股权结构特征对高管薪酬—绩效敏感度的影响

发布时间：2018-01-07 06:26

本文关键词：股权结构特征对高管薪酬—绩效敏感度的影响　出处：《暨南大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着我国证券市场的壮大和发展，我国上市公司的队伍日益庞大，投资者对公司绩效的关注也引致其对公司高管薪酬激励制度的关注，如何建立科学有效合理的高管薪酬激励和监督制度，如何通过薪酬更好地体现高管的价值，如何根据公司的特点因地制宜地制定高管薪酬制度，都是目前我国上市公司高管薪酬制度建设中的突出问题，也是历来是国内外广大学者研究高管薪酬问题的热点和重点。国外大多数文献表明，高管薪酬与公司绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系，且国外学者目前的研究也基本支持了股权结构特征变量会影响高管的薪酬-绩效敏感度这一论点。但考虑到国外的研究多以发达国家的资本市场为研究对象，而我国是一个正处于经济转型期的发展中国家，市场经济体系在建立过程中，并不完善，因此国外研究结果对我国具有参考意义，但借鉴作用有待考察。而国内学者关于股权结构、高管薪酬、公司业绩的研究多是针对其中两两之间的相关性，将三者结合在一起进行相关性分析的研究并不多见。本文将在此基础上结合我国上市公司的实际情况，着重探讨公司股权结构特征对高管薪酬-绩效敏感度的影响。本文在梳理总结有关理论和国内国外相关文献的基础上，搜集了我国沪深两市所有的A股上市公司2010至2011年的年度数据作为样本，通过描述性统计、多元线性回归模型，研究探讨股权结构中第一大股东持股比例、前五大股东持股比例平方和、股权制衡指数等特征变量对高管薪酬-绩效敏感度的影响。研究发现，第一大股东持股比例越高将提高公司的高管薪酬-绩效敏感度；前五大股东持股比例平方和越高将提高公司的高管薪酬-绩效敏感度；第一大股东持股比例超过50%时会在一定程度削弱公司的高管薪酬-绩效敏感度；股权制衡指数升高将减少高管的薪酬水平。同时本文也对比研究了国有上市公司和非国有上市公司的股权结构特征变量对其高管薪酬-绩效敏感度的影响，但并未发现实际控制人性质会造成这种影响的区别。根据研究结论，本文提出了以下几点建议：一是寻求有效的股权结构，在我国目前的市场环境和经济体制下，相对集中的股权结构是更为有效的公司治理结构，保持股权的集中度是必要的。二是继续推进国有企业产权改革，，促进其产权多元化。三是促进高管激励方式多元化发展，引进并创新高管激励机制，同时提高高管薪酬透明度，不仅在额度的披露上作出硬性规定，也应要求上市公司对高管薪酬的结构等其他方面进行披露。
[Abstract]:With the growth and development of China's securities market, listed companies in China's increasingly large contingent of investors, the performance of the company also caused the attention of the executive compensation incentive system, how to establish a scientific and effective and reasonable incentive and supervision system, how to better reflect the executive compensation through the value of the company, how to the characteristics of executive compensation system according to local conditions to develop, is the current outstanding problems in the construction of executive compensation in Listed Companies in China, and has always been a hot point and focus of the research of executive compensation at home and abroad. Most of the foreign literature shows that there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance, and the current research abroad scholars also support the basic characteristics of the ownership structure variables will affect the executive compensation performance sensitivity of this argument. But considering the foreign research Study on the capital market of developed countries as the research object, while China is a developing country is in the period of economic transition, the market economy system is not perfect in the process of establishment, therefore, foreign research results have reference significance to our country, but the reference to be investigated. While the domestic scholars on the ownership structure, executive compensation. Study on the performance of the company is to which the correlation between the 22, the three together are correlation analysis are rare. In this paper, on the basis of the actual situation of Chinese listed companies, with characteristics of the ownership structure affect the sensitivity of executive compensation performance.
This paper summarizes relevant theories and the domestic and foreign literature, the annual data collected in Shanghai and Shenzhen two of all A shares of listed companies from 2010 to 2011 as samples, through descriptive statistics, multivariate linear regression model, study the largest shareholder shareholding structure, the proportion of top five shareholders square and the impact of equity balance index and other variables sensitivity to executive compensation performance. The study found that the higher the proportion of the first shareholder will improve the company's executive compensation performance sensitivity; the proportion of top five shareholders and the higher the square will improve the company's executive compensation performance sensitivity; the first big shareholder the proportion of more than 50% will weaken the company's executive compensation performance sensitivity to a certain degree; equity balance index increased will reduce the level of executive compensation. At the same time, comparative research The influence of ownership structure variables on the executive pay performance sensitivity of state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies is studied. However, the difference between the actual controller nature and the executive pay performance is not found.
According to the research conclusion, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: one is to seek effective equity structure, in the current market environment and the economy, the relative concentration of ownership structure is a more effective corporate governance, maintaining equity concentration is necessary. The two is to continue to promote the reform of property rights of state-owned enterprises. To promote the diversification of property rights. The three is to promote diversification of executive incentives, the introduction and innovation of executive incentive mechanism, and improve the transparency of executive compensation, not only made in the amount of mandatory disclosure, should also require listed companies on executive compensation structure and other aspects of the disclosure.

【学位授予单位】：暨南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92;F275

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