基于演化博弈的食品安全网络舆情演化影响因素研究

发布时间：2018-05-27 04:15

本文选题：食品安全 + 网络舆情　；参考：《南京邮电大学》2016年硕士论文

【摘要】：通过长期网络舆情监测发现,食品安全事件一直处于公众舆论的风口浪尖上。在我国食品安全事件出现了明显的“扎堆”现象,上一波的影响尚未散尽,下一波的冲击又接踵而至,食品安全事件的频繁出现,且得不到根治,逐渐消磨公众对于政府监管部门以及相关行业解决问题的信心,容易导致公众形成共时性的情绪倾向,一旦爆发后果不堪设想。目前关于食品安全网络舆情演化一直受到多方面学者的关注和重视,目前也取到一些成果,本文从媒体、网民、核心企业三个方面对食品安全网络舆情演化的影响因素进行研究,旨在全面分析食品安全网络舆情演化路径、动力机制,探寻有效引导、控制食品安全网络舆情的策略,本文研究内容主要分为以下几个方面:(1)食品安全网络舆情演化中媒体作用因素研究。通过“毒银翘”事件分析了媒体报道对食品安全网络舆情演化的影响,基于媒体报道的真实性与准确性的基础上构建了主流媒体间演化博弈模型,通过媒体策略选择的演化分析以及仿真分析,探讨了媒体初始报道策略选择概率以及媒体不实报道程度对食品安全网络舆情演化的影响。(2)食品安全网络舆情演化中网民作用因素研究。充分考虑到网民的活跃程度以及发帖的数量和质量的差异性,对网民进行分类,通过构建不同类型网民间的演化博弈模型,分析了不同情景下网民的策略选择的演化过程,重点讨论了惩罚力度变化、不同策略选择下的预期收益以及网民和意见领袖群体初始策略选择人数对食品安全网络舆情演化的影响。(3)食品安全网络舆情演化中核心企业作用因素研究。从食品供应链的结构入手,分析食品供应链中的利益相关者以及核心企业,以食品供应链的核心企业为例,分析其在面对食品安全网络舆情可能会对食品供应链带来毁灭性灾难的风险时,是否会选择主动进行食品质量、安全信息的披露来缓解食品供应链的信息不对称,通过构建核心企业间的演化博弈模型,探讨了披露收益与披露成本变动下的演化稳定性以及披露收益高于披露成本、披露收益与披露成本关系不定、披露收益低于披露成本食品安全网络舆情的演化规律。
[Abstract]:Through long-term network public opinion monitoring, food safety events have been in the forefront of public opinion. In our country, food safety incidents appear obvious "piling up" phenomenon, the impact of the previous wave has not been dispersed, the next wave of impact has followed, the frequent occurrence of food safety incidents, and can not get a radical cure. Gradually eroding public confidence in government regulators and related industries to solve the problem, easy to cause the public to form a synchronic emotional tendency, once the outbreak of unimaginable consequences. At present, the evolution of public opinion on the food safety network has been concerned and valued by many scholars. At present, some achievements have been obtained. This article is based on the media and Internet users. This paper studies the influencing factors of the evolution of food safety network public opinion from three aspects of the core enterprise, aiming to analyze the evolution path, power mechanism, effective guidance and control strategy of food safety network public opinion, in order to comprehensively analyze the evolution path of food safety network public opinion, the power mechanism, and the strategy of controlling food safety network public opinion. This paper is mainly divided into the following aspects: 1) the role of media in the evolution of food safety network public opinion. Based on the analysis of the influence of media reports on the evolution of food safety network public opinion, a game model of evolution between mainstream media is constructed based on the authenticity and accuracy of media reports. Through the evolution analysis and simulation analysis of media strategy selection, This paper discusses the influence of media initial report strategy selection probability and the degree of media false report on the evolution of food safety network public opinion. 2) the Internet users' role factors in the food safety network public opinion evolution. Considering the active degree of the netizens and the difference of the quantity and quality of the posts, the paper classifies the netizens, and analyzes the evolution process of the strategy choice of the netizens under different situations by constructing the evolutionary game model of different types of net users. Emphasis is placed on the change in the severity of punishment, The influence of the number of Internet users and opinion leaders on the evolution of food safety network public opinion. 3) the role of core enterprises in the evolution of food safety network public opinion. Starting with the structure of the food supply chain, this paper analyzes the stakeholders and the core enterprises in the food supply chain, taking the core enterprise of the food supply chain as an example. In the face of the risk that food safety network public opinion may bring devastating disaster to food supply chain, it will choose to actively disclose food quality and safety information in order to alleviate the information asymmetry in food supply chain. By constructing the evolutionary game model among the core enterprises, this paper discusses the evolution stability of disclosure income and disclosure cost, and the relationship between disclosure income and disclosure cost is uncertain, and the disclosure income is higher than the disclosure cost. Disclosure income is lower than disclosure cost food safety network public opinion evolution law.
【学位授予单位】：南京邮电大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：D63;F426.82

【相似文献】