我国上市商业银行高管薪酬激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-01-02 03:12

本文关键词：我国上市商业银行高管薪酬激励机制研究　出处：《山西财经大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：上世纪九十年代以来，中国商业银行运用引进战略投资者、积极上市等方法对公司治理、经营理念、发展战略等进行了积极的改革，尤其在建立和完善高管薪酬激励机制方面进行了不懈的探索，取得了一定的成效。但是，国际金融危机的爆发，发达国家商业银行高管薪酬激励机制所暴露的问题为我们敲响了警钟。在此背景下，本文针对我国上市商业银行高管薪酬激励机制进行深入研究，探讨如何更加科学地设计高管薪酬激励机制。文章首先对国内外有关银行业高管薪酬激励机制的相关文献进行整理总结，力求对前人的研究有一个全面的认识并且发现其中可以拓展的地方；其次，与发达国家银行高管薪酬激励机制相比较，得出对我国银行激励机制发展的启示；在充分搜集整理上市银行年报的基础上，论述我国上市商业银行高管薪酬激励的现状和问题；然后，根据委托-代理理论，将银行高管薪酬和总资产收益率分别作为因变量，，并选取上市银行经营风险、成长性、公司治理、高管特征等指标作为控制变量，建立银行高管薪酬决定模型、薪酬效应模型，进行实证分析，并得出结论。最后，通过分析提出在当前国际国内形势下，完善我国上市银行高管薪酬机制的一些政策建议，其中包括：薪酬激励应与绩效管理相结合；短期激励和长期激励相结合；完善公司治理，加强内部监督；提高商业银行信息披露质量，加强投资者和社会公众监管；大力培育职业银行家市场等。
[Abstract]:The last century since 90s, commercial bank Chinese by the introduction of strategic investors, actively listed methods of corporate governance, management concept, development strategy of reform, especially made unremitting exploration in establishing and perfecting the incentive mechanism, has achieved some results. However, the outbreak of the international financial crisis, the exposure of executive compensation incentives of commercial banks of the developed countries the problem is a wake-up call.
Under this background, in view of our country's commercial banks listed on executive compensation incentive mechanism research, explores how to design the executive compensation incentive mechanism. Firstly, the related literature on domestic and foreign banking executive compensation incentive mechanism to summarize the previous research, and strive to have a comprehensive understanding and can be found expand the place; secondly, compared with the executive compensation incentive mechanism of banks in developed countries, draw on our bank incentive mechanism for the development of the enlightenment; in the full collection based on the arrangement of the annual report of listed banks, discusses the status quo and problems of commercial bank executive compensation incentive of Listed Companies in China; then, according to the principal-agent theory, the executive pay the bank and rate of return on total assets as the dependent variable, and selects the listed banks operating risk, growth, corporate governance, executive characteristic index As a control variable, the paper establishes the compensation decision model of the bank executives, the compensation effect model, and makes an empirical analysis, and draws the conclusion.
Finally, put forward in the current international and domestic situation through the analysis, some policy suggestions to improve China's listed banks executive compensation mechanism including: compensation incentive should be combined with performance management; short-term and long-term incentive combination; improve corporate governance, strengthen internal supervision; improve the quality of information disclosure of commercial bank, strengthen investor and society public supervision; to cultivate the market occupation bankers.

【学位授予单位】：山西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.33

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