生产性检测服务选择的博弈分析

发布时间：2018-02-11 14:31

本文关键词： 生产性检测服务决策模型演化博弈合作关系激励机制　出处：《天津工业大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着我国制造业的快速发展以及产业结构转型,企业对检测服务的需求与日剧增。然而目前,对于生产性检测服务的研究还非常少,生产性服务以及高技术服务的研究中也尚缺乏对生产性检测服务的研究。文章对生产性检测服务现状进行分析,研究企业检测服务的选择决策及其外包合作关系和激励机制,为企业决策检测服务提供依据,不仅关系到企业整体收益和战略发展,也会对制造业转型升级和生产性检测服务行业发展产生影响。因此,深入研究生产性检测服务决策及其外包问题具有重要的理论和现实指导意义。本文首先对生产性检测服务概念进行界定,分析了检验检测服务的现状。然后总结分析了制造企业检测服务的选择模式以及发展方向,建立了检测服务选择决策模型。基于交易费用理论,从检测服务量和资产专用性以及边际收益角度进行成本比较,确定企业检测服务的决策方式和范围,并识别检测服务外包全周期中的风险。其次,在确定检测服务外包的前提下,利用演化博弈理论,建立了企业和检测机构之间的合作演化博弈的模型,分析了检测服务机构合作关系的动态演化过程,得出检测机构与制造企业合作关系的演化稳定策略,检测机构的合作行为选择会因为博弈方的初始状态、种群的学习速度等造成不同的演化路径,并运用MATLAB进行数值实验验证。最后,在合作关系分析的基础上,基于委托代理理论,建立基于监督和奖惩的激励机制,确保检测机构在激励机制下能从自身利益最大化角度出发选择对制造企业有利的行为。通过本课题研究,找到检测服务内部化和外包的决策均衡点以及外包双方合作的影响因素,并通过激励机制的设立,有效促进双方之间的合作,可以帮助企业提质增效,促进制造业升级转型,并促进生产性检测服务行业健康发展。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of China's manufacturing industry and the transformation of industrial structure, the demand for inspection services by enterprises has increased dramatically. However, at present, there are very few researches on productive testing services. There is also a lack of research on productive testing services in the research of productive services and high-tech services. This paper analyzes the status quo of productive testing services, studies the decision making of enterprises' testing services and their outsourcing cooperative relationship and incentive mechanism. To provide the basis for enterprise decision detection service is not only related to the overall income and strategic development of the enterprise, but also has an impact on the transformation and upgrading of manufacturing industry and the development of productive testing service industry. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the decision making and outsourcing of productive testing services. Firstly, the concept of productive testing services is defined in this paper. This paper analyzes the current situation of inspection and inspection service, and then summarizes and analyzes the selection mode and development direction of inspection service in manufacturing enterprises, and establishes a decision model of testing service selection, which is based on transaction cost theory. From the perspective of service volume, asset specificity and marginal income, this paper compares the cost, determines the decision-making mode and scope of enterprise detection service, and identifies the risks in the whole outsourcing period of detection service. Secondly, Based on the theory of evolutionary game, the model of cooperative evolutionary game between enterprise and testing institution is established, and the dynamic evolution process of cooperative relationship between testing service organization is analyzed. The evolutionary stability strategy of the cooperative relationship between the detection organization and the manufacturing enterprise is obtained. The cooperative behavior choice of the detection institution will result in different evolution paths due to the initial state of the game party and the learning speed of the population. Finally, based on the analysis of cooperative relationship, based on the principal-agent theory, the incentive mechanism based on supervision and reward and punishment is established. To ensure that the detection organization can choose the beneficial behavior to the manufacturing enterprise from the angle of maximization of its own interests under the incentive mechanism. Finding out the decision-making equilibrium point of internalization and outsourcing of detection services and the factors influencing the cooperation between outsourcing and outsourcing, and promoting the cooperation between the two sides effectively through the establishment of incentive mechanism, can help enterprises to improve quality and increase efficiency, and promote the upgrading of manufacturing industry. And to promote the healthy development of productive testing services industry.
【学位授予单位】：天津工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F203;F425

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