国际技术标准竞争中的国家利益与有筹码的博弈研究

发布时间：2018-06-08 12:54

本文选题：技术标准竞争 + 国家利益　；参考：《北京邮电大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：随着经济全球化的推进和信息产业的迅速发展,经济竞争的制高点已经逐渐转向技术优势,技术标准竞争正在向市场竞争的高级形式演变,各行各业中的企业都在努力尝试将自身的标准树立为市场上的主导标准,从而获得市场的控制权,谋求巨大的商业利益。对国家而言,每个时期不同的主导产业的掌控能力是衡量一个国家竞争力的重要标志,甚至关系到一个国家产业结构、经济结构乃至国际政治结构的调整。原本就在技术上占有绝对优势的发达国家则能够更加便利地成为竞争的主导者,从中获得巨额经济利益。同时,发达国家和垄断企业通过制定标准战略,利用国际标准组织和规则,将知识产权和标准体系结合起来,制订出有利于自己的标准体系,筑起一道坚实的技术壁垒,迫使发展中国家在国际竞争的新格局中处于更加不利的地位。标准争夺的背后实际上隐含了国家对经济领导权的争夺以及对国家战略利益的维护。因此,如何参与标准竞争夺取领先地位,实现国家利益最大化,对于发展中国家来讲,是一个更加亟待解决的核心问题。本文在总结和评述已有文献的基础上,针对技术标准竞争成为市场竞争高级形式的发展趋势,提出国际标准竞争中国家利益量化函数,引入筹码概念,构建多阶段动态博弈模型,研究非对等技术水平和对等技术水平条件下,博弈参与国最优技术管制和新技术标准开发策略。具体而言,主要完成的创新工作如下：一是提出在国际标准竞争中获取国家利益最大化的概念,给出量化的收益函数。将企业间的标准竞争上升到国家间的标准竞争高度,考虑经济利益、安全系数、自主产权量化收益、网络效应、消费者效用等因素,从国家经济安全的角度提出国家利益函数。二是构建非对等技术水平条件下标准竞争动态博弈模型和对等技术水平条件下标准竞争多阶段动态博弈模型。提出技术先行国和追赶国在国际标准竞争中获取国家利益最大化的最优技术标准竞争策略,作为技术追赶的发展中国家往往存在技术创新基础和实力总体较薄弱等问题,需通过产业政策、竞争政策和知识产权保护政策等,支持和促进国内产业发展,并需防止技术先行国滥用知识产权、标准优势等行为。对等水平条件标准竞争,提出了获取国家利益最大化的最优新技术标准开发策略,研究表明,决定动态博弈模型结果的因素取决于知识产权的量化所带来的收益以及两国所采取不同的策略各自需要承受的风险值大小。三是定义了技术标准竞争下的筹码概念,并对其中一种筹码引入博弈对均衡的影响进行了理论分析,对国际标准竞争中运用筹码策略提供理论依据。通过构建有筹码的技术标准竞争多阶段动态博弈模型,提出在国际标准竞争中获取国家利益最大化的最优技术标准竞争策略及筹码策略。在非对称技术水平条件下引入筹码概念,并将其分为保障性筹码和威胁性筹码,分别研究了一国拥有筹码和两国均拥有筹码,三种不同情况下技术先行国的技术管制策略、追赶国新技术标准开发策略。研究表明,拥有筹码的一方比没有筹码的一方更具有优势,会使纳什均衡往有利于自身的方向改变；拥有威胁性筹码的一方比拥有保障性筹码的一方更具有优势；当博弈双方都拥有筹码时,可能会使得纳什均衡朝着社会效益最大化的方向发展。论文最后部分还利用有筹码的技术标准竞争多阶段动态博弈模型对中国的TD-SCDMA和欧盟的WCDMA通信技术标准之间的竞争进行了博弈分析,并对我国开发4G/5G通信标准提出了政策建议,对应用研究做了一些创新性的探讨分析。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economic globalization and the rapid development of information industry, the commanding heights of economic competition have gradually turned to technical advantages. The competition of technical standards is evolving into the advanced form of market competition. All enterprises in all walks of life are trying to set up their own standards as the dominant standards on the market, thus obtaining market control. For the state, the control ability of the different leading industries in each period is an important symbol to measure the competitiveness of a country, even to the adjustment of a country's industrial structure, economic structure and even the international political structure. The developed countries, which have the absolute superiority in technology, can be more effective. At the same time, the developed countries and the monopoly enterprises, through the formulation of standard strategy, the use of international standard organizations and rules to combine intellectual property and standard system, develop a standard system for their own, and build a solid technical barrier to force the developing countries. The new pattern of international competition is in a more disadvantageous position. Behind the standard contention is actually implying the state's contention for economic leadership and the maintenance of the national strategic interests. Therefore, how to take part in the standard competition to seize the leading position and maximize the national interests is a more urgent solution for the developing countries. The core issue.
On the basis of summarizing and reviewing the existing literature, aiming at the development trend of the technical standard competition as the advanced form of market competition, this paper puts forward the quantitative function of the interest of the Chinese family in the international standard competition, introduces the concept of chips, constructs a multi-stage dynamic game model, and studies the participating countries of the game under the non equivalent technical level and the level of peer technology. The best technology control and the new technology standard development strategy are.
First, it puts forward the concept of maximizing national interest in international standard competition, and gives a quantified income function. It raises the standard competition between enterprises to the standard competition height among countries, considers economic benefits, safety coefficient, quantitative income of independent property rights, network effect, and the utility of consumers, from the point of view of national economic security. The function of national interest.
The two is to construct the dynamic game model of the standard competition under the non equivalent technical level and the multi stage dynamic game model of the standard competition under the equal technology level, and put forward the optimal technical standard competition strategy to maximize the national interests in the international standard competition. It is necessary to support and promote the development of domestic industry through industrial policy, competition policy and intellectual property protection policy, such as industrial policy, competition policy and intellectual property protection policy, and to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights and standard advantages. The development strategy of the optimal new technical standards shows that the factors that determine the results of the dynamic game model depend on the benefits of the quantification of intellectual property rights and the magnitude of the risk values that the two countries need to adopt for different strategies.
The three is to define the concept of chips under the competition of technical standards, and the theoretical analysis of the influence of one kind of chips introducing game to equilibrium, and to provide the theoretical basis for the use of chips in international standard competition. The optimal technical standard competition strategy and chip strategy of home benefit maximization are introduced with the concept of chips under the asymmetrical technical level, and divided into secure chips and threat chips. The technology control strategy of a country with chips and two countries with chips and three different situations is studied, and the new technology is chased by the country. Standard development strategy. Research shows that a square with a chip is more advantageous than a non chip, making Nash equilibrium in the direction that is beneficial to itself; a square with threatening chips is more advantageous than a party with a secure chip; when both players have chips, it may make Nash balanced. The direction of the maximization of social benefits is developing.
The last part of the paper also makes use of the technical standard competitive multi stage dynamic game model with the chips to analyze the competition between China's TD-SCDMA and the WCDMA communication technology standards of the European Union, and puts forward some policy suggestions on the development of 4G/5G communication standards in China, and makes some innovative discussion and analysis on the application research.
【学位授予单位】：北京邮电大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F203

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