法条竞合的实践难题及解决

发布时间：2018-05-16 17:52

本文选题：法条竞合 + 想象竞合　；参考：《辽宁大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：法条竞合理论在刑法理论中占有重要地位。我国刑法理论界对法条竞合的相关理论进行了深入的研究并有所成效。但是在针对一般条款对于特殊条款的截堵问题，法条竞合与想象竞合的界分，以及法条竞合的适用原则等基本问题上，仍然不能达成共识，需要进一步深入的探讨。同时，由于法条竞合问题在理论上的模糊性，导致司法者在承办案件的过程中不能准确的处理这种繁杂的法条竞合问题。所以，无论是在理论层面还是司法实践中，都有对此问题作出深刻探讨之必要。本文在全面梳理关于法条竞合实践难题即一般条款对于特殊条款的封堵功能问题，法条竞合与想象竞合的区别问题，法条竞合中从一重处罚原则问题既有研究成果之基础上，进行了进一步的探讨，并提出了解决之道。全文分为以下几部分：第一部分：先由针对一般条款对于特殊条款的封堵功能的相关案例引发出对于封堵功能的反思，进而归纳和分析一般条款对于特殊条款的封堵功能的实践中的做法和理论争议，最后对相关争议进行评析，深入论证一般条款不具有封堵功能的原因。笔者认为一般条款对于特殊条款的封堵违背了罪行法定的基本原则，忽视了立法者设立特殊条款的目的。第二部分：先由法条竞合与想象竞合易混淆的相关案例引发的问题，总结法条竞合与想象竞合区别在理论上的不同观点，以及实践中的不同作法，最终确定法条竞合与想象竞合区分标准。笔者认为只存在包容关系的法条竞合，，法条之间的交叉关系不能构成法条竞合。我们只有注意到这个关键区别，才能很好把握两者的界限。第三部分：先由法条竞合中重法优于轻法的相关案例引发的问题，进一步归纳出法条竞合可否适用从一重处罚原则的理论之争即肯定说和否定说。最后分析肯定说的缺陷，以及对法条竞合不应当适用从一重处罚原则提出我自己的见解。从一重处罚原则违背了罪刑法定的基本原则，法条竞合的从一重处罚原则违背了立法本意，超越了立法设定的选择范围。从立法本意来看，从一重处罚并不存在于立法者授权的选择范围内，若司法者在由于特别条款的处罚较轻而选择适用较重一般条款，就是对立法权的僭越。
[Abstract]:The theory of concurrence of laws and articles occupies an important position in the theory of criminal law. The theoretical circle of criminal law of our country has carried on the thorough research to the related theory of the law article concurrence, and has carried on the result. However, there is still no consensus on the basic issues such as the blocking of special clauses in general terms, the boundary division between the competing articles of law and imaginative competition, as well as the applicable principles of competing articles of law, and so on, which need to be further explored. At the same time, because of the ambiguity in theory, the judiciary can not deal with this complicated problem in the process of handling cases accurately. Therefore, whether in theory or judicial practice, there is a need to make a profound study of this issue. On the basis of the existing research results, this paper comprehensively combs the practical problems concerning the overlapping of laws, that is, the blocking function of the general clauses for the special clauses, the difference between the competing articles of laws and the imaginative concurrence, and the principle of single penalty in the competition of articles of law. Further discussion was carried out and solutions were put forward. The full text is divided into the following parts: The first part: from the general clause to the special clause plugging function related cases to trigger the reflection on the plugging function, and then induces and analyzes the practice and the theory dispute of the general clause for the special clause blocking function. Finally, the related disputes are analyzed and the reasons why the general clause does not have plugging function are discussed in depth. The author thinks that the general clause forbids the special clause violates the basic principle of crime and neglects the purpose of legislator to set up special clause. The second part: firstly, the problems caused by the confusion between the competing of articles of law and the competing of imagination are discussed, and the different viewpoints in theory and the different practices in practice are summarized. Finally determine the distinction standard between the law and the imagination. The author thinks that there is only an inclusive relationship between articles of law, and the cross relationship between articles of law can not constitute a combination of articles of law. Only by paying attention to this crucial difference can we grasp the boundary between the two. The third part: firstly, the problem caused by the case that the law is more important than the light law, and the theory of whether the law can be applied from the principle of double punishment, that is, the affirmative theory and the negation theory. Finally, this paper analyzes the defects of affirmation theory, and puts forward my own opinion on the principle of double punishment which should not be applied to the concurrence of articles of law. The principle of single punishment violates the basic principle of legality, and the principle of concurrent punishment violates the original intention of legislation and exceeds the scope of choice set by legislation. From the point of view of legislative intention, from the perspective of legislative intent, the choice of heavy punishment does not exist in the scope of the legislative authorization. If the judiciary chooses to apply the heavier general clause because of the lighter punishment of the special clause, it is a violation of the legislative power.
【学位授予单位】：辽宁大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D914

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