歌尔股份股票期权激励对研发创新的影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-22 20:40

本文选题：股权激励　切入点：股票期权　出处：《石河子大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在知识经济飞速发展的时代,科技对于经济增长的促进作用正在与日俱增,创新能力作为影响竞争力的重要因素被众多国家视为关键发展目标。我国公布的《国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要(2006-2020年)》指出我国存在自主创新能力较弱,企业核心竞争力不强的现象。2016年9月的G20峰会也将“科技创新”作为会议重要论题。企业是国家专利数量的主要贡献者,如何促进其更好地开展研发创新活动就成为亟需解决地问题。企业普遍存在代理问题,管理者不愿从事高风险、高投入特点的研发活动。而股权激励由于具有缓解代理冲突的特点,被越来越多的企业所重视。多数学者已运用实证模型得出股权激励能够促进企业研发投入额的增加,然而实证得出对研发活动激励性最强的激励方式,并不是我国实施股权激励计划企业所选的主流方式。近年来,以“研发创新”为生存之根本的制造行业中,实施股权激励方案的企业数量逐年增多,但选用限制性股票激励方式的企业占比极高,歌尔股份为少数选用股票期权激励方案的企业,因此,本文以歌尔股份为研究对象。于理论梳理后,对研发创新活动进行阶段性划分,然后对歌尔股份实施股票期权激励前后的研发投入、成果产出、研发创收进行趋势分析。再选取同行企业进行对比,以分析股票期权激励和限制性股票激励对于企业研发创新活动的影响强弱。继而结合委托代理理论、前景理论、人力资本论和内容激励论搭建分析框架,对两种激励方式作用于企业研发创新活动的影响过程进行分析,最后根据分析结果对歌尔股份的股权激励方案提出改进建议。数据分析结果表明,股票期权激励和限制性股票激励均能对企业的研发创新活动产生正面效应,股权激励实施后企业的研发创新指标较激励实施前有明显增长。实施股票期权激励的歌尔股份较实施限制性股票激励的对比企业,在研发创新活动方面数据表现更佳。结合委托代理理论、前景理论、人力资本论和内容激励论对股权激励作用机理进行分析,产生此种现象的原因是:股权激励使高管和所有者的目标函数趋于一致,股票期权的股价波动率敏感性强于限制性股票,其风险规避性弱于限制性股票。具有风险厌恶感的管理者会在股票期权的激励作用下加强企业的研发投资力度。由于股票期权激励满足了员工对于收入增长的经济需求,兼具权利义务的非对称性,因而能够调动人才的主观能动性,对企业研发成果产出以及研发创收增加产生积极影响。
[Abstract]:In the era of the rapid development of knowledge economy, the role of science and technology in promoting economic growth is increasing day by day. Innovation ability, as an important factor affecting competitiveness, is regarded as a key development objective by many countries. The outline of the National Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (2006-2020) published by China points out that there is a weak independent innovation capability in China. The G20 summit in September 2016 also made "science and technology innovation" an important topic. Enterprises are the main contributors to the number of national patents. How to promote its R & D innovation activities has become a problem that needs to be solved urgently. There is a common agency problem in enterprises, and managers are unwilling to engage in high risk. The equity incentive has been paid more and more attention to by more and more enterprises because of its characteristics of mitigating agency conflict. Most scholars have used empirical model to conclude that equity incentive can promote the increase of enterprise R & D investment. However, the empirical results show that the strongest incentive to R & D activities is not the mainstream way chosen by Chinese enterprises to implement the equity incentive plan. In recent years, in the manufacturing industry, "R & D innovation" is the basic survival of the manufacturing industry. The number of enterprises implementing equity incentive scheme is increasing year by year, but the proportion of enterprises that choose restrictive stock incentive method is very high. This article regards the Goer stock as the research object. After combing the theory, the research and development innovation activities are divided into stages, and then the R & D input before and after the stock option incentive is put into practice. In order to analyze the influence of stock option incentive and restrictive stock incentive on R & D innovation activities, and then combine the principal-agent theory and prospect theory, this paper analyzes the trend of R & D income generation. The human capital theory and the content incentive theory set up the analysis frame, and analyzed the influence process of the two kinds of incentive ways acting on the enterprise R & D innovation activity. Finally, according to the results of the analysis, some suggestions are put forward to improve the equity incentive scheme of Goer shares. The results of data analysis show that both stock option incentive and restrictive stock incentive can produce positive effects on R & D innovation activities of enterprises. After the implementation of equity incentive, the R & D innovation index of enterprises has significantly increased compared with that before the implementation of incentive. Data performance in R & D innovation activities is better. Combined with principal-agent theory, prospect theory, human capital theory and content incentive theory, the mechanism of equity incentive is analyzed. The reason for this phenomenon is that equity incentive converges the objective functions of executives and owners, and stock options are more sensitive to stock price volatility than restricted stocks. Risk aversion is weaker than restricted stock. Managers with a sense of risk aversion will strengthen their R & D investment under the incentive of stock option. Because of the asymmetry of rights and obligations, it can mobilize the subjective initiative of talents and have a positive impact on the output of R & D and the increase of R & D income.
【学位授予单位】：石河子大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F426.6;F272.92;F273.1

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