商业银行股权结构与冒险行为、破产风险关系的实证研究——基于14家上市商业银行面板数据的分析

发布时间：2018-01-11 02:14

本文关键词：商业银行股权结构与冒险行为、破产风险关系的实证研究——基于14家上市商业银行面板数据的分析　出处：《上海经济研究》2014年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文从我国14家上市商业银行2008-2012年的面板数据出发,通过实证模型分析商业银行股权结构与冒险行为、破产风险之间的关系。结果表明:政府直接持股作为一种次优手段,抑制了银行资产配置过程中的冒险行为,风险偏好更趋于保守;第2-10股东或持股超过5%的股东持股对银行的冒险行为和破产风险关系不显著,中小股东对大股东没有起到制衡作用;外资股东的存在对银行的冒险行为不存在稳定性影响;较高的资本充足率增大了银行的冒险行为,促使银行在作投资决策时会比较大胆激进;银行总资产规模越大,抗风险能力越强。鉴于此,本文提出:一是健全和完善银行内部治理机制;二是注意政府持股可能产生的"软约束问题",规范政府行为,减少政府干预;三是增强债权人对银行的市场约束能力。
[Abstract]:Based on the panel data of 14 listed commercial banks in China from 2008 to 2012, this paper analyzes the equity structure and risk-taking behavior of commercial banks through empirical model. The relationship between bankruptcy risk. The results show that: as a kind of sub-optimal means, the government direct ownership inhibits the risk-taking behavior in the process of asset allocation, and the risk preference tends to be more conservative; The relationship between the risk-taking behavior and bankruptcy risk of the bank is not significant for the 2-10 shareholder or the shareholder holding more than 5% shares, and the minority shareholder has no check and balance effect on the large shareholder. The existence of foreign shareholders has no effect on the stability of banks' risk-taking behavior; The higher capital adequacy ratio increases the risk-taking behavior of banks and makes them more bold and aggressive when making investment decisions. The larger the total assets of banks, the stronger the ability to resist risks. In view of this, this paper puts forward the following points: first, perfect and perfect the internal governance mechanism of banks; Second, we should pay attention to the "soft constraint problem" which may arise from the government ownership, standardize the government behavior and reduce the government intervention; Third, enhance the market restraint ability of creditors to the bank.
【作者单位】：中国人民银行宁波市中心支行;
【分类号】：F832.33
【正文快照】： 美国次贷危机引发全球性的金融危机,而不断发酵的欧洲主权债务危机,将西方银行业危机推到更加令人担忧的层面。此轮金融危机给银行业带来了巨大的损失,同时也反映了相关银行在公司治理上的严重缺陷,控制性大股东侵占行为、风险监管的缺位使得银行追逐短期利益,不合理的股权结

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