晋升压力、官员任期与城市商业银行的贷款行为

发布时间：2018-01-21 13:41

本文关键词： 晋升压力官员任期城市商业银行贷款行为　出处：《经济研究》2011年12期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：基于晋升激励的视角,本文以城市商业银行样本验证了政府股东的"政治观"。本文考察了地方官员的晋升压力及任期对城商行贷款行为的影响。结果表明晋升压力大时,城商行会减少贷款,但官员任期会弱化这种作用;从期限结构看,减少的是短期贷款,且会增加中长期贷款。同时城商行会减少批发零售业而增加建筑、房地产业贷款,也会有较高的集中度、关联贷款及不良贷款率,且除关联贷款外,官员任期大多对二者关系有强化作用。进一步的研究显示,晋升压力会通过增加中长期贷款、增加房地产贷款、提高集中度的途径形成不良贷款,且在官员考核中增加环境、民生指标能够有效抑制不良贷款的累积。
[Abstract]:From the perspective of promotion motivation. This paper verifies the "political view" of government shareholders with the sample of city commercial banks. This paper examines the influence of the promotion pressure of local officials and the tenure of tenure on the loan behavior of city commercial banks. The results show that the promotion pressure is high. City-Merchants will reduce lending, but the term of office of officials will weaken this role; From the term structure, the reduction is short-term loans, and will increase medium- and long-term loans. At the same time, city commercial banks will reduce the wholesale and retail trade and increase construction, real estate loans, will also have a higher concentration. Related loans and non-performing loan rates, with the exception of related loans, the term of office of most of the relationship between the two strengthened. Further research shows that promotion pressure will increase real estate loans by increasing medium- and long-term loans. The way to improve the concentration of non-performing loans, and to increase the environment in the assessment of officials, livelihood indicators can effectively curb the accumulation of non-performing loans.
【作者单位】：南开大学公司治理研究中心;山东大学经济学院金融学系;
【基金】：国家社科基金重大项目(10ZD&035) 教育部新世纪优秀人才计划(NCET-10-0517);教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(08JJD630007)的阶段性研究成果国家自然科学基金项目(71172066)
【分类号】：F832.4
【正文快照】： 一、引言政府对银行的所有权在世界范围内广泛存在(La Porta et al.,2002),此时银行的行为不可避免要受到政府的干预和影响,因此在研究银行问题时,考虑政府对金融资源的控制是非常必要的(Dinc,2005)。尽管早期的“发展观”认为政府股权有利于金融发展,但自Kornai(1979)、Shlei

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