煤矿安全治理的新制度经济学分析

发布时间：2018-07-27 18:08

【摘要】：改革开放以来，中国社会经济高速发展的同时，矿难也受到了普遍关注，，矿难已然成为中国久治不愈的百年沉珂。煤矿安全事故的发生与煤矿安全治理息息相关，改革开放以来，我国经历了由计划经济向市场经济的变迁，经济体制的变革同时也深深地影响着我国的煤矿安全治理。伴随着乡镇煤矿的兴起，计划经济时期传统的单向行政命令式的煤矿安全治理已经无法适应新的形势，煤炭产量大幅增长的同时，矿难也频繁发生。这对我国的煤矿安全治理提出了新的要求。煤矿安全问题制约着我国煤炭工业的进一步发展，煤矿安全治理是当前我国经济建设的一项重要内容，本文从新制度经济学的角度系统分析了我国改革开放以后煤矿安全治理各项措施的演进过程，具有重要的理论和现实意义。改革开放后煤矿安全治理涉及的主体由原先的政府与煤矿企业扩展到中央政府、地方政府、煤矿企业，矿工及第三方力量，它们围绕煤矿安全问题展开了新的利益博弈，从而形成了一系列旨在规范他们之间关系的煤矿安全治理措施。本文运用制度变迁理论、产权理论、委托代理理论对煤矿安全的准入治理、产权治理、监察治理及行政问责治理进行了分析，并运用博弈模型对委托代理问题进行了深入探讨，旨在揭示这一制度演进的内在逻辑及有效运行的社会机理，以期对改善我国的煤矿安全治理有所启发。本文的基本结论为：第一，我国的煤矿安全准入治理并不是简单地向减少审批的方向发展，而是根据不同的历史背景由制度供给者与制度需求者的成本收益等多种综合因素决定的，煤矿安全的准入治理中还存在着审批者与煤矿企业信息不对称、审批者缺乏有效监督等问题。第二，煤矿安全产权治理的演进体现为采矿权取得制度从无偿到有偿的转变，通过对相关主体激励约束的改变逐步改善了我国的煤矿安全状况。现阶段的产权治理中还存在着采矿权取得制度亟待完善，国有矿的产权改革迫在眉睫等问题。第三，煤矿安全监察治理从以管代监模式向监管分离模式的演进，主要是通过提高代理人的独立性使煤矿安全状况发生了好转。现阶段煤矿安全监察治理中存在着煤矿安全监察主体单一、独立性不强等问题。第四，煤矿安全行政问责治理通过提高代理人的违约成本，减少了煤矿安全事故的发生。目前的行政问责制中还存在问责主体单一、缺乏有关问责的专门法律等问题。最后，笔者针对这些问题提出了相应的政策建议。本文的创新之处在于本文认为煤矿安全治理是一个动态的演进过程，通过系统地梳理煤矿安全的治理措施，将其分为煤矿安全的准入治理、产权治理、监察治理及行政问责治理四个方面，选取了新制度经济学的研究视角，运用制度变迁理论、产权理论与委托代理理论对这四项措施的演变过程进行了分析。但是，本文存在着在一定程度上忽略了科学技术对煤矿安全的影响以及对法律治理方面的分析不足等问题。四项治理措施之间的相互影响也是我们需要进一步研究的问题。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up and the rapid development of China's social and economic development, the mining disaster has also received widespread attention. The mine disaster has become a long lasting century Ceekay in China. The occurrence of coal mine safety accidents is closely related to the management of coal mine safety. Since the reform and opening up, China has experienced the change from the planning economy to the market economy and the reform of the economic system. At the same time, it has a deep influence on the management of coal mine safety in China. With the rise of the township coal mine, the traditional one-way administrative command type coal mine safety management in the planned economy period has been unable to adapt to the new situation, while the coal production has increased greatly, the mine disaster also frequently occurs. This has put forward new requirements for the safety management of the coal mine in our country. The coal mine safety problem restricts the further development of China's coal industry. The coal mine safety management is an important part of the current economic construction in our country. This paper systematically analyzes the evolution process of various measures of the coal mine safety management after the reform and opening up in China, which has important theoretical and practical significance.
After the reform and opening up, the main body of the coal mine safety management is extended from the original government and coal mine enterprises to the central government, the local government, the coal mine enterprises, the miners and the three party forces, which have launched a new benefit game around the coal mine safety problems, thus forming a series of measures to regulate the relationship between them. This paper uses the theory of institutional change, property right theory and principal-agent theory to analyze the admittance management of coal mine safety, property right governance, supervisory governance and administrative accountability management, and makes an in-depth discussion on the principal-agent problem by using the game model, aiming at revealing the internal logic of the system and the effective operation of the social mechanism. It has some inspiration to improve the management of coal mine safety in China.
The basic conclusions of this paper are as follows: first, the management of coal mine safety access in China is not simply developed to reduce the direction of examination and approval, but is determined by a variety of comprehensive factors, such as the cost and benefit of the institutional suppliers and the system needs, according to the different historical background. The information asymmetry, the examiner lacks the effective supervision and so on. Second, the evolution of the coal mine safety property management embodies the transformation of the mining right acquisition system from free to paid, and gradually improves the state of coal mine safety in China through the change of the related subject incentive and constraint. To be perfect, the property rights reform of state-owned mines is imminent. Third, the evolution of coal mine safety supervision and management from the mode of supervision to supervision separation is mainly through the improvement of the independence of the agent to improve the safety of coal mine. Fourth, coal mine safety administrative accountability governance through improving the agent's cost of breach of contract, reduce the occurrence of coal mine safety accidents. The current administrative accountability system still exists a single accountability subject, the lack of specific legal issues related to accountability. Finally, the author put forward the corresponding policy suggestions on these issues.
The innovation of this article lies in the view that the coal mine safety management is a dynamic evolution process. Through systematically combing the management measures of coal mine safety, it divides it into four aspects: the admittance management of the coal mine safety, the property right governance, the supervisory governance and the administrative accountability governance, and selects the research perspective of the new institutional economics and uses the institutional change. Theory, property right theory and principal-agent theory are used to analyze the evolution process of these four measures. However, this paper ignores the impact of science and technology on coal mine safety and the lack of analysis on legal governance to a certain extent. The mutual influence between the four measures is also needed to be further studied. The problem.
【学位授予单位】：山西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.1;F426.21

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