信息对称悖论与中小企业融资行为

发布时间：2018-01-09 01:23

本文关键词：信息对称悖论与中小企业融资行为　出处：《上海经济研究》2011年10期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：由于银行与中小企业之间信息不对称以及大银行对规模效应的要求,中小企业的融资难问题至今未能化解。本文为近年来我国民间兴起的中小企业互助融资模式构建了一个数理模型。理论分析表明:第一,银企之间存在信息对称悖论,也即银行一味要求企业提供完全信息,会导致双亏;适度信息不对称则能实现双赢;第二,一定条件下,企业房屋、设备等实物类硬资本与经营能力、财务状况、历史信用等信息类软资本之间具有替代关系;第三,中小企业通过互助融资模式能拆借到所需的软硬资本,并能根据意愿隐匿财务信息,从而有利于它们的生存和发展;此外,中小企业还能通过集体这个"最后借款人"增加资信等级,并使银行调高收益预期,从而最终可实现交换的帕累托最优。
[Abstract]:Due to the requirements of information asymmetry between banks and SMEs and banks to scale effect, the small and medium-sized enterprise financing difficult problem has failed to resolve. This paper is the rise of China's private small and medium-sized enterprises in recent years mutual financing mode to build a mathematical model. The theoretical analysis shows that: first, there is a symmetric information paradox between the bank, the bank just ask the enterprise to provide complete information, will lead to a double deficit; moderate information asymmetry can achieve a win-win situation; second, the housing enterprises under certain conditions, financial condition, equipment and other physical hard capital and management ability, and there is an alternative relationship between the history of credit information such as the type of soft capital; third, small and medium-sized enterprises through mutual financing mode lending to the required hardware capital, and according to the intention of hiding financial information, which is conducive to their survival and development; in addition, the small and medium-sized enterprise can also through the collective The "last borrower" increases the credit rating and makes the bank higher earnings expectations, thus ultimately achieving the Pareto optimality of the exchange.

【作者单位】：重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;西北大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(70703038) 全国教育科学规划课题(EFA080248)的资助
【分类号】：F276.3
【正文快照】： 一、引言在中国,计划体制留下了大而规范的银行,市场经济体制形成的过程中产生了大量小而不规范的中小企业。一般而言,国有大银行为了实现信贷业务的规模效应不希望向中小企业发放贷款,而且由于绝大多数中小企业缺乏合格的抵押品,财务信息也不健全,致使国有大银行更不愿意向

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