市场引导、政府干预失灵与“双低企业”空转运营

发布时间：2018-03-24 21:16

  本文选题：退出机制　切入点：进入规制　出处：《经济学动态》2017年07期

【摘要】：大量双低企业的存在是导致某些行业产能过剩的一个重要原因。本文基于这类企业主要参与者的"成本——收益"简化模型,分析了其"空转"或"不退出"行为发生的经济机理。本文以我国汽车行业"双低企业"数据库为基础,使用零膨胀负二项回归模型的计量分析发现:(1)经营绩效的高低不是导致低效企业空转时间长短的关键要素,即市场竞争对企业退出决策没有实质性影响;(2)在受规制的汽车行业,地方政府保护是"双低企业"长期存在的体制性诱因;(3)进入和退出政策在标准与实施机制上的不对称,延长了企业的空转时间。从企业实际退出或者失败角度进行的Probit检验也部分佐证了经营绩效和产业政策的相关性。本文还分析了汽车行业"特别公示制"这一退出机制的实施困境:进入规制导致了对在位者的过度保护,使得低效企业更易获得政府"父爱主义"保护的同时,也面临着更高的行政性退出壁垒。就供给侧结构性改革中的"去产能"问题而言,只有实现低效产能企业的有序退出,才能破除政府直接干预企业微观行为的体制基础,从而使市场在企业退出决策中发挥决定性作用。
[Abstract]:The existence of a large number of double-low enterprises is an important cause of overcapacity in some industries. This paper analyzes the economic mechanism of "idling" or "not withdrawing" behavior. This paper is based on the "double low enterprise" database of automobile industry in China. The econometric analysis of zero expansion negative binomial regression model shows that the level of performance is not the key factor leading to the idle time of inefficient enterprises, that is, market competition has no substantial influence on the decision of enterprise exit. The protection of local governments is a long-standing institutional incentive for "double low enterprises" to be asymmetric in terms of standards and implementation mechanisms of entry and exit policies. The Probit test from the point of view of actual exit or failure also partly proves the correlation between business performance and industrial policy. This paper also analyzes the retreat of "special publicity system" in automobile industry. The dilemma of the implementation of the exit mechanism: entry regulation leads to excessive protection of the incumbent, While making inefficient enterprises more easily protected by the government's "fatherhood", they are also facing higher administrative exit barriers. In terms of "deproductivity" in supply-side structural reforms, only an orderly withdrawal of inefficient productive capacity enterprises can be achieved. Only when the government directly interferes with the microcosmic behavior of the enterprise can the system foundation be broken, and the market can play a decisive role in the decision of enterprise exit.
【作者单位】： 复旦大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“价值链不对称嵌入情景下本土轿车企业优化纵向组织结构的战略研究与应用”(71372114) 教育部人文社科一般项目“本土轿车制造企业自主产品开发的多案例比较研究”(12YJA630003)的资助
【分类号】：D630;F426.471
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本文编号：1660059