产能过剩异质性的形成机理

发布时间：2018-01-08 16:20

本文关键词：产能过剩异质性的形成机理　出处：《中国工业经济》2017年08期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：针对中国产能过剩的长期性抑或周期性问题,国内学者主要从政府过度干预(如政府购买和政府补贴)角度进行解释,忽略了政企合谋。本文以煤炭行业为例,首次在国有、民营二元所有制结构下探讨企业产能过剩的异质性形成机理。理论研究表明,政企合谋是民营企业落后过剩产能形成以及淘而不汰的重要原因。政企合谋一方面使本该淘汰的落后小煤炭企业存活在市场上,另一方面还诱使有能力投资安全清洁生产设备的企业转而选择交保护费,并以落后的方式生产,加剧落后产能的形成。此外,针对国有煤炭企业的补贴政策虽有利于保障国有煤炭企业安全清洁生产,但会滋生依靠补贴存活的国有"僵尸企业"过剩产能。本文数值模拟的结果表明,中国煤炭行业因政企合谋与补贴政策带来的产能过剩导致全社会消费者福利水平损失约9%;其中,政企合谋带来的落后过剩产能由于具有较高的安全隐患以及环境污染的负外部性,比补贴政策带来的国有"僵尸企业"过剩产能造成更大的福利损失。上述结论在核心参数波动情况下仍然稳健。本文的政策含义是,要从根本上解决产能过剩问题,政企合谋的影响不容小觑。
[Abstract]:In view of the long-term or cyclical problem of overcapacity in China, domestic scholars mainly explain from the perspective of excessive government intervention (such as government purchase and government subsidies), ignoring the complicity of government and enterprises. This paper takes the coal industry as an example. For the first time, under the dual ownership structure of state-owned and private enterprises, the formation mechanism of the heterogeneity of overcapacity in enterprises is discussed. Government and enterprise collusion is an important reason for the formation of backward excess capacity of private enterprises and the formation of Amoy. On the one hand, the government and enterprises collude to make the backward small coal enterprises which should be eliminated survive in the market on the one hand. On the other hand, it also induces enterprises with the ability to invest in safe and clean production equipment to pay protection fees instead, and to produce in a backward way, thus exacerbating the formation of backward production capacity. Although the subsidy policy for state-owned coal enterprises is conducive to ensuring the safety and clean production of state-owned coal enterprises, it will breed the excess capacity of state-owned "zombie enterprises" which depend on subsidies. The numerical results of this paper show that. China's coal industry due to government and enterprise collusion and subsidies brought about overcapacity resulting in the loss of consumer welfare level of the whole society about 9; Among them, the government and enterprises colluded to bring backward excess capacity due to high security risks and negative externalities of environmental pollution. The excess capacity of state-owned "zombie enterprises" caused greater welfare losses than the subsidy policy. The above conclusion is still robust in the case of the fluctuation of core parameters. The policy implication of this paper is. To fundamentally solve the problem of overcapacity, the influence of government-enterprise collusion can not be underestimated.
【作者单位】：浙江大学经济学院;浙江大学社会科学研究院;浙江大学民营经济研究中心;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“要素流动、集聚租金与税收竞争——基于NEG与SCGE的理论模型与政策评估”(批准号71373235);国家自然科学基金青年项目“知识产权保护与国内商品流通渠道的绩效”(批准号71503232) 国家社会科学基金一般项目“资源错配、规模扭曲与产能过剩和产能落后研究”(批准号15BJL051)
【分类号】：F426.21
【正文快照】： 一、引言自2008年全球金融危机以来,国内外经济紧缩使得中国的产能过剩问题凸显。作为供给侧结构性改革五大任务之首,去产能被放到空前重要的位置。然而,产能过剩现象并非中国经济发展在最近几年才面临的新问题。从20世纪末至今,中国大致经历了三次大规模的产能过剩。其中,第

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