反垄断审查结构性救济法律问题研究
发布时间：2018-10-25 08:48
【摘要】：在经济全球化和市场竞争日趋白热化的环境下,经营者集中如雨后春笋般蓬勃发展。对于达到法定申报标准的经营者集中案,世界各个国家和地区的反垄断执法机构几乎无条件予以批准,并尽量减少被直接禁止的案件,以满足企业对规模效应的合理需求和提升本国企业的市场竞争力。反垄断审查结构性救济制度便是为了兼顾经营者集中的正面效果和负面效果而产生的“中间机制”,其改变了二元选择(禁止或同意)的硬性干预模式。该制度自产生以来,受到各国反垄断执法机构和反垄断法学界的广泛认可,中国也逐步出台相关文件对其加以确认,并多次运用于实际案件。本文从反垄断审查结构性救济的基本概念和内容入手,着重对其主体和客体方面存在的法律问题进行研究,以期对我国反垄断审查结构性救济加以反思和完善。 全文除引言和结语外,共分四部分： 第一部分“反垄断审查结构性救济概述”。从反垄断审查结构性救济的概念、内容入手,指出其具有多方面的作用,并分析其产生的理论基础。 第二部分“反垄断审查结构性救济主体法律问题”。本部分首先指出第三方买家和受托人两个主体的选择直接影响反垄断审查结构性救济实施效果。其次,通过考察西方发达国家的立法和指南,研究第三方买家的选择标准和机制,以及受托人的选任和职责,以期明确主体在结构性救济制度中的作用。 第三部分“反垄断审查结构性救济客体法律问题”。客体是影响结构性救济成功与否的另一重大因素。本部分首先借鉴西方发达国家的经验,明确结构性救济客体的认定标准。其次,划定客体具体范围,分析独立经营的资产或业务、关键的知识产权和必要的人力资源三种主要资产类型。最后,探析结构性救济客体追加机制产生的原因,考察西方发达国家“皇冠宝石条款”的应用。 第四部分“我国反垄断审查结构性救济的完善”。本部分笔者回归我国反垄断审查的视野。首先对我国结构性救济的立法和执法现状进行梳理,在此基础上,指出我国结构性救济制度中主体和客体方面存在的不足。最后,结合西方发达国家的经验提出我国反垄断审查结构性救济的完善建议。
[Abstract]:In the environment of economic globalization and increasingly fierce market competition, the concentration of operators is booming. For cases of concentration of operators that meet the statutory reporting standards, the antitrust law enforcement agencies in various countries and regions of the world have almost unconditionally approved them, and have minimized the number of cases that have been directly prohibited. In order to meet the reasonable demand for scale effect and enhance the market competitiveness of domestic enterprises. The structural relief system of anti-monopoly examination is a "intermediate mechanism" which aims to balance the positive and negative effects of the concentration of operators, which changes the dualistic choice (prohibition or consent) of hard intervention mode. Since its emergence, the system has been widely recognized by anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and anti-monopoly law scholars. China has gradually issued relevant documents to confirm it, and it has been used in practical cases many times. Starting with the basic concept and content of the structural relief of antimonopoly review, this paper focuses on the legal problems existing in its subject and object in order to reflect on and perfect the structural relief of antimonopoly review in China. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the full text is divided into four parts: the first part, "Overview of the structural relief of antitrust review". Starting with the concept and content of anti-monopoly review structural relief, this paper points out that it has various functions and analyzes its theoretical basis. The second part is about the legal problems of the main body of antitrust review. This part first points out that the choice of the third party buyer and the trustee directly affects the effect of antitrust review on the implementation of structural relief. Secondly, by investigating the legislation and guidance of western developed countries, the paper studies the selection criteria and mechanism of third-party buyers, as well as the selection and duties of trustees, in order to clarify the role of the subject in the structural relief system. The third part is the legal problem of the object of anti-monopoly review. The object is another important factor influencing the success of structural relief. This part first draws lessons from the western developed countries' experience, and clarifies the identification standard of the structural relief object. Secondly, define the specific scope of the object, analyze the independent operation of assets or business, key intellectual property rights and necessary human resources three main types of assets. Finally, the paper analyzes the causes of the supplementary mechanism of structural relief object, and examines the application of the Crown Gem Clause in western developed countries. The fourth part is the perfection of structural relief of anti-monopoly review in China. In this part, the author returns to the field of view of anti-monopoly review in China. Firstly, the author combs the current situation of legislation and law enforcement of structural relief in China, and then points out the deficiency of the subject and object in the system of structural relief in China. Finally, based on the experience of the western developed countries, the paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the structural relief of antitrust review in China.
【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D922.294
本文编号：2293208
[Abstract]:In the environment of economic globalization and increasingly fierce market competition, the concentration of operators is booming. For cases of concentration of operators that meet the statutory reporting standards, the antitrust law enforcement agencies in various countries and regions of the world have almost unconditionally approved them, and have minimized the number of cases that have been directly prohibited. In order to meet the reasonable demand for scale effect and enhance the market competitiveness of domestic enterprises. The structural relief system of anti-monopoly examination is a "intermediate mechanism" which aims to balance the positive and negative effects of the concentration of operators, which changes the dualistic choice (prohibition or consent) of hard intervention mode. Since its emergence, the system has been widely recognized by anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and anti-monopoly law scholars. China has gradually issued relevant documents to confirm it, and it has been used in practical cases many times. Starting with the basic concept and content of the structural relief of antimonopoly review, this paper focuses on the legal problems existing in its subject and object in order to reflect on and perfect the structural relief of antimonopoly review in China. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the full text is divided into four parts: the first part, "Overview of the structural relief of antitrust review". Starting with the concept and content of anti-monopoly review structural relief, this paper points out that it has various functions and analyzes its theoretical basis. The second part is about the legal problems of the main body of antitrust review. This part first points out that the choice of the third party buyer and the trustee directly affects the effect of antitrust review on the implementation of structural relief. Secondly, by investigating the legislation and guidance of western developed countries, the paper studies the selection criteria and mechanism of third-party buyers, as well as the selection and duties of trustees, in order to clarify the role of the subject in the structural relief system. The third part is the legal problem of the object of anti-monopoly review. The object is another important factor influencing the success of structural relief. This part first draws lessons from the western developed countries' experience, and clarifies the identification standard of the structural relief object. Secondly, define the specific scope of the object, analyze the independent operation of assets or business, key intellectual property rights and necessary human resources three main types of assets. Finally, the paper analyzes the causes of the supplementary mechanism of structural relief object, and examines the application of the Crown Gem Clause in western developed countries. The fourth part is the perfection of structural relief of anti-monopoly review in China. In this part, the author returns to the field of view of anti-monopoly review in China. Firstly, the author combs the current situation of legislation and law enforcement of structural relief in China, and then points out the deficiency of the subject and object in the system of structural relief in China. Finally, based on the experience of the western developed countries, the paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the structural relief of antitrust review in China.
【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D922.294
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