不完全隐性存款保险制度下银行信息披露与风险承担行为关系研究

发布时间：2018-04-08 12:50

本文选题：银行　切入点：信息披露　出处：《中南大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：摘要：市场约束与最低资本金约束,以及外部监管一起,共同成为新巴塞尔资本协议的三大支柱。市场约束的具体表现形式之一就是信息披露,银行向社会公开披露的信息会反映银行的经营状况和风险程度,投资者可以根据银行披露的信息做出不同的投资决策,对于承担风险较高的银行,投资者要求的回报也较高,所以均衡状态下银行会倾向于降低承担风险的水平来降低融资成本。这表明银行向市场披露信息越多,市场约束效应越强。然而,信息披露最终能充分发挥市场的约束效应存在一定前提条件,即只有当投资者对银行信息披露保持较高的敏感性时才有动力采取市场约束行动。我国政府曾对银行实施的多次救助显示,虽然我国尚未建立专门的存款保险制度,但是在我国,政府作为最后担保人的“隐性”存款保险制度已经存在,这势必会影响投资者对于银行风险信息的敏感度。我国实行的是一种不完全的隐性存款保险制度,即银行的类别不同,发生危机时获得政府救助的概率也不同。本文从博弈分析的视角探究银行与投资者之间的行为范式,深刻认知在隐性存款保险制度下信息披露与银行风险承担行为间的相互作用机理与机制,发现信息披露程度足够大时,发生危机时不一定得到国家全额本金救助的银行倾向于选择稳健的风险承担策略；隐性存款保险制度下,银行倾向于承担较大的风险且隐性存款保险程度会削弱信息披露对于银行风险承担的约束效应,并且本文通过实证分析证明了相关结论,具有重要的理论意义和应用价值,并据此提出政策建议：监管部门应提高银行强制信息披露水平,从而达到约束银行风险承担的目的；同时为了加强信息披露的作用,政府应逐步变革隐性存款保险制度为显性存款保险制度。这样不仅可以保障投资者的利益,也让银行明确自己的责任,同时也有利于提高投资者关注银行信息披露的积极性,为监管部门的政策制订提供重要的理论基础与决策支持。
[Abstract]:Absrtact: market constraint, minimum capital constraint and external supervision together become the three pillars of the new Basel Capital Accord.One of the specific forms of market constraints is information disclosure. The information disclosed by banks to the public will reflect the operating conditions and risk levels of banks. Investors can make different investment decisions according to the information disclosed by banks.For banks with higher risks, investors demand higher returns, so in equilibrium banks tend to lower the level of exposure to lower financing costs.This indicates that the more information banks disclose to the market, the stronger the market restraint effect.However, there are some preconditions for information disclosure to give full play to the market constraint effect, that is, only when investors maintain a high sensitivity to bank information disclosure can they take market restraint actions.Our government has carried out many rescues to the bank, although our country has not yet established a special deposit insurance system, but in our country, the "recessive" deposit insurance system, which the government acts as the last guarantor, already exists.This will inevitably affect the sensitivity of investors to bank risk information.What our country implements is an incomplete hidden deposit insurance system, that is, different types of banks and different probability of obtaining government assistance in the event of crisis.This paper explores the behavioral paradigm between banks and investors from the perspective of game analysis, and deeply recognizes the interaction mechanism and mechanism between information disclosure and risk-bearing behavior of banks under the implicit deposit insurance system.When it is found that the degree of information disclosure is large enough, the banks that do not necessarily get the state's full principal rescue in the event of a crisis tend to choose a sound risk-bearing strategy; under the implicit deposit insurance system,Banks tend to bear larger risks and the extent of implicit deposit insurance will weaken the constraint effect of information disclosure on banks' risk-taking, and this paper proves the relevant conclusions through empirical analysis, which has important theoretical significance and application value.On the basis of this, the author puts forward some policy suggestions: the regulatory authorities should improve the level of compulsory information disclosure of banks, so as to achieve the purpose of restraining banks from taking risks; at the same time, in order to strengthen the role of information disclosure,The government should gradually change the implicit deposit insurance system into the explicit deposit insurance system.This can not only protect the interests of investors, but also make banks clear of their own responsibilities, but also help improve the enthusiasm of investors to pay attention to bank information disclosure, and provide an important theoretical basis and decision support for the policy formulation of regulatory authorities.
【学位授予单位】：中南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.1

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