我国上市公司管理层股权激励与公司业绩的实证研究

发布时间：2018-03-15 10:22

本文选题：股权激励　切入点：公司业绩　出处：《天津财经大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2006年我国股权分置改革之后,上市公司股权激励相关法律法规相继出台,为我国上市公司实施管理层股权激励提供了法律依据。经过最初几年的整顿与规范,越来越多的上市公司公布管理层股权激励计划。股权激励作为一种长期激励机制,旨在降低代理成本,提高经营效率,以实现股东权益最大化,源于西方发达国家,上市公司通过这种制度提高了公司业绩,促进了公司发展,鉴于我国经济制度与西方国家存在较大差异,股权激励在我国的实施能否能够提高公司业绩是值得关注的。本文从基本激励理论出发,在充分研究国内外大量文献的基础上,结合公司业绩评价相关理论提出了两点假设,本文假设管理层股权激励能够提高公司业绩,且国有性质公司与非国有性质公司管理层股权激励对公司业绩的影响不同。本文选取2006-2011年公布股权激励计划的全体上市公司为样本,在剔除数据不全的公司后进行实证研究,发现我国总体上市公司管理层股权激励能够提高公司业绩,与我国大多数学者研究结果相同；另一方面,本文将总体样本划分为国有性质与非国有性质上市公司两个样本,分别进行实证检验,发现非国有性质上市公司管理层股权激励对公司业绩产生促进作用,而国有性质上市公司管理层股权激励水平与公司业绩并不存在显著的线性关系。然而分析我国上市公司的业绩,国有性质上市公司平均业绩明显高于非国有性质上市公司,且各家经营业绩保持在相对稳定的水平上,非国有性质上市公司不乏亏损之流,也存在高净资产收益率的优秀个体,业绩水平参差不齐,总体差于国有性质上市公司。综合上述两方面,本文认为,非国有性质上市公司适合发展股权层股权激励,目前国有企业上市公司管理层股权激励与公司业绩关系不明显,建议高管寻求适合自身发展的激励模式帮助企业提高业绩。
[Abstract]:After the reform of split share structure in 2006, the relevant laws and regulations of equity incentive of listed companies were issued one after another, which provided the legal basis for the implementation of equity incentive of management of listed companies in China. After the first few years of rectification and regulation, More and more listed companies publish management equity incentive plans. As a long-term incentive mechanism, equity incentive aims to reduce agency cost, improve management efficiency, and realize the maximization of shareholders' rights and interests, which originates from western developed countries. Through this system, listed companies improve their corporate performance and promote their development. In view of the great differences between China's economic system and western countries, it is worth paying attention to whether the implementation of equity incentives in China can improve the performance of companies. Starting from the basic incentive theory, based on the full study of a large number of literature at home and abroad, combined with the relevant theories of corporate performance evaluation, this paper puts forward two hypotheses, this paper assumes that management equity incentive can improve the performance of the company. And the impact of management equity incentive on corporate performance is different between state-owned companies and non-state-owned companies. This paper selects all listed companies published equity incentive plan from 2006 to 2011 as a sample and carries out empirical research after excluding companies with incomplete data. It is found that management equity incentive can improve corporate performance, which is the same as that of most scholars in China. On the other hand, this paper divides the total sample into state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies. The empirical test shows that the equity incentive of non-state-owned listed companies has a positive effect on the performance of the company. However, the average performance of state-owned listed companies is significantly higher than that of non-state-owned listed companies. Moreover, the operating performance of each company is kept at a relatively stable level, and the non-state-owned listed companies are not lack of losses, and there are excellent individuals with high net asset returns, and the performance level is uneven. On the basis of the above two aspects, this paper holds that the non-state-owned listed companies are suitable for the development of equity incentive. At present, the relationship between the management equity incentive and the performance of the listed companies is not obvious. It is suggested that executives seek incentive models suitable for their own development to help enterprises improve their performance.
【学位授予单位】：天津财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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