我国资本市场发展对企业投融资行为的影响研究

发布时间：2018-02-04 23:08

本文关键词： 不完美资本市场融资约束企业投资投资-现金流敏感性　出处：《山东大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：经典的MM理论认为在资本市场完美的条件下,企业投资决策与融资决策无关。然而现实的资本市场并不完美,大多存在信息不对称、代理问题以及交易成本等缺陷,这些问题导致企业投资行为与融资行为紧密相连。这为在资本市场不完美条件下,检验资本市场发展对企业投融资行为的影响提供了契机。我国资本市场伴随着市场经济改革逐步建立起来,在资源配置中起到越来越重要的作用,并取得了前所未有的发展。我国资本市场发展是否克服了自身存在的缺陷,缓解了我国企业融资约束现象,改善了企业投资行为?这有待于检验。本文从这个思路出发,主要研究资本市场发展通过信息不对称以及企业代理问题对我国企业投融资行为产生的影响。本文对我国资本市场发展过程进行了梳理,并从理论角度出发,研究了资本市场发展对企业投融资行为的影响机制。资本市场发展主要通过信贷可得性原理、市场分割原理、交易成本以及信息不对称影响企业的外部融资能力,信息不对称对企业融资能力影响最持久。而企业融资约束主要通过债务积压原理以及代理成本影响企业的投资行为,代理成本理论是其中的主要因素。在以上理论分析基础之上,本文建立了资本市场发展影响企业融资约束、企业投资行为的一个分析框架。本文采用美国梅肯研究院(Milken Institute)公布的指标Capital Access Index衡量我国资本市场发展程度。选择了2000年至2010年沪深两市470家制造业公司平衡面板数据,采用系统广义矩(GMM)估计方法检资本市场发展对企业投融资行为的影响。在按照所有权进行分组的情况下,得出了一些有益的结论。结论认为：中央国有企业(央企)和地方国有企业都表现出了较强的公司代理成本问题,使企业投资对内部现金流敏感,表现为人为的融资约束。央企的代理问题导致企业过度投资,地方国有企业代理问题导致企业经营者为个人以及领导集团谋利。受资本市场投资者不断成熟以及地方国企经营能力不足的影响,资本市场更倾向于为央企而不是地方国企融资,进而表现出央企过度投资要比地_方国有企业严重。经过检验,资本市场发展并没有显著的缓解国有企业的代理问题,过度投资行为没有得到改善。民营企业投资对内部现金流敏感的主要原因在于民营企业与外部融资环境的信息不对称,信息不对称导致了民营企业外部融资溢价,产生了融资约束,进而导致民营企业投资不足。经检验资本市场发展通过降低信息不对称有效的缓解了民营企业的融资约束,改善了民营企业的投资不足。最后,本文根据研究结果给出了相应的政策建议。
[Abstract]:The classical MM theory holds that under the perfect condition of capital market, the enterprise investment decision has nothing to do with the financing decision. However, the real capital market is not perfect, and most of the information asymmetry exists. The problems of agency and transaction cost lead to the firm's investment behavior being closely related to the financing behavior, which is under the imperfect condition of the capital market. It provides an opportunity to examine the influence of the development of capital market on the investment and financing behavior of enterprises. With the reform of market economy, China's capital market is gradually established and plays an increasingly important role in the allocation of resources. And has achieved unprecedented development. Has the development of China's capital market overcome its own shortcomings, ease the phenomenon of corporate financing constraints, and improve enterprise investment behavior? From this perspective, this paper mainly studies the influence of capital market development on the investment and financing behavior of Chinese enterprises through asymmetric information and agency problems. This paper combs the development process of our country's capital market, and studies the influence mechanism of the capital market development on the enterprise's investment and financing behavior from the angle of theory. The capital market development is mainly through the principle of credit availability. The principle of market segmentation, transaction cost and information asymmetry affect the external financing ability of enterprises. Asymmetric information has the most lasting effect on the financing ability of enterprises. Financing constraints mainly affect the investment behavior of enterprises through the principle of debt overstocking and agency costs. Agency cost theory is one of the main factors. On the basis of the above theoretical analysis, this paper establishes an analytical framework for the influence of the development of capital market on the financing constraints and investment behavior of enterprises. This paper adopts Milken Institute, Macken Research Institute, USA. Published indicators Capital Access. Index measures the development of China's capital market. It selects the balance panel data of 470 manufacturing companies from 2000 to 2010 in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. The system generalized moment GMMs (GMMM) estimation method is used to examine the influence of the development of capital market on the investment and financing behavior of enterprises. In the case of grouping according to ownership. Some useful conclusions are drawn. It is concluded that both central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have shown a strong corporate agency cost problem, which makes enterprise investment sensitive to internal cash flow. Performance of human financing constraints. The agency problem of central enterprises leads to overinvestment. The agency problem of the local state-owned enterprises leads the business operators to profit for individuals and leading groups. It is influenced by the maturity of the investors in the capital market and the insufficiency of the management ability of the local state-owned enterprises. The capital market is more inclined to finance central enterprises than local state-owned enterprises, which shows that the overinvestment of central enterprises is more serious than that of local state-owned enterprises. The development of capital market has not significantly alleviated the agency problem of state-owned enterprises. Excessive investment behavior has not been improved. The main reason that private enterprises are sensitive to internal cash flow is the asymmetric information between private enterprises and external financing environment. Asymmetric information leads to the external financing premium of private enterprises, resulting in financing constraints. By reducing information asymmetry, the financing constraints of private enterprises are effectively alleviated, and the insufficient investment of private enterprises is improved. Finally, according to the research results, this paper gives the corresponding policy recommendations.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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