盈余管理、所有权性质与费用粘性——基于我国制造业上市公司的经验数据

发布时间：2018-06-03 20:31

  本文选题：盈余管理 + 所有权性质　； 参考：《企业经济》2017年08期

【摘要】：本文基于2011-2015年沪深两市A股主板制造业上市公司数据,实证检验了盈余管理、产权性质与费用粘性之间的关系。研究发现,由于国有企业严重的代理冲突,其费用粘性水平显著高于非国有企业;盈余管理与费用粘性的关系不能一概而论。交叉项的研究结果表明,产权性质对费用粘性的影响要强于盈余管理。对此,企业可要求管理者披露费用粘性信息,以更好地了解企业的费用控制问题,降低信息不对称;同时,通过制定约束与激励机制来弱化代理冲突。最后,本文提出设置费用粘性水平这一考核指标,丰富了绩效考核体系的内容,也为企业的绩效考核实践提供了一定的借鉴意义。
[Abstract]:The relationship between earnings management, property property and cost stickiness is tested on the basis of the data of 2011-2015 A stock market listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen two cities. It is found that the stickiness level of the state-owned enterprises is significantly higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises because of the serious agency conflict in the state-owned enterprises; the relationship between earnings management and cost stickiness is not almost all. The results of the cross term study show that the property property has a stronger influence on the stickiness of the cost than the earnings management. In this case, the enterprise may require managers to disclose the sticky information of the cost to better understand the cost control of the enterprise and reduce the information asymmetry. At the same time, by making the constraint and incentive mechanism to weaken the agency conflict. Setting the index of cost sticky level enriches the content of the performance appraisal system, and provides a certain reference for the performance appraisal practice of enterprises.
【作者单位】： 太原理工大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：山西省软科学课题项目“山西省煤层气产业盈利模式创新研究”(项目编号:2015041009-1)
【分类号】：F406.7;F424;F832.51
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本文编号：1974083