中国自然保护区生态补偿机制构建与反思--基于各方利益主体的博弈视角

发布时间：2018-06-29 19:09

本文选题：自然保护区 + 生态补偿　；参考：基于各方利益主体的博弈视角

【摘要】：在分析生态补偿机制中各方利益主体决策行为的基础上,构建了中国自然保护区生态补偿政策下两组核心利益主体的博弈模型,研究了相关利益主体行为的"可信性问题"和相关因素变动对主体行为的影响。结果表明:"不可信许诺"使得生态补偿政策难以达到预期效益,要使社区居民遵守"诺言",取决于查处概率和处罚金额两方面因素;在现实生活中,由于"激励悖论"现象的存在,增加对企业的罚款从长远来看并不能真正抑制企业的污染行为,反而会增加当地保护区管理部门懈怠渎职的概率。因此,提出中国自然保护区生态补偿机制的重构路径:以健全官员考核体系,加大惩处力度为基础;以加强宣传教育,提高居民收入为纽带;以完善法律制度,创新监管机制为动力;以明确责任主体,疏通信息渠道为保障。
[Abstract]:Based on the analysis of the decision-making behavior of the stakeholders in the ecological compensation mechanism, the game model of the two groups of core interest subjects under the ecological compensation policy of the nature reserves in China is constructed. This paper studies the credibility of the behavior of the relevant stakeholders and the influence of the change of the relevant factors on the behavior of the subject. The results show that the "untrustworthy promise" makes it difficult for ecological compensation policy to achieve the expected benefits. To make the community residents keep the "promise" depends on the probability of investigation and punishment and the amount of punishment. Because of the phenomenon of "incentive paradox", increasing the fines on enterprises can not really restrain the pollution behavior of enterprises in the long run, but will increase the probability of slack and dereliction of duty on the part of local reserve management departments. Therefore, this paper puts forward the reconstruction path of ecological compensation mechanism in nature reserves in China: based on perfecting the assessment system of officials, increasing punishment, strengthening propaganda and education, raising residents' income, and perfecting the legal system. Innovation of the regulatory mechanism as the driving force; to clear the main responsibility of the information channel for the protection.
【作者单位】：贵州大学管理学院;贵州大学旅游与文化产业学院;
【分类号】：D922.68

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