有记忆专利竞赛中的期权博弈

发布时间：2018-01-01 12:28

本文关键词：有记忆专利竞赛中的期权博弈　出处：《管理工程学报》2011年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：通过引入非齐次泊松过程并考虑企业RD活动中的"学习效应"或"记忆性",研究了两企业的专利竞赛问题。分别就单个企业的投资时机选择和两家企业在非合作博弈条件下所形成的有记忆专利竞赛进行了分析,结论表明:RD活动的"记忆性"使得单个企业的投资临界值降低,且无论是连续区域企业的等待期权价值还是停止区域执行期权后的项目价值均比无记忆时有所增加;而在有记忆专利竞赛中,由于领导者价值始终大于追随者价值,占先的动机加强,投资临界值降低,最终使博弈在较低专利价值处产生双方均不愿接受的同时投资均衡。
[Abstract]:By introducing the inhomogeneous Poisson process and considering the "learning effect" or "memory" in the enterprise R D activity. This paper studies the patent competition of the two enterprises, and analyzes the investment opportunity of the single enterprise and the memory patent competition formed by the two enterprises under the condition of non-cooperative game respectively. The conclusion shows that the "memory" of the "memory" of the R & D activity reduces the investment threshold for individual firms. Both the waiting option value of continuous regional enterprises and the project value after stopping regional execution options are higher than those without memory. But in the memory patent competition, because the leader value is always greater than the follower value, the preemptive motivation strengthens, the investment critical value drops. In the end, the game results in investment equilibrium at the lower patent value, which both parties are unwilling to accept.
【作者单位】：电子科技大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：高校博士点基金项目(教技发中心函[2004]164号) 教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”项目(教技函[2005]35号)
【分类号】：F224;F830.9
【正文快照】： 0引言现代企业竞争的中心已由资本竞争转向技术竞争,企业的技术创新已成为企业保持竞争优势的基础。企业间日益激烈的技术竞争、技术创新投资的不确定性、成本的不可逆性以及投资时机的可选择性,使得技术创新投资的决策问题日显重要,各种旨在指导企业RD活动和技术竞争的理论

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