欧盟竞争法对知识产权滥用市场支配地位的规制

发布时间：2018-08-22 14:12

【摘要】：知识产权法和竞争法从产生之日便交织在一起，它们之间既存在共同目标，又具有冲突和矛盾的一面。共同目标体现在鼓励创新和促进消费者福利。冲突则主要在于它们鼓励创新和促进消费者福利的方式不同：反垄断法是通过反对限制竞争、维护市场有效竞争来实现目标，因为限制竞争会损害现实和潜在的竞争；而知识产权法则是通过授予某种限制竞争的方式，如通过保护专有权，给予权利人一段时间内的排他性权利来激励人们在知识经济领域的创新活动。虽然知识产权法保护权利人的排他性权利，但知识产权与一般财产权一样在反垄断法上并无根本的区别，因为知识产权也具有限制竞争的可能性，难免会受到反垄断法的制约。也就是说，一方面，权利人有权通过其发明创造等受知识产权保护的智力成果获取竞争优势地位甚至垄断地位；另一方面，因为市场经济的本质是竞争，竞争也是促进创新的途径之一，反垄断法不允许知识产权人凭借其垄断地位而严重妨碍、限制或者扭曲市场竞争。对于竞争法是否应该干预知识产权的问题，理论界有两种截然相反的观点。一种是不干预论，这种观点认为即使某一特定知识产权确实给权利人带来了垄断力，这种排他性权利也应该受到保护，免于竞争法审查；竞争法的适用只会给知识产权制度的激励机制造成负面影响。政策制定者在打击限制竞争行为时犯错的可能性和各种错误的代价决定了谴责竞争性行为的成本比豁免限制竞争行为的成本要高。因此，建议竞争法执法者不要干预与知识产权有关的创新市场。美国在微软拆分案对待知识产权垄断的态度是不干预论。当微软面临垄断而被起诉面临拆分的危险时，美国经济学界达成了一种前所未有的默契，痛斥美国反垄断法。与不干预论相反的是欧盟委员会一贯持有的干预论，这种干预的基础是互补理论。互补理论认为：知识产权法授予排他性权利的事实并不意味着知识产权和竞争规则之间存在固有的冲突。实际上，这两个法律制度都以促进消费者福利和资源的有效分配为基本目标。创新是一个开放的竞争市场所必要的、动态的组成部分。知识产权通过鼓励企业投资开发新产品、新技术来促进动态竞争，而竞争法通过给企业实施竞争压力促进创新。所以，二者均为促进创新和竞争所必须。除了知识产权制度的保护外，企业投资创新也需要来自其他企业的竞争压力。没有知识产权保护，竞争者可以通过模仿来竞争，而不需要自己投资更好的新产品；没有竞争压力，就不能保证知识产权人获得垄断利润后会继续投资创新。尤其在迅猛发展的高科技领域，某个拥有事实上或法律上的标准的知识产权企业很容易将整个市场收归己有，此后该知识产权企业就可能排除这一市场原本存在的竞争，为扩张知识产权而开始寻租活动。由此可见，在竞争状态下，一个竞争者可以通过投资创新赢得未来的垄断利润，但反过来，在垄断状态下，一个支配地位企业不需要继续投资未来的创新就能获得垄断利润。所以，以互补理论为基础的干预论主张，动态竞争受到限制时竞争法应该干预知识产权领域。近年来，跨国公司屡屡在我国通过知识产权策略如拒绝许可、超高定价、强制性一揽子许可、设置“专利丛林”等手段，滥用其因为拥有知识产权而获得的市场支配地位，排挤竞争对手，危及我国民族企业的发展，损害消费者福利。在我国，从理论上讲，知识产权滥用的情况也不仅仅发生在跨国公司身上，国内企业同样也可能发生知识产权滥用的情况。但目前由于我国本土企业在知识产权方面还处于相对劣势，而跨国公司实力雄厚，技术先进，持有的知识产权也很多，较之我国一般企业来说更容易发生知识产权滥用的问题，其影响也更大。所以经常见诸报端的知识产权滥用市场支配地位行为主要是跨国公司所为。在中国并不是真的不存在知识产权滥用市场支配地位的问题，只是因为很多情况下没有相应的法律规范才使一些行为没有受到应有的制裁。如何防止知识产权制度背离其立法初衷和沦为创新垄断的工具，是我国反垄断法需要解决的一个重要问题。过度保护的权利必然导致权利的滥用。尤其在我国自主创新水平较低，技术相对落后，而外来知识产权力量强大的状况下，知识产权立法已与国际接轨，降低知识产权保护水平不可行，因此不能不强化知识产权反垄断规制。强知识产权保护与强反垄断法规制是一个硬币的两面，是为我国技术发展经济腾飞保驾护航的两大支柱。因此，两手都要抓，而且两手都要硬。相对于知识产权保护来说，我国知识产权反垄断问题显得更为突出，已经迫在眉睫，但我国在知识产权反垄断方面的立法却不完善。如何在保护竞争和保护知识产权之间找到平衡点，即一方面保护知识产权的激励机制，使其充分发挥“给天才之火添加了利益之油”的功能，以最终丰富公共产品和提高消费者福利，另一方面又要维护市场的有效竞争，将知识产权领域的排除、限制竞争限于为激励创新所必需的范围之内，这是我国急需解决的问题。从国际经验看，欧盟竞争法的首要目标是建立统一的内部市场，对利用知识产权来限制商品货物自由流动和限制自由竞争等行为进行严格规制，欧洲法院因此创立了一系列规制知识产权滥用的原则和判例。欧盟对知识产权滥用的规制主要是通过竞争法来实现。与美国那种对知识产权反竞争行为，尤其是知识产权滥用市场支配地位行为较为宽松的态度相比，欧盟的经验更适合今天的中国。在滥用市场支配地位的规制上，我国《反垄断法》更多地借鉴了欧盟竞争法的模式。我国已颁布并实施的《反垄断法》对知识产权反垄断行为只有原则性的规定，具体内容言之甚少，反垄断法在知识产权领域的适用成了理论和实践中的难点问题。在知识产权滥用市场支配地位方面，欧盟积累了一些案例和行政执法经验，出台了《欧盟运行条约》第102条(下文简称TFEU第102条)的执法指南，学术研究成果也较为丰富，这些为我国在知识产权领域滥用市场支配地位行为方面的立法和执法提供了借鉴；此外，欧盟一直在探讨的效果分析方法改革对我国知识产权领域滥用市场支配问题分析方法具有一定的参考意义。基于以上认识，本文对知识产权领域滥用市场支配地位的欧盟竞争法规制进行了研究，具体内容如下。第一章从知识产权保护与竞争法的关系着手，从经济学、竞争法学角度对这一问题展开分析，比较了各种学说的优劣，回顾了欧美等竞争执法先进国家和地区对二者关系处理的历史，就竞争法能否干预知识产权领域问题形成研究的基本立场。第二章对欧盟竞争法规制知识产权滥用市场支配地位的一般方法做了深入探讨，阐述了欧盟竞争判例法中传统的形式主义分析方法和欧盟委员会一直在呼吁采用的TFEU第102条效果分析方法，并就效果方法能否适用于知识产权滥用市场支配地位案件做了比较分析。第三章和第四章，针对欧盟知识产权领域滥用市场支配地位案件中涉及的具体行为分别进行了分析，对构成要件、判断标准等逐一展开了论述，并指出了欧盟委员会和法院对具体案件处理中存在的不足。拒绝许可是欧盟知识产权反竞争行为中最为典型的一种，在例外情况下可能构成知识产权滥用市场支配地位行为。典型案例主要有IBM案、Volvo案和Renault案、Magill案、IMSHealth案和微软案。这些案例的发展，使欧盟对拒绝许可反竞争行为的构成要件越来越明晰，新产品规则、二级市场标准和关键设施标准等都在本文中得到了详细的论述。滥用专利申请制度是一种新型的知识产权领域滥用市场支配地位行为，欧盟委员会的制药行业调查报告和最新的案例对该行为都持积极的规制态度，有一定的可取之处，但也存在一些遗留的问题，对此本文也做了相应探讨。最后，结合我国的知识产权立法状况，国际知识产权保护水平，我国知识产权保护与经济增长的关系以及我国知识产权领域滥用市场支配地位现状和我国知识产权反垄断立法现状等，在借鉴欧盟经验的基础上，对完善我国知识产权领域滥用市场支配地位规制从原则到具体分析方法都提出了对策与建议，以期对《关于知识产权领域反垄断执法的指南》的制定提供一些有益的参考。
[Abstract]:Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law have been intertwined from the very day of their emergence. They have both common objectives and conflicting and contradictory aspects. Competition is controlled and effective competition is maintained in the market to achieve the goal, because restriction of competition will damage the actual and potential competition; while intellectual property law encourages people to innovate in the field of knowledge economy by granting some form of restriction of competition, such as protection of exclusive rights and granting the obligee exclusive rights for a period of time. Intellectual property law protects the exclusive rights of the obligee, but there is no fundamental difference between intellectual property rights and general property rights in anti-monopoly law, because intellectual property rights also have the possibility of restricting competition and will inevitably be subject to anti-monopoly law. That is to say, on the one hand, the obligee has the right to be protected by intellectual property rights through his invention and creation. On the other hand, because the essence of market economy is competition, competition is also one of the ways to promote innovation, anti-monopoly law does not allow intellectual property owners to rely on their monopoly status to seriously hinder, restrict or distort market competition.
There are two opposing views on whether competition law should intervene in intellectual property rights. One is non-intervention, which holds that even if a particular intellectual property right does bring monopoly power to the obligee, the exclusive right should be protected from the review of competition law. The incentive mechanism of the intellectual property system has a negative impact. The likelihood of policymakers making mistakes in combating restrictive competition and the cost of all kinds of mistakes determine that the cost of condemning competitive behavior is higher than that of exempting restrictive competition. When Microsoft faces the danger of being sued for fragmentation, the American economists have reached an unprecedented tacit agreement to denounce the US antitrust law. The theory of complementarity holds that the fact that exclusive rights are granted by intellectual property law does not imply an inherent conflict between intellectual property rights and competition rules. In fact, both legal systems aim at promoting the effective distribution of consumer welfare and resources. Intellectual property promotes dynamic competition by encouraging firms to invest in new products and technologies, while competition law promotes innovation by imposing competitive pressures on firms. Therefore, both are necessary to promote innovation and competition. Competitive pressures. Without intellectual property protection, competitors can compete by imitation without having to invest in better new products; without competitive pressures, there is no guarantee that intellectual property owners will continue to invest and innovate after gaining monopoly profits. Especially in the fast-growing high-tech sector, where there are de facto or legal standards. It is easy for an intellectual property enterprise to own the whole market, and thereafter the intellectual property enterprise may eliminate the original competition in this market and start rent-seeking activities for the expansion of intellectual property rights. In this situation, a dominant firm does not need to continue to invest in future innovation to obtain monopoly profits. Therefore, the intervention theory based on complementarity theory advocates that competition law should intervene in the field of intellectual property when dynamic competition is restricted.
In recent years, multinational corporations have repeatedly abused their dominant position in the market because of their intellectual property rights, excluded competitors, endangered the development of China's national enterprises and damaged the welfare of consumers by means of intellectual property strategies such as refusing to license, overpricing, compulsory licensing package and setting up a "patent jungle". Theoretically speaking, the abuse of intellectual property rights is not only happened to transnational corporations, but also to domestic enterprises. However, at present, the domestic enterprises are still at a relative disadvantage in the aspect of intellectual property rights, and the transnational corporations are powerful, advanced in technology, and hold a lot of intellectual property rights, compared with them. Generally speaking, the abuse of intellectual property rights is more likely to occur in Chinese enterprises, and its impact is even greater. Therefore, the abuse of market dominance of intellectual property rights, which is often seen in newspapers, is mainly caused by multinational corporations.
In China, there is no real problem of abusing the dominant position of the intellectual property rights in the market, only because there are no corresponding legal norms in many cases, some acts are not subject to due sanctions. Excessive protection of the rights will inevitably lead to abuse of rights. Especially in China, the level of independent innovation is low, technology is relatively backward, and foreign intellectual property rights are powerful, intellectual property legislation has been in line with international standards, reducing the level of intellectual property protection is not feasible, therefore, we must strengthen the anti-monopoly regulation of intellectual property rights. Strong intellectual property protection and strong anti-monopoly laws and regulations are two sides of a coin, which are the two pillars of China's technological and economic development. How to find a balance between the protection of competition and the protection of intellectual property, that is, the incentive mechanism to protect intellectual property, so that it can give full play to the function of "adding oil to the fire of genius" in order to enrich public goods and improve consumer welfare, on the other hand, to maintain the balance? It is an urgent problem for China to protect the effective competition in the market, exclude the intellectual property field and limit the competition to the range necessary to stimulate innovation.
From the international experience, the primary objective of EU competition law is to establish a unified internal market and strictly regulate the use of intellectual property rights to restrict the free flow of goods and restrict free competition. Therefore, the European Court of Justice has created a series of principles and precedents to regulate the abuse of intellectual property rights. This is mainly achieved through competition law. Compared with the more relaxed attitude of the United States towards anti-competitive intellectual property rights, especially the abuse of market dominance, the EU experience is more suitable for China today.
As for the regulation of abusing the dominant position of the market, China's Anti-monopoly Law draws more lessons from the model of the EU Competition Law. The EU has accumulated a number of cases and administrative law enforcement experience in the abuse of market dominance over intellectual property rights. It has issued a law enforcement guide to Article 102 of the Operational Treaty of the EU (hereinafter referred to as Article 102 of the TFEU). The academic research results are also relatively rich. These are the legislation on abuse of market dominance in the field of intellectual property rights in China. In addition, the reform of the effect analysis method which the EU has been discussing has certain reference significance to the analysis method of the abuse of market dominance in the field of intellectual property rights in China. Next.
The first chapter starts with the relationship between intellectual property protection and competition law, analyzes this issue from the perspective of economics and competition law, compares the advantages and disadvantages of various theories, reviews the history of dealing with the relationship between the two in advanced countries and regions of competition law enforcement, such as Europe and the United States, and makes a basic Study on whether competition law can interfere in the field of intellectual property. Position.
Chapter 2 discusses the general methods of regulating the abuse of market dominance of intellectual property rights by EU competition law, expounds the traditional formalism analysis method in EU competition case law and the TFEU Article 102 effect analysis method which the European Commission has been calling for, and discusses whether the effect method can be applied to the abuse of intellectual property rights market. A comparative analysis of field dominance cases is made.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively analyze the specific acts involved in the cases of abuse of market dominance in the field of intellectual property rights in the European Union, discuss the constitutive requirements and the criteria of judgment one by one, and point out the deficiencies in the handling of specific cases by the European Commission and the courts. Typical cases are IBM, Volvo and Renault, Magill, IMSHealth and Microsoft. The development of these cases has made the EU increasingly clear about the components of anti-competitive refusal to license, and new product rules. The abuse of patent application system is a new type of abuse of market dominance in the field of intellectual property rights. The European Commission's investigation report on the pharmaceutical industry and the latest cases have a positive regulatory attitude towards the abuse of market dominance. But there are still some problems left behind, and this is also discussed in this paper.
Finally, based on the current situation of China's intellectual property legislation, the international intellectual property protection level, the relationship between China's intellectual property protection and economic growth, the abuse of market dominance in the field of intellectual property in China and the current situation of China's intellectual property anti-monopoly legislation, we can draw on the experience of the European Union to improve the field of intellectual property in China. The regulation of abuse of market dominant position has put forward countermeasures and suggestions from the principle to the concrete analysis method, with a view to providing some useful reference for the formulation of the Guidelines on Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement in the Field of Intellectual Property Rights.
【学位授予单位】：华东政法大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D996.1

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