外部约束机制监督与公司行为空间转换——由次贷危机引发的思考

发布时间：2018-06-11 11:17

本文选题：分析师跟进 + 盈余管理　；参考：《管理世界》2011年06期

【摘要】：外部约束机制为什么有时不能阻止资本市场危机事件(如次贷危机)的发生?本文以2007～2009年中国沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,以分析师跟进和盈余管理分别作为外部约束机制和公司行为的替代,通过实证检验两者之间的关系来对这一问题进行了深入分析。研究发现,分析师跟进会促使公司盈余管理向不易被识别的项目转移。这表明,在面对外部机制约束时,管理层会利用信息优势把动机更好地隐藏于不易被识别的空间。这给我们一个启示,外部约束机制没能制止危机事件的发生可能源于管理层太广的行为空间。越广的行为空间,越易帮助管理层逃避监督。因此,当资本市场新事物出现时,监管者尤其要关注其对管理层财务报告技术空间变化的影响。
[Abstract]:Why can't external restraint mechanism sometimes prevent the occurrence of capital market crisis (such as subprime mortgage crisis)? This paper takes the A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China from 2007 to 2009 as the research samples, and takes the follow-up of analysts and earnings management as the substitute for external constraint mechanism and corporate behavior, respectively. Through the empirical test of the relationship between the two to the in-depth analysis of this problem. Analysts follow up, the study found, prompting earnings management to shift to less recognizable items. This shows that in the face of external mechanism constraints, the management will use the information advantage to better hide the motivation in the less recognizable space. This gives us a revelation that the failure of the external constraint mechanism to prevent the occurrence of crisis events may be due to the management's wide behavior space. The wider the behavioral space, the easier it is to help management escape oversight. Therefore, when new things in capital markets appear, regulators should pay particular attention to their influence on the spatial change of management financial reporting technology.
【作者单位】：上海外国语大学国际金融贸易学院;上海财经大学会计与财务研究院/会计学院;上海财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(项目批准号:70972061) 教育部人文社科重点研究基地基金(项目批准号:06JJD630015) 上海财经大学211项目第3期、上海高校选拔培养优秀青年教师科研专项基金上海外国语大学青年教师科研创新团队项目的资助
【分类号】：F276.6;F832.51

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