管理层薪酬外部公平性与企业业绩：管理层投资行为的中介传导效应检验
发布时间：2018-07-21 16:28
【摘要】：管理层激励一直是学术界研究的热点,它是解决当今公司制下企业所有权和经营权分离的主要方法。其中薪酬契约是管理层激励的核心内容,也是影响管理层管理行为的重要因素。所以如何有效地设计薪酬契约是公司治理的一个难点。学术界普遍认为提高薪酬可以解决所有者的委托代理问题,然而却不知在什么情况下需要提高管理层薪酬,以及提高到什么程度合适。这就需要一个标准,也就衍生出了管理层薪酬的公平性问题。自从2005年,我国强制上市公司披露公司管理层薪酬,这就使得高管将自己的薪酬与其他公司高管的薪酬进行比较成为了可能,对自身薪酬有了公平与否的新认知,从而来调整自己的行为。而管理层的行为直接影响公司的业绩。因此,管理层薪酬外部公平产生的经济后果是改进我国公司薪酬制度必须考虑的因素。研究管理层薪酬外部公平性与企业业绩关系一般会运用的以下相关理论:公平理论、锦标赛理论、委托代理论、前景理论以及薪酬扭曲理论,本文在这五大理论的基础上分析了管理层投资行为是如何成为管理层薪酬外部公平性与企业业绩之间的“桥梁”。首先,提出了管理层薪酬外部公平性的研究背景,目前我国社会存在严重的分配不均的问题,这使得管理层薪酬成为社会关注的热点之一。同时我国还存在制造业投资过热的问题,这使得管理层投资行为也被重点关注。在这样的研究背景下,研究管理层投资行为将有助于这两个问题的解决;其次,论述了关于管理层薪酬外部公平性、管理层投资行为以及企业业绩的文献综述、相关的理论分析。最后,采用2007-2015年沪深A股制造业上市公司的数据,利用实证研究以及中介效应验证方法来进行回归分析,研究表明管理层投资行为是管理层薪酬外部公平性与企业业绩的中介变量。利用建立的四大模型进行回归分析,得出管理层薪酬外部正向或负向公平性,不利于减少管理层的非效率投资行为,进而也不利于提高企业业绩。说明了企业管理层薪酬与企业业绩并不具有高度敏感性,给予管理层过高的薪酬并不能达到应有的激励效果。在公司治理的结构中,管理层的地位不言而喻,其行为对于促进公司的长久发展是至关重要的。本文通过理论与实证分析,提出改善管理层薪酬的一些建议。通过平衡管理层现金薪酬与股权薪酬,达到对管理层激励效果的最大化;通过企业内部较高的股权集中度来抑制管理层非效率投资行为;通过完善管理层薪酬的披露机制,加强外界对管理层薪酬的关注以及监督。研究管理层薪酬外部公平性、管理层投资行为与企业业绩具有现实意义,探究管理层薪酬外部公平性对管理层投资行为的影响,才能更有效地减少企业的非效率投资行为,促进企业业绩的增长,实现企业价值的提升。并且对于企业来说人力资本在企业中的地位属于重中之重,制定有效、具有竞争力的薪酬契约是企业吸引、留住人才的重要措施。
[Abstract]:Management motivation has always been a hot topic in academic research. It is the main method to solve the separation of enterprise ownership and management right under the current company system. The compensation contract is the core content of management incentive and also an important factor affecting management behavior. So how to effectively design compensation contract is a difficult point of corporate governance. The academic community generally believes that increasing pay can solve the owner's principal-agent problem, but I do not know what to improve management pay and to what extent it is appropriate. This requires a standard, which also derives the fairness of management pay. Since 2005, China's mandatory listed companies disclosed the company. Management pay, which makes it possible for executives to compare their remuneration with the salary of other executives, to have a new cognition of their own compensation, and to adjust their behavior. And the behavior of management directly affects the performance of the company. Therefore, the economic consequences of the external equity of the management pay are changed. The factors that must be considered in our company's salary system must be considered. The following related theories are generally used to study the relationship between the external fairness of management salary and the relationship of enterprise performance: equity theory, tournament theory, principal-generation theory, prospect theory and compensation distortion theory. Based on these five theories, the management investment behavior is analyzed. What is the "bridge" between the external fairness of management salary and the performance of the enterprise. First, it puts forward the research background of the external equity of management salary. At present, there is a serious problem of uneven distribution in our society, which makes the salary of management become one of the hot spots of social concern. At the same time, there is still a question of overheating investment in manufacturing industry in China. In this kind of research background, the study of management investment behavior will help to solve the two problems. Secondly, it discusses the external fairness of management salary, management investment behavior and enterprise performance, related theoretical analysis. Finally, adopt 2007-2015. The data of the Shanghai and Shenzhen A stock listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen are analyzed by the empirical research and the medium effect verification method. The study shows that the management investment behavior is the intermediary variable of the management salary external equity and the enterprise performance. Using the four models established to carry out regression analysis, the external positive or negative direction of management salary is obtained. Fairness is not conducive to reducing the inefficient investment behavior of management, and in turn is not conducive to improving the performance of the enterprise. It shows that the salary of the management layer is not highly sensitive to the performance of the enterprise, and the salary of the management layer is too high to achieve the due incentive effect. In the structure of the corporate governance, the management level is self-evident. Behavior is very important to promote the long-term development of the company. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, this paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the management salary. By balancing the management level of cash pay and equity compensation, the incentive effect is maximized. The management level is suppressed by the higher concentration of equity in the enterprise. By perfecting the disclosure mechanism of management salary, we should strengthen the attention and supervision of the external management salary, study the external equity of the management salary, the investment behavior of management and the performance of the enterprise, and explore the influence of the external equity of management salary to the management investment behavior, so as to reduce the enterprise more effectively. The inefficiency investment behavior promotes the growth of enterprise performance and improves the enterprise value. And for the enterprise, the position of human capital in the enterprise is the most important. Making effective and competitive compensation contract is the important measure to attract and retain talents.
【学位授予单位】：天津商业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F425;F406.7
本文编号：2136112
[Abstract]:Management motivation has always been a hot topic in academic research. It is the main method to solve the separation of enterprise ownership and management right under the current company system. The compensation contract is the core content of management incentive and also an important factor affecting management behavior. So how to effectively design compensation contract is a difficult point of corporate governance. The academic community generally believes that increasing pay can solve the owner's principal-agent problem, but I do not know what to improve management pay and to what extent it is appropriate. This requires a standard, which also derives the fairness of management pay. Since 2005, China's mandatory listed companies disclosed the company. Management pay, which makes it possible for executives to compare their remuneration with the salary of other executives, to have a new cognition of their own compensation, and to adjust their behavior. And the behavior of management directly affects the performance of the company. Therefore, the economic consequences of the external equity of the management pay are changed. The factors that must be considered in our company's salary system must be considered. The following related theories are generally used to study the relationship between the external fairness of management salary and the relationship of enterprise performance: equity theory, tournament theory, principal-generation theory, prospect theory and compensation distortion theory. Based on these five theories, the management investment behavior is analyzed. What is the "bridge" between the external fairness of management salary and the performance of the enterprise. First, it puts forward the research background of the external equity of management salary. At present, there is a serious problem of uneven distribution in our society, which makes the salary of management become one of the hot spots of social concern. At the same time, there is still a question of overheating investment in manufacturing industry in China. In this kind of research background, the study of management investment behavior will help to solve the two problems. Secondly, it discusses the external fairness of management salary, management investment behavior and enterprise performance, related theoretical analysis. Finally, adopt 2007-2015. The data of the Shanghai and Shenzhen A stock listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen are analyzed by the empirical research and the medium effect verification method. The study shows that the management investment behavior is the intermediary variable of the management salary external equity and the enterprise performance. Using the four models established to carry out regression analysis, the external positive or negative direction of management salary is obtained. Fairness is not conducive to reducing the inefficient investment behavior of management, and in turn is not conducive to improving the performance of the enterprise. It shows that the salary of the management layer is not highly sensitive to the performance of the enterprise, and the salary of the management layer is too high to achieve the due incentive effect. In the structure of the corporate governance, the management level is self-evident. Behavior is very important to promote the long-term development of the company. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, this paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the management salary. By balancing the management level of cash pay and equity compensation, the incentive effect is maximized. The management level is suppressed by the higher concentration of equity in the enterprise. By perfecting the disclosure mechanism of management salary, we should strengthen the attention and supervision of the external management salary, study the external equity of the management salary, the investment behavior of management and the performance of the enterprise, and explore the influence of the external equity of management salary to the management investment behavior, so as to reduce the enterprise more effectively. The inefficiency investment behavior promotes the growth of enterprise performance and improves the enterprise value. And for the enterprise, the position of human capital in the enterprise is the most important. Making effective and competitive compensation contract is the important measure to attract and retain talents.
【学位授予单位】：天津商业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F425;F406.7
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