清洁发展机制下我国商业银行与企业间的博弈研究

发布时间：2018-03-21 11:42

本文选题：碳金融　切入点：清洁发展机制　出处：《武汉理工大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着全球气候变暖问题的日益严重,人们在生产与生活过程中拥有的碳排方空间从免费的公共资源变为受重点约束的考量因素,同时低碳经济的发展成为纷纷关注的焦点问题。而金融体系的支持与推动对于低碳经济的发展具有重要的影响,以碳排放权为核心的碳金融,作为解决气候变化问题进行金融创新的主要方向,是促进经济与社会可持续发展的重要经济手段。清洁发展机制(CDM)是我国作为发展中国家参与碳排放权交易的重要方式,对我国碳金融顺利发展发挥着重要作用。本文从博弈论的角度研究我国商业银行与生产企业在进行CDM项目建设上的决策行为会如何相互作用。第一部分详细论述了碳金融及清洁发展机制的基本理论并从经济学角度分析了CDM项目实施的可行性。在对我国CDM项目省市分布和减排类型建设现状进行深入分析基础上,提出了我国企业CDM项目建设及商业银行参与方面存在的问题。第二部分运用动态博弈的方法,通过建立两方三阶段动态博弈模型,分析商业银行支持CDM项目建设的业务开展和参与CDM项目企业是否按照规定进行减排生产的双方博弈行为。根据博弈结果总结出CDM项目的正常实施依赖于监管部门奖惩制度和银行对其业务开展监督的持续性。第三部分运用进化博弈的方法分析商业银行和企业在长期动态的博弈过程中行为的选择方向。通过构建进化博弈模型,求解复制动态方程的进化稳定策略和渐进稳定状态等方法讨论了监管部门的监管程度、银行开展力度和消费者关注程度的渐进稳定状态。根据博弈结果总结出,企业CDM项目参与的决策行为受到监管部门奖惩、商业银行等金融机构的承载和社会公众低碳意识的影响,以此为基础,认为应从政府等主管部门的激励和惩罚机制、商业银行推动机制、企业的参与机制方面促进我国CDM项目的建设和完善。第四部分为了进一步讨论在长期动态博弈过程中各参数对博弈各方的影响,通过计算机程序对进化博弈中的复制动态方程进行了数值仿真,并且仿真的结论进一步验证了博弈结果的正确性。最后,结合博弈模型的均衡分析结果,从政府、商业银行以及企业三个角度提出了相应的策略。政府作为监管部门应加强监管力度和完善奖惩制度,营造建设的大环境。商业银行应广泛开展相关创新业务来支持CDM项目发展,利用金融杠杆有力地促进自然和社会环境的良性发展。企业应积极参与适合自身的CDM项目,从而取得品牌宣传与推广的先机。
[Abstract]:As global warming becomes more acute, the amount of carbon space that people have in their production and lives has changed from a free public resource to a critical constraint. At the same time, the development of low-carbon economy has become the focus of attention, and the support and promotion of the financial system has an important impact on the development of low-carbon economy. As the main direction of financial innovation to solve the problem of climate change, it is an important economic means to promote sustainable economic and social development. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is an important way for China to participate in carbon emissions trading as a developing country. It plays an important role in the smooth development of carbon finance in China. From the perspective of game theory, this paper studies how the decision-making behavior of commercial banks and manufacturing enterprises in China will interact in the construction of CDM projects. The first part discusses the basic theories of carbon finance and clean development mechanism in detail. This paper analyzes the feasibility of implementing CDM project from the angle of economics. On the basis of in-depth analysis of the distribution of provinces and cities and the construction of emission reduction types of CDM projects in China, The problems in the construction of CDM projects and the participation of commercial banks in China are put forward. The second part uses the method of dynamic game to establish a two-party and three-stage dynamic game model. This paper analyzes the game behavior of commercial banks supporting the construction of CDM projects and whether the enterprises involved in CDM projects are engaged in emission reduction production in accordance with the regulations. Based on the results of the game, it is concluded that the normal implementation of CDM projects depends on the regulatory authorities. The third part uses the evolutionary game method to analyze the choice direction of commercial banks and enterprises in the long-term dynamic game process. The evolutionary stability strategy and the gradual stable state of solving the replicating dynamic equation are discussed in this paper. The degree of supervision, the degree of bank development and the degree of consumer concern are discussed. The decision-making behavior of enterprise CDM project participation is influenced by the reward and punishment of the regulatory department, the bearing capacity of the financial institution such as the commercial bank and the low carbon consciousness of the public. On the basis of this, the incentive and punishment mechanism of the government and other competent departments should be taken as the basis. In 4th, in order to further discuss the influence of the parameters on the game parties in the long-term dynamic game process, the commercial banks promote the construction and perfection of the CDM project in the aspect of the participation mechanism of the enterprises. The replicating dynamic equation in evolutionary game is numerically simulated by computer program, and the conclusion of simulation further verifies the correctness of the game result. Finally, combining the equilibrium analysis result of the game model, this paper puts forward the corresponding strategies from three angles of government, commercial bank and enterprise. The government should strengthen the supervision and perfect the reward and punishment system as the supervision department. Commercial banks should carry out relevant innovative business to support the development of CDM projects, and make use of financial leverage to promote the benign development of natural and social environment. Enterprises should actively participate in CDM projects suitable for themselves. In order to achieve brand publicity and promotion of the first opportunity.
【学位授予单位】：武汉理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.33;F279.2;F224.32

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