争诉讼机制[J];辽宁公安司法管理干部学院学报;2008年01期

7 宋海伟;王海峰;;反垄断贸易壁垒机制初探[J];贵州警官职业学院学报;2007年02期

8 黎雅琴;;美国消费者集团诉讼中的“优待券”和解问题初探[J];凯里学院学报;2007年01期

9 汪洋;唐加锴;;公共选择理论视野下的腐败治理问题[J];中国市场;2011年22期

10 郑鹏程;;美国反垄断法三倍损害赔偿制度研究[J];环球法律评论;2006年02期



本文编号:2147287

资料下载
论文发表

本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/falvlunwen/susongfa/2147287.html


Copyright(c)文论论文网All Rights Reserved | 网站地图 |

版权申明:资料由用户43dfa***提供,本站仅收录摘要或目录,作者需要删除请E-mail邮箱bigeng88@qq.com