制造商的再制造专利许可策略研究

发布时间：2018-03-05 13:22

本文选题：再制造　切入点：专利许可　出处：《重庆大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着再制造产业的发展，原产品制造商（以下简称制造商）与再制造商的利益冲突和知识产权冲突问题逐渐显现。现有司法实践和学术研究对再制造是否构成侵权的论点，从“权利用尽”和“默许认可”的原则来讲，可以认为修理不构成侵权，而再制造和再造相当于生产全新的产品，在未经许可的情况下会构成侵权。因此再制造专利许可是企业再制造决策必须考虑的因素。目前关于再制造闭环供应链的研究主要集中在废旧品回收，产品定价策略，再制造品销售渠道，，再制造模式等领域，鲜有文献研究闭环供应链中的再制造专利许可问题。本文首先对再制造的作用与意义进行了概述，提出了再制造行业面临的专利许可问题，并对涉及再制造与专利许可的国内外研究文献进行了述评。其次在细分绿色消费者和普通消费者的基础上，研究了制造商的再制造专利许可行为。分别构建了不许可再制造和许可再制造两种情形下的供应链定价模型，求得了制造商和再制造商的最优定价策略以及制造商的最优专利许可费，并对不许可再制造和许可再制造两种情形下的最优决策进行了比较分析。通过数值仿真，分析了绿色消费者市场份额、普通消费者对再制造品的接受度对最优专利许可费、最优产品价格和供应链成员利润的影响。最后研究了制造商的最优再制造专利许可策略，在考虑消费者偏好的基础上，分别构建了制造商不许可再制造、制造商采取提成许可制许可再制造、制造商采取固定费许可制许可再制造情形下的供应链定价模型，求得并比较了制造商采取不同的再制造专利许可策略情形下制造商和再制造商的最优定价策略，得出了提成许可制和固定费许可制的适用范围。通过数值仿真，分析了消费者偏好对产品价格、产品销量和制造商利润的影响。
[Abstract]:With the development of the remanufacturing industry, the conflicts of interest and intellectual property rights between the original product manufacturers (hereinafter referred to as the manufacturers) and the re-manufacturers have gradually emerged. In terms of the principles of "exhaustion of rights" and "tacit approval", it can be considered that repair does not constitute an infringement, and that remanufacturing and reengineering is tantamount to the production of a completely new product. Therefore, remanufacturing patent license is a factor that must be considered in the remanufacturing decision. At present, the research on the closed-loop supply chain of remanufacturing is mainly focused on the recycling of waste goods and the pricing strategy of the products. In the field of remanufacture distribution channel and remanufacturing mode, few literatures have studied the issue of remanufacturing patent license in closed-loop supply chain. In this paper, the role and significance of remanufacturing are summarized, the problems of patent licensing in remanufacturing industry are put forward, and the domestic and international research literatures on remanufacturing and patent licensing are reviewed. Secondly, on the basis of subdividing green consumers and ordinary consumers, this paper studies the manufacturer's remanufacturing patent license behavior, and constructs the supply chain pricing model under the condition of non-licensed remanufacturing and licensing remanufacturing, respectively. The optimal pricing strategy of manufacturer and re-manufacturer and the optimal patent license fee of manufacturer are obtained, and the optimal decision in the case of non-licensed remanufacturing and licensed remanufacturing is compared and analyzed. The effects of market share of green consumers, acceptance of remanufactured products by ordinary consumers on optimal patent licensing fees, optimal product prices and profit of supply chain members are analyzed. Finally, the optimal remanufacturing patent licensing strategy of manufacturer is studied. On the basis of considering consumer preference, the manufacturer does not permit remanufacturing, and the manufacturer adopts royalty license to remanufacture. The manufacturer adopts the supply chain pricing model in the case of fixed fee license and remanufacturing, and obtains and compares the optimal pricing strategy between manufacturer and remanufacturer under different remanufacturing patent licensing strategies. Through numerical simulation, the influence of consumer preference on product price, product sales volume and manufacturer's profit is analyzed.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F424;F713.2;F204

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