管理层特征对上市公司盈余管理影响的实证研究
发布时间:2018-04-19 17:42
本文选题:管理层特征 + 盈余管理 ; 参考:《沈阳工业大学》2013年硕士论文
【摘要】:上市公司会计信息的真实、可靠一直是我国资本市场健康、有序发展的关键因素。而上市公司的盈余管理行为又严重影响着公司会计信息质量,因此关注上市公司的盈余管理行为对保证我国资本市场健康运行至关重要。由于我国上市公司的管理层特征与企业盈余管理程度关系紧密。因此,研究公司管理层特征对上市公司盈余管理的影响,分析其成因、提出相应意见,对降低盈余管理程度提高上市公司会计信息质量具有重要意义。 本文在阐述了管理层特征与盈余管理关系相关理论的基础上,结合我国沪市A股上市公司的实际情况,选取了管理层持股比例、管理层报酬、管理层股权激励比例、独立董事比例、董事长与总经理二职兼任、政治关联、管理层年龄、性别比例为自变量,公司规模和资产负债率作为控制变量,用经过修正后的琼斯模型来对各个公司盈余管理行为进行计量。分别依据截面数据和面板数据分析上市公司管理层特征对盈余管理行为的影响。在截面数据方面,本文筛选了沪市A股640家上市公司作为样本,运用spss17.0软件进行多元回归分析。在面板数据方面,本文选取了562家上市公司从2008—2012年5年间共2810个样本值,运用Eviews6.0软件进行回归分析。 通过实证分析得到以下结论:无论是依据截面还是面板数据,管理层持股比例、管理层薪酬、政治关联性均通过1%的显著性水平检验,独董比例在截面数据分析中通过1%的显著性水平检验而在面板数据分析中通过5%的显著性水平检验,其中管理层持股比例、政治关联性都与盈余管理程度正相关,管理层薪酬与盈余管理程度负相关。截面数据分析中,独董比例与盈余管理程度负相关,,当加入时间因素后的面板数据分析中,独董比例与盈余管理程度正相关。同时在面板数据分析中,董事长与总经理二职兼任、管理层年龄也分别通过1%和5%的显著性水平检验。
[Abstract]:The true and reliable accounting information of listed companies is the key factor for the healthy and orderly development of China's capital market.The earnings management behavior of listed companies seriously affects the quality of accounting information, so it is very important to pay attention to the earnings management behavior of listed companies to ensure the healthy operation of our capital market.As the management characteristics of listed companies in China are closely related to the degree of earnings management.Therefore, it is of great significance to study the influence of management characteristics on earnings management of listed companies, analyze its causes, and put forward corresponding suggestions to reduce the degree of earnings management and improve the quality of accounting information of listed companies.Based on the theory of the relationship between management characteristics and earnings management and the actual situation of A-share listed companies in Shanghai stock market, this paper selects the proportion of management stock holding, management compensation, management equity incentive ratio.The proportion of independent directors, the second post of chairman and general manager, the political connection, the age of management, the sex ratio are independent variables, the size of the company and the ratio of assets and liabilities are the controlling variables.The modified Jones model is used to measure the earnings management behavior of each company.Based on cross-section data and panel data, this paper analyzes the influence of management characteristics on earnings management behavior of listed companies.In terms of cross-section data, this paper selects 640 A-share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange as a sample and carries out multivariate regression analysis with spss17.0 software.In terms of panel data, this paper selects a total of 2810 sample values of 562 listed companies from 2008 to 2012, and carries out regression analysis with Eviews6.0 software.Through the empirical analysis, the following conclusions are obtained: whether based on cross-section or panel data, management shareholding ratio, management compensation, political relevance all pass the significant level test of 1%.The proportion of independent directors is tested by 1% significance level in cross-section data analysis and 5% significance level test in panel data analysis. The proportion of management ownership and political relevance are all positively related to earnings management degree.There is a negative correlation between management compensation and earnings management.In the cross-section data analysis, the proportion of independent directors is negatively correlated with the degree of earnings management, and the proportion of independent directors is positively correlated with the degree of earnings management in panel data analysis after adding time factors.At the same time, in the panel data analysis, the chairman and the general manager hold the same post, and the management age also passes the significant level test of 1% and 5% respectively.
【学位授予单位】:沈阳工业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F832.51;F275;F272.91
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