同洲电子大股东股权质押融资风险研究

发布时间：2018-04-13 14:17

本文选题：大股东 + 股权质押　；参考：《石河子大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国上市公司大多数都存在较为集中的股权情况,公司治理的委托代理问题已经从股东与管理层间的利益冲突转变为大股东同中小股东间利益冲突。当以谋求自身利益为目的时,大股东凭借持有股权获得较高的控制权地位,影响着上市公司的经营发展和利益相关者的投资决策。目前,我国上市公司频繁出现大股东高份额质押股权的现象。大股东不需要转让股权,就可以借助股权质押这种融资渠道在短期内获取大量资金。在股权质押期间,被质押的股权受到上市公司经营业绩和股票市场中股价波动的影响,存在股价下跌甚至濒临质押警戒线的可能,影响到全体股东的权益和上市公司的发展。而大股东将被质押股权带来的股东权益变动风险转嫁给质权人,这促使了大股东利益侵占的动机,危害了上市公司及利益相关者的合法权益。因此,研究大股东的股权质押问题具有很强的理论价值和现实意义。本文以深圳市同洲电子股份有限公司为案例,分析了大股东股权质押融资风险类型。依据风险影响的主体,提出具有针对性的建议。首先,阐述了本文的研究背景和研究意义,从大股东股权质押动机,股权质押融资风险类型和股权质押融资风险应对三个角度对国内外学者的相关文献进行整理和评述;其次,本文用到的相关概念和理论基础,从股权质押制度和信息披露制度两方面介绍了制度背景;再次,对同洲电子大股东股权质押的过程进行了介绍,分析了大股东股权质押动机和股权质押融资中的利益侵占方式;最后,对大股东股权质押融资风险进行具体的分类和分析,并得出结论和政策建议。通过研究发现,大股东股权质押行为被质押股权的现金流权在质押期间转移给了质权人,加深了大股东控制权与现金流权的分离程度,印证了大股东利用股权质押获取大量资金并进行利益侵占的动机。在此情况下,引发了大股东股权质押道德风险、处置风险和市场风险。针对于上述情况,本文提出了如下建议:(1)完善上市公司的内部治理,制定对于大股东股权质押行为规范的公司制度,做好相应的风险预警和应对机制;(2)加强中小股东和质权人等利益相关者在公司经过程中经营的参与程度和相关信息的知情权;(3)进一步完善大股东股权质押的制度规范和相应的信息披露制度。
[Abstract]:Most of the listed companies in our country have concentrated stock rights. The principal-agent problem of corporate governance has changed from the conflict of interests between shareholders and management to the conflict of interests between large shareholders and small and medium-sized shareholders.When the purpose is to seek for their own interests, the majority shareholders obtain a higher position of control by holding equity, which affects the management and development of listed companies and the investment decisions of stakeholders.At present, China's listed companies frequently appear the phenomenon of large shareholders' high shares of pledged shares.Large shareholders do not need to transfer equity, can use equity pledge this financing channel in the short term to obtain a large number of funds.During the period of stock pledge, the pledged shares are affected by the operating performance of listed companies and the fluctuation of stock price in the stock market. There is the possibility that the stock price will fall or even be close to the warning line of pledge, which will affect the rights and interests of all shareholders and the development of listed companies.However, the major shareholders pass on the risk of the change of shareholders' rights and interests brought by the pledge to the mortgagee, which promotes the motive of the major shareholders' interest encroachment and endangers the legitimate rights and interests of listed companies and stakeholders.Therefore, it is of great theoretical value and practical significance to study the issue of equity pledge of major shareholders.Taking Shenzhen Tongzhou Electronic Co., Ltd as an example, this paper analyzes the risk types of major shareholder equity pledge financing.According to the subject of risk influence, the paper puts forward some specific suggestions.First of all, this paper expounds the research background and significance of this paper, from the major shareholders' equity pledge motivation, equity pledge financing risk type and equity pledge financing risk should be three angles to collate and comment on the relevant literature of domestic and foreign scholars; secondly,This paper uses the relevant concepts and theoretical basis, from the equity pledge system and information disclosure system to introduce the system background; again, the process of Tongzhou electronic major shareholders equity pledge is introduced.The paper analyzes the motivation of major shareholders' equity pledge and the ways of interest encroachment in the financing of equity pledge. Finally, the paper classifies and analyzes the risk of major shareholders' equity pledge financing, and draws conclusions and policy recommendations.Through the research, it is found that the cash flow rights of the pledged shares are transferred to the mortgagee during the period of pledge, which deepens the separation degree between the control rights and the cash flow rights of the major shareholders.Confirmed that the major shareholders use equity pledge to obtain a large number of funds and interest usurpation motivation.In this case, it leads to moral hazard, disposal risk and market risk.In view of the above situation, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: 1) perfecting the internal governance of listed companies and establishing a company system that regulates the behavior of major shareholders' equity pledge.(2) strengthen the participation of stakeholders such as minority shareholders and hypothecators in the course of the company's operation and the right to know the relevant information. 3) further improve the system of equity pledge of large shareholders.Standardizing and corresponding information disclosure system.
【学位授予单位】：石河子大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F426.6;F406.7

【参考文献】