基于EVA的我国上市银行高管薪酬激励效应的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-04 06:23

本文关键词：基于EVA的我国上市银行高管薪酬激励效应的实证研究　出处：《西南财经大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来,每逢上市公司年报发布时,被惊为“天价”的上市银行高管薪酬总是引起各界的关注。特别是金融危机爆发期间,在整个银行业经营业绩不景气的情况下,国内上市商业银行高管薪酬仍然居高不下,且在各行业高管薪酬的排名中也是位列前茅。对此,学术界、媒体界等各界人士纷纷质疑,银行高管到底应该拿多少工资?高管薪酬是否与银行的经营业绩挂钩?高管薪酬是否对银行的经营管理起到了应有的激励作用?在此背景下,研究银行高管薪酬对经营业绩的激励作用就有了现实意义。高管薪酬激励是基于委托代理关系的背景下提出来的。为适应社会化大生产的发展,企业制度的发展主要经历了三种制度模式即业主制、合伙制和公司制。公司制企业在生产经营管理过程中所有权与经营权分离,在公司内部存在股东和经营管理者之间的委托代理关系。在委托代理关系下,经营管理者作为代理人代理股东经营管理企业,股东作为企业的所有者对企业享有所有权和参与公司重大决策的权利。因此在日常的经营中,经营管理人员特别是高级管理人员更容易掌握整个企业的经营状况,更容易获得第一手资料信息,而股东则在企业有关信息的掌握上滞后于高管人员,甚至是只能看到企业披露的信息。企业真实的经营管理过程对股东来说就像半透明的黑匣子。股东与高管人员之间存在严重的信息不对称,这种信息不对称容易导致高管人员的道德风险,即掌控企业经营大权的高管人员可能会为自己的利益而牺牲企业的长远利益。上述就是所谓的委托代理问题。由于委托代理问题会对企业长远发展产生不利影响,损害股东的财富,企业界、学术界在探寻解决委托代理问题方法的过程中提出了高管薪酬激励制度。高管薪酬激励制度作为解决委托代理问题的方法之一,其目的是使经营者的利益与公司利益相一致,在通过薪酬激励高管人员在经营中做出有利于股东财富的管理。十四届三中全会对现代企业制度的特征作了概括,十五届四中全会强调了要建立和完善现代企业制度,随之现代企业制度在国内企业中逐步建立起来。相应地为了解决现代企业制度中存在的委托代理问题,国内企业也引入高管薪酬激励制度。在我国高管薪酬主要由基本工资和绩效工资构成,高管薪酬激励除了绩效工资外还有较长期的股权激励,但在目前来看股权激励在我国的企业公司治理中还不普遍。高管薪酬激励中货币薪酬激励主要表现在绩效工资方面,企业实行绩效工资制度将高管薪酬与企业业绩挂钩,以便激励管理人员在经营管理工作中以增加股东财富为目标,提高工作的积极性和效率,为股东创造更多的财富。货币薪酬激励主要是属于激励高管的短期性手段,为使高管利益与股东利益更好的趋向一致还要采取中长期激励手段如股权激励计划等,在整个高管薪酬激励中应该将短期激励手段与中长期激励手段相结合才能更好的对高管起到持续的激励作用,使高管利益与企业利益最大程度的联系在一起,更好的解决委托代理关系中存在的问题。随着我国商业银行治理的改革,高管薪酬激励也被引入上市银行治理。上市商业银行高管薪酬一般包括基本薪酬、绩效工资和中长期激励。随着我国商业银行的逐步上市和证监会对高管薪酬披露的要求,我国上市银行在其年报中都会披露有关高级管理人员、董事会和监事会的薪酬情况。这对于国内学者研究高管薪酬与银行绩效的相关性提供了可参考的数据。学者们对高管薪酬与企业绩效关系的讨论特别是在08年金融危机爆发以来显得尤为激烈。从目前总体研究情况来看国内学者研究关注的是如此高的高管薪酬能否对经营业绩起到有效地激励作用或者是高管薪酬的制定是否取决于企业的经营绩效。国内学者对高管薪酬激励相关研究已有20年左右,前期主要是在参考国外经验的基础上从理论角度探讨高管薪酬激励的问题,主要包括绩效工资、期股计划等的研究。随着国内公司治理的不断完善和信息披露制度的完善,国内学者的研究重点逐渐从理论研究向实证研究转移,希望通过对相关数据的实证分析检验国内企业高管薪酬与绩效的关系,并取得了一系列的研究成果。虽然有众多的学者们研究,也取得了成果,但这些成果并没有形成统一的定论。在高管薪酬和企业绩效的关系研究中主要的研究结论有负相关关系、不相关关系和正相关关系。从研究的视角来看主要有基于内生性视角的研究和基于外生性视角的研究。在研究中对研究变量的选择也不尽相同。对于高管薪酬的指标有些研究使用所有高管人员的报酬总额,有的学者则选用前三名最高薪酬的均值或总额,还有的学者在研究中使用高管团队内部的薪酬差距。对于企业绩效的指标的选择主要是财务指标,还有部分学者选用EVA评价指标、平衡计分卡等。因此基于委托代理理论和高管薪酬激励理论进一步对银行高管激励作用进行研究,实证检验高管薪酬制度对银行业绩的激励作用,验证国内上市银行高管薪酬激励的效果具有一定的理论意义。本文具体研究的是我国上市商业银行高管薪酬对银行绩效的激励效应,主要从六个部分对研究情况进行了介绍。第1章介绍了本文的研究背景、目的和意义、研究的方法和内容,这一部分在文章总体中占据着总览全文的作用,详细介绍了写作之前的思路框架,对后文的写作起着基本的指导作用。第2章介绍了高管薪酬激励的基本概念和理论。由于不同学者在研究高管薪酬激励问题时往往对于研究中所涉及到的相关概念的定义不同,研究的结论也会有所差异,因此本文在研究前首先对相关概念进行明确的定义,也便于后文中相关理论和实证检验的进行。本章还对高管薪酬涉及的相关理论,如委托代理理论、公司治理理论、高管薪酬激励等相关理论做了具傣的介绍,对相关理论知识进行回顾与梳理,在理顺基础知识的基础上才能更好的进行下一步的研究与分析。第3章是国内外相关研究文献的回顾与评述。这一章从国外研究状况和国内研究状况两个大的方面进行了祥简结合的文献介绍,在其中又根据研究角度的不同分为外生性视角的研究和内生性视角的研究。本章最后从研究视角、研究结论、国内外研究的对比方面对前面的文献进行总体的评述,并认为高管薪酬激励的研究仍然有很长的路要走。第4章主要分析了国内上市商业银行高管薪酬激励现状。银行作为国民经济中的重要行业,其经营管理有其特殊性,比如其经营目标的多重性、风险控制的重要性等。接下来详细介绍了国内高管薪酬的政策与规范制度,在此基础上具体介绍了国内银行高管的薪酬结构,并对16家上市银行高管薪酬前三名均值的非平衡面板数据做了简单地描述性统计。这些数据主要来源于各上市商业银行披露的年报和补充报告。第5章详细介绍了EVA指标。高管薪酬的相关数据在前一章中已经做了具体的介绍,银行业绩指标在整个研究中起着重要的作用。这一章主要介绍了EVA指标的相关理论知识、选择原因、模型、调整后的EVA指标计算等。在这一章中计算占了很大一部分,EVA指标是基于企业经营净利润调整后的数值,在计算过程中涉及到的中间值较多,数据收集工作较重,主要来源是各银行年报、和讯财经网站、通达信股票分析软件等。第6章我们的研究进入了实证检验阶段,得出结论,并提出合理的建议。基于前人的研究和本文中前面的介绍,该章通过搜集数据、选择变量和模型,在EViews软件的帮助下实现了高管薪酬与银行绩效之间的回归,并得出高管薪酬对当期、下一期业绩存在负激励。国有银行高管薪酬与银行绩效存在负相关,但不显著,非国有商业银行高管薪酬对银行经营业绩存在显著地负激励。在此基础上,本章最后提出了自己对国内上市银行高管薪酬激励问题的三方面的建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, when the listed company's annual report released, was surprised to "price" of executive compensation in listed banks is always concerned by the community. Especially during the financial crisis, the operating performance of the entire banking industry downturn, domestic commercial banks listed on executive pay is still high, and in the industry ranking of executive compensation is also in the forefront. In this regard, academia, media and other sectors have questioned whether bank executives should take how much salary? Whether executive pay and bank performance? Whether executive pay is the management of the bank to a proper incentive? In this context, the research of bank executive compensation incentive operating results have a practical significance.
Executive compensation incentive is based on principal-agent relationship under the background mentioned above. In order to adapt to the development of social production, the development of the enterprise system has experienced three main modes of system namely ownership, partnerships and corporations. The separation of corporate ownership in the production management process and management rights, the principal-agent relationship exists between in the internal relationship between shareholders and managers. In the principal-agent relationship, the management of enterprise management as an agent of shareholders, the shareholders as the owner of the enterprise ownership and the right to participate in major decision-making enterprises. So in daily business management personnel, especially senior management personnel is easier to grasp the whole enterprise the operating conditions, easier to obtain first-hand information, and information about shareholders in the enterprise master behind executives, even Can only see the information of the company. The black box real business management process for shareholders. As translucent the serious information asymmetry between shareholders and executives, this information asymmetry will lead to moral hazard of executives, which control the business power of the executives may for their own interests at the expense of the long-term interests of enterprises. This is the so-called principal-agent problem. The principal-agent problem will have a negative impact on the long-term development of enterprises, shareholders' wealth, business circles and academic circles in the quest to solve the principal-agent problem in the process of the method proposed. The executive compensation incentive system of executive compensation incentive system as one of the methods to solve the principal-agent problem, its purpose is to the interests of the operators is consistent with the interests of the company, through the incentive pay for executives in the business to make a favorable In shareholder wealth management. On the third Plenary Session of the 14th CPC Central Committee of the modern enterprise system characteristics are summed up in the fourth Plenary Session of the 15th CPC Central Committee, stressed the need to establish and improve the modern enterprise system, with the modern enterprise system in the domestic enterprises gradually built up accordingly. In order to solve the principal-agent problem in the modern enterprise system, domestic enterprises are also introduced. In the executive compensation incentive system executive compensation in China is mainly composed of basic salary and performance pay incentive in addition to long-term equity incentive and performance salary, but the equity incentive in the present situation in our country's corporate governance is not universal. The executive compensation incentive in monetary incentive is mainly reflected in the performance of wages, enterprises in the implementation of performance pay system will be linked to executive pay and corporate performance, in order to encourage managers in the management work to increase shareholder wealth Rich as the goal, to improve the working enthusiasm and efficiency, create more wealth for shareholders. Monetary incentive is mainly short-term means belonging to executives incentives, in order to make the interests of executives and shareholders interests tend to take a better favorable long-term incentive means such as equity incentive plan, the executive compensation incentive should be the short-term incentive and long-term incentive combination can better incentive effect of executives continued, the maximum interests of executives and business interests together in a better solution to the principal-agent relationship. With the reform of China's commercial bank governance, executive compensation incentive of listed banks is also introduced the governance of listed commercial banks. Executives' salary includes basic salary, performance pay and long-term incentive. As China's commercial banks gradually listed and the Commission on executive pay For disclosure requirements of listed banks in China will disclose the relevant senior management personnel in its annual report, remuneration of board of directors and board of supervisors. This provides reference data for the correlation of domestic scholars research on executive pay and bank performance. Discussion on executive compensation and enterprise performance relationship between the scholars in particular the 08 years since the outbreak of the financial crisis is particularly intense. From the current situation of the overall domestic scholars study is concerned with such a high executive compensation on the performance of the business can play an effective incentive role or executive compensation setting depends on whether the performance of the enterprise. The domestic scholars on the executive compensation incentive research for about 20 years, the discussion is mainly the executive compensation incentive problem from the angle of theory on the basis of foreign experience, including the performance salary and stock option plan. With the research etc. Domestic corporate governance improvement and the improvement of information disclosure system, the research focus of domestic scholars gradually shifted from theoretical research to empirical research, analysis of the relationship between executive compensation and performance to test domestic enterprises on the basis of empirical data, and obtained a series of achievements. Although there are many scholars also. Achieved results, but these results did not form a unified conclusion. In the study of the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance in the main conclusions of the study are negative correlation, no correlation and positive correlation. From the research perspective is mainly based on the endogeneity and exogeneity. Based on the research perspective in research a study on the choice of variables are not the same. For executive compensation index in some of the total compensation using all executives, some scholars selected the top three most High salary mean or total, some scholars use pay gap within the executive team in the study. The enterprise performance index selection is the main financial indicators, as well as some scholars use EVA evaluation index, balanced scorecard. Therefore the research on the principal-agent theory and the high tube salary incentive theory further to bank executives incentive effect based on the empirical test of executive compensation incentive system of bank performance, has a certain theoretical significance to verify the domestic listed bank executive compensation incentive effect.
This paper is the study of the incentive effect of executives of listed commercial banks pay on bank performance, mainly from the six parts of the research are introduced. The first chapter introduces the research background, purpose and significance, research method and content, this part of the total body plays a role in this. And introduces the framework before writing, the writing of this article plays a fundamental and guiding role. The second chapter introduces the basic concepts and theories of executive compensation incentive. Because of different scholars incentive problems in the study of executive compensation is often related to concepts involved in the research of different definitions, the conclusion of the study will be the differences, this paper first defines the related concepts, is easy to the relevant theoretical and empirical test. This chapter also relates to the relevant theories of executive compensation The theory, such as principal-agent theory, corporate governance theory, incentive theory with Dai introduction of relevant theoretical knowledge on the basis of reviewing and combing, straighten out the basic knowledge on to the next step of research and analysis. The third chapter is the review of relevant research literature at home and abroad this chapter. The research situation and research status of domestic and abroad from two aspects combined with the literature about Jane Cheung, and in which according to the different research angle for the external perspective and the endogeneity of research. At the end of this chapter, from the perspective of research, the conclusion of the study, comparative research at home and abroad on the front of the literature of the general comment on, and that the study of executive compensation incentive is still a long way to go. The fourth chapter mainly analyzes the domestic commercial banks listed on executive compensation incentive status as national bank. Important sectors of the economy, its management has its particularity, such as multiple business goals, the importance of risk control. Then introduces the domestic policies and regulations of executive compensation system, on the basis of detailed introduces the domestic bank executive compensation structure, and unbalanced panel data on executive compensation 16 the top three listed banks mean to do a simple descriptive statistics. The main sources of data disclosure in the listed commercial banks annual report and supplementary report. The fifth chapter introduces the EVA index. The relevant data of executive compensation has done a detailed introduction in the previous chapter, bank performance index plays an important role in the whole study. This chapter mainly introduces the related theory of EVA, the choice of indicators, model, adjusted EVA index calculation. In this chapter the calculation account for a large part, EVA The subject is the enterprise net profit after adjustment of business value based on the intermediate in the process of calculation involves the value of more data collection work is heavy, is the main source of the annual report of the bank, and the financial website, access to the letter stock analysis software. In the sixth chapter, we research into the test phase, draw the conclusion, and put forward the reasonable the front of the previous studies and suggestions. This paper based on the introduction, this chapter through the data collection, variable selection and model, with the help of the EViews software to realize the regression between executive compensation and bank performance, and the impact the current executive pay, a negative incentive. The performance is negatively related to the performance of state-owned bank executives payment of the bank, but not significant, non state-owned commercial bank executives pay significantly negative incentive for banks operating performance. On this basis, this chapter puts forward to the domestic city bank executives pay Three suggestions on the issue of remuneration incentive.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.3

【参考文献】