构造与博弈:互联网监控的权力关系解构

发布时间：2018-03-17 07:11

  本文选题：互联网监控　切入点：逻辑构造　出处：《行政法学研究》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：基于互联网运行结构形成的监控体系在逻辑构造上由政治逻辑和经济逻辑构成。两种逻辑进路围绕政治逻辑形成了国家、商业组织与社会个体三方参与的权力关系。由于各方利益主张不同,权力关系时刻处于博弈之中。作为监控者,国家与商业组织会在绝大多数情境中采取合作策略,而在利益严重冲突时则转变为对抗策略。无论监控者之间采取何种策略,均将使作为被监控者的社会个体利益遭受损害,加剧了权力结构的不稳定性。国家为调和利益冲突,通过立法程序来确定各方在监控关系中的利益顺位。由于立法程序也将国家利益放在首位,而社会个体利益始终放在末尾,这种权力关系还将长期处于博弈状态中。
[Abstract]:The monitoring system based on the operation structure of Internet is composed of political logic and economic logic in logic structure. The power relationship between commercial organizations and social individuals is always in the game because the interests of all parties are different. As monitors, the state and commercial organizations will adopt cooperative strategies in most situations. No matter what strategy is adopted between the monitors, the interests of the individual society as the monitored person will be harmed and the instability of the power structure will be aggravated. In order to reconcile the conflict of interests, the state will reconcile the conflict of interests. Because the legislative procedure also puts the national interests in the first place, and the social individual interests always put at the end, the power relationship will be in a game state for a long time.
【作者单位】： 西南政法大学;重庆市南岸区人民检察院;
【基金】：2015年教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目“国家治理现代化视野中的犯罪治理模式研究”(1978-2013)(15YJS820085)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：D912.1
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本文编号：1623689